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in the RECORD under Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.)

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Berry, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had agreed to the report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the House to the bill (S. 659) to amend the Higher Education Act of 1965, the Vocational Education Act of 1963, the General Education Provisions Act (creating a National Foundation for Postsecondary Education and a National Institute of Education), the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Public Law 874, 81st Congress, and related acts, and for other purposes.

The message also announced that the House had disagreed to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 14734) to authorize appropriations for the Department of State and for the U.S. Information Agency; agreed to the conference asked by the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. MORGAN, Mr. ZABLOCKI, Mr. HAYS, Mr. FOUNTAIN, Mr. FASCELL, Mr. MAILLIARD, Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN, Mr. BROOMFIELD, and Mr. THOMSON of Wisconsin were appointed managers on the part of the House at the conference.

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1972

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. [unclear]). Under the previous order, the [unclear] lays before the Senate S. 3390, a bill to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and for other purposes. The bill is stated by title.

The bill was read by title as follows:

A bill (S. 3390) to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and for other purposes.

The Senate proceeded to consider the bill, which had been reported from the Committee on Foreign Relations with an amendment to strike out all after the enacting clause and insert:

That this Act may be cited as the "Foreign Assistance Act of 1972".

OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION

SEC. 2. Section 234(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, relating to the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, is amended by striking out "(1) accept as evidence of indebtedness debt securities convertible to stock, but such debt securities shall not be converted to stock while held by the Corporation" and inserting in lieu thereof "(1) in its financing programs, acquire debt securities convertible to stock or rights to acquire stock, but such debt securities or rights shall not be converted to stock while held by the Corporation".

REFUGEE RELIEF ASSISTANCE

SEC. 3. Section 491 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, relating to refugee relief assistance, is amended by striking out "1972" and "\$250,000,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "1973" and "\$50,000,000", respectively.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

SEC. 4. Chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, relating to military assistance, is amended as follows:

(1) In section 504(a), relating to authori-

zation, strike out "\$500,000,000 for the fiscal year 1972" and insert in lieu thereof "\$600,000,000 for the fiscal year 1973".

(2) In section 506(a), relating to special authority, strike out "1972" wherever it appears and insert in lieu thereof "1973".

(3) In section 513, relating to military assistance authorizations for Thailand—

(A) insert in the section caption immediately after "Thailand", a comma and the following: "Laos, and South Vietnam"; and

(B) add at the end thereof the following new sentence: "After June 30, 1973, no military assistance shall be furnished by the United States to Laos or South Vietnam directly or through any other foreign country unless that assistance is authorized under this Act or the Foreign Military Sales Act."

(4) (A) In section 514(a)(1), relating to special foreign country accounts, strike out "10" wherever it appears and insert in lieu thereof "25".

(B) The amendment made by subparagraph (A) of this paragraph is effective July 1, 1972.

(5) At the end of such chapter 2, add the following new section:

"SEC. 515. LIMITATIONS ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS.—(a) No funds authorized or appropriated under any provision of law shall be made available by any means by any officer, employee, or agency of the United States Government for the purpose of financing any military operations by foreign forces in Laos, North Vietnam, or Thailand outside the borders of the country of the government or person receiving such funds unless Congress has specifically authorized or specifically authorizes the making of funds available for such purpose and designates the area where military operations financed by such funds may be undertaken outside such borders.

"(b) Upon requesting Congress to make any such authorization, the President shall provide to Congress a copy of any agreement proposed to be entered into with any such government or person and the complete details of the proposed military operation. Upon such authorization by Congress, the President shall provide a copy of any such agreement and thereafter of all plans and details of such operation."

SECURITY SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE

SEC. 5. Section 532 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, relating to authorization for security supporting assistance, is amended by striking out "1972" and "\$618,000,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "1973" and "\$650,000,000", respectively.

TRANSFER BETWEEN ACCOUNTS

SEC. 6. Section 610(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, relating to transfer between accounts, is amended—

(1) by inserting immediately after "except that" the designation "(1)"; and

(2) by inserting before the period at the end thereof a comma and the following: "and (2) no funds made available for any provision of part I of this Act may be transferred to, or consolidated with, funds made available for any provision of part II of this Act (including chapter 4 of such part II)".

PROHIBITION AGAINST FURNISHING ASSISTANCE

SEC. 7. Section 620 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, relating to prohibitions against furnishing assistance, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:

"(x) No assistance may be furnished under part II of this Act (including chapter 4 of such part), and no sale, credit sale, or guaranty with respect to defense articles or defense services may be made under the Foreign Military Sales Act, to, for, on behalf of the Governments of Pakistan, India (including Sikkim), Bangladesh, Nepal, Ceylon, the Maldives Islands, or Bhutan."

ALLOCATION AND REIMBURSEMENT AMONG AGENCIES

SEC. 8. Subsection (a) of section 632 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, relating to allocation and reimbursement among agencies, is repealed.

LIMITATIONS ON CAMBODIAN ASSISTANCE

SEC. 9. Section 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, relating to limitations upon assistance to or for Cambodia, is amended—

(1) by striking out "\$341,000,000" and "1972", wherever they appear in subsections (a) and (b) and inserting in lieu thereof "\$275,000,000" and "1973", respectively; and

(2) by inserting in subsection (g), after "section", a comma and the following: "or any amendment thereto".

FOREIGN MILITARY SALES

SEC. 10. The Foreign Military Sales Act is amended as follows:

(1) In section 31(a), relating to authorization, strike out "1972" and insert in lieu thereof "1973".

(2) In section 31(b), relating to aggregate ceiling on foreign military sales credits, strike out "1972" and insert in lieu thereof "1973".

EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES

SEC. 11. Section 8(b) of the Act entitled "An Act to amend the Foreign Military Sales Act, and for other purposes", approved January 12, 1971, as amended, is amended by striking out "\$185,000,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "\$150,000,000".

HOSTILITIES IN INDOCHINA

SEC. 12. (a) Notwithstanding any provision of this or any other Act, all United States military forces, including combat and support forces, stationed in South Vietnam, shall be withdrawn in a safe and orderly manner from South Vietnam no later than August 31, 1972. No funds shall be authorized, appropriated, or used for the purpose of maintaining any United States military forces, including combat and support forces in South Vietnam after August 31, 1972.

(b) The involvement of United States military forces, land, sea, or air for the purpose of maintaining, supporting, or engaging in hostilities in or over Indochina shall terminate after—

(1) an agreement for a verified cease-fire between United States Forces and the National Liberation Front and those allied with the National Liberation Front, and

(2) the release of all United States prisoners of war held by the Government of North Vietnam and forces allied with such Government, and

(3) an accounting for all Americans missing in action who have been held by or known to such Government of such forces. An accounting for such American personnel referred to above shall be subject to verification by the International Red Cross or any other international body mutually agreed to by the President of the United States and the Government of North Vietnam.

AZORES AND BAHRAIN AGREEMENTS

SEC. 13. Commencing thirty days after the date of enactment of this Act, no funds may be obligated or expended to carry out the agreements signed by the United States with Portugal and Bahrain, relating to the use by the United States of military bases in the Azores and Bahrain, until the agreement, with respect to which the obligation or expenditure is to be made, is submitted to the Senate as a treaty for its advice and consent.

PROHIBITING OBLIGATION OR EXPENDITURE OF FUNDS FOR CERTAIN AGREEMENTS TO WHICH THE SENATE HAS NOT GIVEN ITS ADVICE AND CONSENT

SEC. 14. No funds may be obligated or expended to carry out any agreement entered into, on or after the date of enactment of this Act, between the United States Govern-

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ment and the government of any foreign country (1) providing for the establishment of a military installation in that country at which combat units of the Armed Forces of the United States are to be assigned to duty, (2) revising or extending the provisions of any such agreement, or (3) providing for the storage of nuclear weapons or the renewal of agreements relating to such storage, unless such agreement is submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent and unless the Senate gives its advice and consent to such agreement. Nothing in this section shall be construed as authorizing the President to enter into any agreement relating to any other matter, with or without the advice and consent of the Senate.

AUTHORITY FOR THE COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE TO FILE REPORTS

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare be permitted to file reports until midnight tonight.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SENATOR TUNNEY AND SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD ON MONDAY, JUNE 12, 1972

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that on Monday next, immediately after the two leaders have been recognized under the standing order, the distinguished junior Senator from California (Mr. TUNNEY) be recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes, and that he be followed by the junior Senator from West Virginia (Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD) for not to exceed 15 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

QUORUM CALL

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT—BILL ADJUSTING RATES OF PAY FOR GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES—H.R. 9092

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at such time as H.R. 9092, an act to provide an equitable system for fixing and adjusting the rates of pay for prevailing rate employees of the Government, is called up and made the pending business before the Senate, there be a time limitation on debate as follows: Two hours on the bill, to be equally divided and controlled by the distinguished Senator from Hawaii (Mr. Ford) and the distinguished Senator from Wyoming (Mr. McGEE); the

time on any amendment, debatable motion, or appeal be limited to 30 minutes, to be equally divided between and controlled by the mover of such and the manager of the bill (Mr. McGEE); provided further, that Senators in control of time on the bill may yield therefrom to Senators on any amendment, debatable motion, or appeal; provided further that if the manager of the bill should favor any amendment, debatable motion or appeal, then the time in opposition thereto would be under the control of the distinguished Republican leader or his designee; and provided finally, that no nongermane amendments may be in order.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, the junior Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Cook) will be with the crew of Apollo 16 on Monday. I ask unanimous consent that he be granted leave of the Senate on Monday next.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PROGRAM

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, the program for Monday is as follows:

The Senate will meet at 11 a.m. After the two leaders have been recognized under the standing order, the distinguished junior Senator from California (Mr. TUNNEY) will be recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes, after which the junior Senator from West Virginia, now speaking, will be recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes, following which there will be a period for the transaction of routine morning business for not to exceed 30 minutes, with statements therein limited to 3 minutes.

At the conclusion of the period for the transaction of routine morning business, the Senate will resume consideration of S. 3390, the bill to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and for other purposes.

At 2:30 p.m. the Senate will proceed to conduct three consecutive rollcall votes on the following treaties, and in the order stated: One, the International Plant Protection Convention; two, the Convention To Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism; three, the Treaty with Honduras on the Swan Islands.

Following the rollcall votes on the aforementioned treaties, the Senate will resume consideration of the Foreign Assistance Act.

So Senators are reminded that there will be at least three rollcall votes on Monday, these occurring back-to-back and beginning at 2:30 p.m.

Mr. President, as a postscript, may I say that the Senate will continue consideration of the Foreign Assistance Act on Tuesday through the remainder of next week or until such time as the bill

is disposed of. The leadership, however, expects and hopes to operate, beginning with Tuesday, a two-track system where necessary.

I might add that Senators should be alerted to the possibility of Saturday sessions beginning next week and continuing until the Democratic Convention, there is a very strong possibility of Saturday sessions until the Republican Convention.

There is much work to be done, so in order to get the work done and remaining "must" legislation enacted, it is highly likely that there will be long sessions and at least the possibility of some Saturday sessions.

I say this just so Senators may be on notice and may act accordingly.

ADJOURNMENT TO MONDAY, JUNE 12, 1972, AT 11 A.M.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, if there be no further business to come before the Senate, I move, in accordance with the previous order, that the Senate stand in adjournment until 11 o'clock a.m. on Monday next.

The motion was agreed to; and at 5:32 p.m. the Senate adjourned until Monday, June 12, 1972, at 11 a.m.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate June 8, 1972:

DIPLOMATIC AND FOREIGN SERVICE

W. Beverly Carter, Jr., of Pennsylvania, a Foreign Service information officer of class 1, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the United Republic of Tanzania.

C. Robert Moore, of Washington, a Foreign Service Officer of the class of career minister, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Federal Republic of Cameroon.

CONFIRMATIONS

Executive nominations confirmed by the Senate June 8, 1972:

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

William A. Carey, of Illinois, to be General Counsel of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for a term of 4 years.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Richard G. Kleindienst of Arizona to be Attorney General.

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

George P. Shultz, of Illinois, to be Secretary of the Treasury.

Charles E. Walker, of Connecticut, to be Deputy Secretary of the Treasury.

Edwin S. Cohen, of Virginia, to be Under Secretary of the Treasury.

John Michael Hennessy, of Massachusetts, to be an Assistant Secretary of the Treasury. Lee H. Henkel, Jr., of Georgia, to be an Assistant General Counsel in the Department of the Treasury (Chief Counsel for the Internal Revenue Service).

U.S. DISTRICT COURTS

Charles W. Joiner, of Michigan, to be a U.S. district judge for the eastern district of Michigan.

Albert W. Coffrin, of Vermont, to be a U.S. district judge for the district of Vermont.

the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and for other purposes.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, my position is very simple and short on an amendment that is also simple and short.

This is not a contest or a disagreement, or anything of that kind, between two committees of the Senate. My attitude is just to try to keep the lines straight and keep the record straight with respect to the actual military operation, the fighting in Indochina.

The matter we have before us now, S. 3390, is the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and its continuation. This is an annual measure, and it includes our worldwide military assistance program, wherever it applies.

However, after we really got into the war in Vietnam on an appreciable scale and were paying the cost of the equipment, the weapons, and really the operation of the army of South Vietnam, plus the Koreans, who are also there, and also some other allies in a much smaller way, and after we were carrying that load, running into the millions of dollars for years, the machinery, the book-keeping, the accounting of our military assistance program—ordinarily called MAP—proved inadequate and inefficient when it came to the handling of the vast sums.

MAP is a peace program. It is military aid for peace, and goes to a great many countries. It is administered by the State Department under a regular, prescribed system and distribution. Military aid to South Vietnam during the fighting of this war is really, as I have said, a war measure. It is war money and it involves taking care of a fighting army under battle conditions. So we just have to have a different system altogether.

Mr. McNamara, then Secretary of Defense, appeared before our committee and testified to the inadequacy of the ordinary MAP system in meeting this problem. He asked that the matter be transferred over to the Armed Services Committee—it was not a choice between committees—to let that committee authorize what they saw fit in the way of money for our own forces in that area, for U.S. forces. All that money for supplies and everything else was commingled, anyway, for our troops and their troops. That money would be kept track of and Congress would have control over it, but it would come from a different source. It would come from the Department of Defense. That was Mr. McNamara's recommendation, and the Foreign Relations Committee informally agreed to that. It has worked since 1966, and we have gotten along all right.

This had been gone into before. Since I have become chairman I have known about it, and our committee has gone into it very carefully. Our staff has worked on it. We have called on them for a complete accounting of that money and have called on them for an accounting of the amount of money the Department of Defense has spent in different countries. They have supplied the information. We put it out on the table when the bills were being marked up last year and the year before. We had plenty of discussion about it. The Senator from Missouri was

very much interested in it and was very helpful in it. He and I had some difference of opinion about it, but one thing we did—we worked out an amendment that we finally agreed on. Anyway, the two of us did.

This year we have worked on it again. We did not quite reach an agreement. We did not quite get to that point. The pending bill provides that, after fiscal 1973, all this would go back to the Foreign Relations Committee. I am not suggesting the Foreign Relations Committee would not do a good job on it. I just say that if we put it back into MAP, we are going to have an inadequate system. We are going to have a source of money in the State Department to pay for the fighting that is being carried on by the military, and we will run into the same snags and the same unbearable burdens that existed previously.

My amendment is to strike that amendment in the bill and await events, and just as soon as the hostilities stop over there, or even as soon as we have a cease-fire agreement carried out with evidence of permanence, I would be willing to let the matter go back to the Foreign Relations Committee, or let the Senate do that.

As evidence of my willingness, we agreed last year that jurisdiction over funds for Thailand would be sent to the Foreign Relations Committee, because the fighting was not going on there. At least, the prospect was that there would not be any fighting there, and I agreed to let this jurisdiction go back to the Foreign Relations Committee.

I have the same attitude now toward South Vietnam, Laos, and the other countries, as I had last year toward Thailand. We were hoping last year the war would be over by now, but it is not, so we have to look realities in the face.

I urge the Senate, for the reasons I have assigned, to strike this part of the proposed bill, to await events. The matter can be considered at any time next year.

The Senator from Alabama (Mr. SPARKMAN) is familiar with this matter. I see him on his feet. I am glad to yield to the Senator.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator. Of course, I agree with what the Senator has said about what we might call more or less an understanding that we had. Last year, for example, the Foreign Relations Committee had this same provision in the bill, and here on the floor of the Senate, as the Senator has pointed out, all of that part relating to countries other than Thailand was stricken from the bill. Thailand was transferred to the MAP program. The Senator at that time made a statement somewhat alone the lines of his remarks this morning. I will quote what he said last year on this issue. He said:

I am willing that in the future jurisdiction with respect to Southeast Asia be returned to the Committee on Foreign Relations. I think that while we are there and our men are there and the activities are going on, we ought to keep it where it is because they have to be considered together.

As I understand, that is the same argument the Senator presents at this time.

Mr. STENNIS. Yes.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Before we get to the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1973, undoubtedly we will be out of that war. In fact, the Mansfield amendment which is in this bill requires that—

Mr. SYMINGTON. Did the Senator say fiscal 1973?

Mr. SPARKMAN. No, I said the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1973. The Mansfield amendment which is in this bill requires that all forces be removed from South Vietnam by August 31 of this year. In other words, I think all of us will agree that it is a matter of a relatively short time until we are going to be out of that war.

Let me say something else. In past years, when we have had the military program and the economic program—we used to have them in two parts—I felt very strongly that we ought not to be called upon to handle the military program, but it was decided otherwise, and I think the decision was made both by the committee and by the Senate. So I do not find too much difficulty in going along with the Senator on this proposal, because it is just a matter of time; certainly, as the Senator says, next year it would be understood that it would revert back to the Committee on Foreign Relations under the regular MAP program; and if the Senator is willing, I would be willing to accept the amendment.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. Yes; I thank the Senator from Alabama for his very timely remarks, and I am glad to yield to the Senator from Missouri.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I am impressed with the argument made by the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee. I would ask, is Thailand currently under the Foreign Relations Committee?

Mr. STENNIS. I believe it is for 1973.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes.

Mr. STENNIS. Yes, it is, that is correct, for 1973 it is under the Foreign Relations Committee.

Mr. SYMINGTON. And the Senator's amendment does not change Thailand; it just changes Vietnam and Laos?

Mr. STENNIS. That is correct. My amendment just strikes out the provisions of the bill that are relevant.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, as a member of both these committees, based on the war that is going on, I would agree with the chairman, and am glad the distinguished Senator from Alabama (Mr. SPARKMAN) says he would accept this amendment. I would also support it.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator from Missouri very much. Again I emphasize that he has worked on this problem and is very familiar with it, having worked on it from year to year, and has really made a contribution.

Mr. President, I think we ought to be very clear that we all want this war to be over, and are hoping that it will be, as we were a year ago that it would be over by now. Certainly we hope that before this matter arises again it will be over. But I want to make it clear that until it is, as long as we have this situation of

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having to apply these sums of money, I think the jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committee ought to continue as it is under the present law.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I am glad the Senator makes that clear.

Mr. STENNIS. Yes.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I said that on the ground that we were all confident that we will be out before that time.

Mr. STENNIS. Yes. That is all right. I thank the Senator.

Just a word here: I have been thinking a great deal. I have made very few prophecies about the extent of this war, and I do not make any prophecies now, but I am encouraged to say just a few words about the present situation as compared to what it was 60 days ago, or soon after the offensive started.

I feel encouraged by the developments of the last few weeks. Maybe I am on the gloomy side a little, or express myself when I am gloomy more than when feeling a little better. At any rate I have decided I would say just a few words today, in no way intended to give a rosy report—I have heard too many rosy reports on this matter for the last many years—but I think, Mr. President, that it is fair and accurate to say that in several important respects, things are looking somewhat better in this war, certainly better than they were soon after this recent offensive started.

First, the mining of the North Vietnam harbors and the renewed bombing of communications and other targets is apparently slowing down the delivery of the vital fuel, ammunition, and other supplies to the south.

Second, the bombing is, by all accounts, more accurate and effective than before. That impresses me. It seems to me—and I have not had the weekly special briefing on this; I missed the one today—but news accounts and what I pick up here and there impress me that this bombing is more accurate and effective, and it includes more vital targets, and that is encouraging to me.

Finally and most importantly, the North Vietnamese offensive, which was so devastating in its early phases, appears to have been greatly slowed, if not stalled, by the stiffening South Vietnamese, who have been greatly helped by our air support, of course.

I have sometimes discounted the ability of the South Vietnamese to hold under the vigorous determination of these seasoned soldiers from the north, but I have been very much pleased with the way the South Vietnamese have stiffened and have responded. I know they are greatly helped by our advisers, and I give the greatest credit to those advisers. I think this, even though not enough has happened yet to bring about any final decision.

Of course, the North Vietnamese always have the option of retreat, of going back into the bushes, going back to guerrilla warfare, and recouping, revitalizing, resupplying, and coming back to fight another day.

I really think that this evidence that we find now is encouraging. Just as an

example, I mention the Kontum area, how it has held out successfully, and An Loc. I am advised that some 35 disabled tanks of the North Vietnamese that had been knocked out of operation have been discovered recently in a very small area.

So I have that word of encouragement, and I just decided last night that I would say these words today in this debate, for whatever they might be worth generally.

I want to make clear, now, that I am not predicting any great, overwhelming victory, but I do think conditions are about as I have outlined.

I yield to the Senator from Missouri.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the able Senator, and came over to support the Senator on his amendment. On the conduct of the war, I would ask the able chairman, inasmuch as the United States has a gross national product of well over a trillion dollars, and the estimated gross national product of North Vietnam is \$3 billion, less than one-third of 1 percent of the gross national product of the United States, does the Senator not believe that if we really do our best to destroy the forces attacking South Vietnam, in the long run we might well be successful?

Mr. STENNIS. Oh, I think so, if we really put forth the effort, and apparently we have given our military the green sign to go on this further than we have before.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I am not one who believes that the North Vietnamese will abandon their effort. We can give the South Vietnamese tanks, planes, and guns, but we cannot give them heart; and it becomes increasingly clear that only the use of massive U.S. airpower saved the Saigon Government.

What worries me is the consistent support of this Thieu Government by this administration; I, for one, do not believe that this war, which is costing us billions of dollars and, what is more important, thousands of American lives as well as the lives of hundreds of thousands of civilians over there—including women and children in South Vietnam as well as North Vietnam—is important to the security of the United States.

I know the able chairman said, in the beginning, that he did not want to get into this war and I would hope he would agree with me—especially as the terrible pictures of civilian casualties continue to come out as a matter of public record that the sooner we can get out of there, the better for all concerned.

Mr. STENNIS. I appreciate the Senator's remarks very much. He is very well versed in this subject. As he has said, he knows that my attitude is—that we are already in, and we have to do the best we can. I do not want us to have to tuck tail and be forced out. We would have to live with that for a century.

Mr. President, I have sent to the desk an amendment which would delete that provision in the foreign assistance bill which would transfer the authority for funding military aid for South Vietnam and Laos into the regular military aid program under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Relations Committee. I invite the attention of the Senate to the letter which is on each Senator's desk, since

this spells out the reasons why such a shift is entirely inappropriate at this time.

The main reason why such funding must remain for the time being within the wartime funding pattern of the current methods is as follows:

Since a war is in progress in South Vietnam and Laos, it is simply impractical for funding to be handled under the normal peacetime provisions of the military assistance program. The military assistance program, properly under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Relations Committee, is designed for peacetime military aid. In peacetime we can make precise estimates of equipment needs. In peacetime we can order a specific number of rounds of ammunition and with precise levels of military grants or sales provide the stockpiles and modern weapons that our allies need.

But wartime is entirely different. During the Korean war a funding system was established which was very similar to that which we now use for South Vietnam and Laos. It essentially authorizes that funds appropriated for Department of Defense military functions may be used by other free world forces. That means that in the emergency conditions of a war, particularly when U.S. forces are involved, we can make expenditures for wartime needs for both U.S. and allied forces in a quick and flexible fashion. Often the logistic systems of the American and allied forces are integrated with one another.

It is simply impractical in the heat of battle to operate an accounting system which keeps track of whether a specific round of ammunition is going to be used by American or South Vietnamese forces. Not only the South Vietnamese Army, but also the South Vietnamese Navy and Air Force are supplied with American equipment. In peacetime, when U.S. forces are no longer fighting in that part of the world, it will be clear that replacements of equipment and ammunition needed by the South Vietnamese and Laotian Armies will be entirely separate from expenditures for U.S. forces. Thus I hope, and intend, that in the future the responsibility for military aid to these two nations can be returned to a normal peacetime basis and the jurisdiction for that aid can be returned to the Foreign Relations Committee. But it would be putting the cart before the horse to seek to return the funding for this aid to a peacetime basis before the conditions which would permit such a return actually exist.

I should point out that there is nothing new or different about this method of funding. As I have mentioned above, it was used during the Korean war for funding of American and Allied forces in that conflict. In 1966 and 1967 this method of funding—called military assistance service funded—was begun for South Vietnam and Laos because of the hostilities in these countries. Last year the Foreign Relations Committee included in the bill as reported a provision which would have returned responsibility for funding for South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand to the normal peacetime military assistance program.

It was agreed at that time that the

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military assistance program for Thailand would be returned to the military assistance program under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Relations Committee but that the time was not yet appropriate for the change in the funding authority for South Vietnam and Laos. I believe that, and I still believe, that when the conditions permitting a normal and peacetime military assistance program—such as that which we now have for Korea—exist in South Vietnam, it will be appropriate for us to return to the normal peacetime system of handling the military assistance program. But these conditions do not yet exist and we do not yet know when they will come about.

We all hope it will be soon. But none of us can be sure. The request for military assistance for the free world forces in Southeast Asia will have to be increased for the current fiscal year from \$2.5 to \$2.7 billion we have been told by the Department of Defense. This is a result of the North Vietnamese offensive which has required the expenditure of large amounts of ammunition by the South Vietnamese, the replacement of equipment destroyed during the fighting, and so forth.

We all hope that these expenditures will be predictable and that there will be no unpleasant surprises during the months ahead. But we cannot be absolutely certain, and we should not write it into hard law that in exactly 12 months and 17 days from this moment the war and the need for wartime funding methods will be over. We must see what comes and we must match the funding methods to the needs of Southeast Asia, not the other way around.

I urge Senators to vote to adopt the amendment.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the text of the letter I have sent to each Senator.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

U.S. SENATE,

Washington, D.C., June 13, 1972.

DEAR COLLEAGUE: The amendment which I have proposed to the Foreign Assistance Act for FY 1973, on which we will vote today, deletes a provision in the bill which would transfer all funding for military assistance in South Vietnam and Laos into the annual military assistance program, under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Relations Committee.

As you are no doubt aware, military assistance for these two countries is now handled differently—it is authorized in the annual Department of Defense Procurement Authorization Bill, which comes under the jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committee. There is a good reason for this. Since there are hostilities currently in South Vietnam and Laos, it is simply impractical for military assistance to be funded under the normal peacetime procedures of the military assistance program. This was recognized back in 1966 when the authorization aid to these two countries was transferred to the military authorization bill, at the request of the Department of Defense. This is the only way it is practical to fund military assistance for countries which are involved in continuing hostilities which directly or indirectly involve American forces. The funding for our allies was handled this way during the Korean War.

I do not, by any means, believe that the

funding authorization for military aid to South Vietnam and Laos should be perpetually kept in this status any more than aid to Korea was kept there. I am willing that, in the future, jurisdiction over the military aid to these two countries should be returned to the Committee on Foreign Relations. I made this point last year at the time we agreed to return jurisdiction over military assistance to Thailand to the Foreign Relations Committee.

The Committee on Armed Services thus does not seek or intend for the current funding procedures to become a permanent fixture. But as long as the war is being fought in South Vietnam and Laos, the funding requirements for this type of assistance are so different from the requirements or ordinary peacetime military assistance that the aid to these two countries must be in a different category.

The report accompanying the Foreign Assistance Act contends that returning this funding to the regular military aid program will "symbolize" the return of the responsibility for the war in Vietnam to the Vietnamese. I am afraid that it would do something far more damaging than that. By unnecessarily complicating the funding of our assistance to South Vietnam and Laos, such a shift in funding could seriously endanger the effectiveness of that return of responsibility to the Vietnamese.

I urge you to vote in favor of the amendment.

Sincerely,

JOHN C. STENNIS.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I am willing to have a voice vote on the amendment.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I yield back my time.

Mr. STENNIS. I yield back the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is a unanimous consent agreement to vote on the amendment at 2:45 p.m.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order be vacated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. SPARKMAN. And that we proceed to vote at this time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Mississippi.

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill is open to further amendment.

AMENDMENT NO. 1220

Mr. SAXBE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the previous order to call up my amendment to S. 3390 at a later time this afternoon be vacated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. SAXBE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that such amendment be called up at this time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Is the amendment at the desk?

Mr. SAXBE. The amendment is at the desk.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment of the Senator from Ohio will be stated.

The assistant legislative clerk read the amendment, as follows:

On page 10, line 16, strike out "\$150,000,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$150,000,000 exclusive of excess defense articles ordered for grant to the Republic of Vietnam".

Mr. SAXBE. Mr. President, I send to the desk a modification of the amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The modification will be stated.

The assistant legislative clerk read the modification, as follows:

On page 10, line 12, immediately after "Sec. 11," insert "(a)"; in line 17, before the title "HOSTILITIES IN INDOCHINA", insert the following:

(b) section 8(e) of said act is amended by striking out the words "prior to July 1, 1972."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair inquires of the Senator from Ohio whether it is his intent to vacate the part of the agreement that related to a limitation on time as well as bringing up the amendment at another time.

Mr. SAXBE. Mr. President, I believe that we can dispose of this amendment in a very short time, and I therefore ask unanimous consent that the order for the time reservation also be vacated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. SAXBE. Mr. President, this is a very short amendment and has to do with limitations on the excess military equipment. The amount is reduced from \$185 million to \$150 million. This is agreeable, although it is a 13-percent cutback. However, the modification that it would apply to all the countries, including South Vietnam, would deprive the other countries of the material that the President thinks is necessary for them to maintain their individual defense in the troubled world today. Therefore, I submit that this very short amendment, which would knock out the date prior to July 1, 1972, would accomplish what I believe is the intention of the Senate.

My amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act would eliminate the provision of excess defense articles to Vietnam from the \$150 million ceiling on the provision of "no cost" excess defense articles to allied and friendly governments. Last year the \$185 million ceiling for the provision of these "no cost" excess defense articles excluded the provision of these articles to South Vietnam. As presently drafted, section 11 of the Foreign Assistance Act includes Vietnam and reduces the ceiling to \$150 million—\$35 million below last year's figure.

Mr. President, the provision of excess defense articles to South Vietnam is a key element in our Vietnamization program. With this equipment the Vietnamese will be able to continue to make progress in beating back the North Vietnamese invasion and assuming more and more of the responsibility for their own defense.

The administration asked for a \$245 million ceiling on "no charge" excess defense articles and within this ceiling had tentatively allocated \$32.2 million for Vietnam. If the ceiling proposed by the Foreign Relations Committee is amended to exclude South Vietnam, the total amount available for other nations under this program will have been reduced by \$62.8 million or over 13 percent when compared to the amount authorized in fiscal year 1972. This alone is a severe cut but one which the administration is prepared to live with if South Vietnam is excluded from this ceiling.

We must understand that the equipment is actually excess to the needs of our own Armed Forces. I have heard it said that the Department of Defense simply declares excess any equipment it wishes to give away to foreign countries. This is not true. Equipment is determined to be excess after careful calculations show that it no longer is needed for our own mobilization requirements and retention in stock would be uneconomical.

We should realize that this excess equipment was bought and paid for—usually many years ago—through the Defense budget. It has served the purpose for which purchased. For the most part, it is obsolescent or uneconomically repairable by U.S. standards. But to foreign countries that do not need the most sophisticated and latest models, and where materials are relatively scarce but labor is relatively plentiful and inexpensive, these are very useful items. If not used to meet bona fide military assistance requirements, it generally must be disposed of as scrap and valuable defense assets are wasted.

I am not prepared to say that, if we waste this equipment, the United States will have to purchase it at some later time for our foreign friends. But I do say that someone will have to buy it, and I suspect that the United States in one way or another will wind up footing a considerable part of that bill.

I also have heard it said that excess equipment is given to foreign countries simply because it is available—that there is no real requirement for it. This too is not true. It is given away only when available items match a preestablished requirement that has been validated by U.S. officials under a very rigid set of criteria. I think it significant to add here that only about 5 percent of the available excess is used for military assistance. The rest does not match a validated requirement or else is material that is not supplied under the program.

The purpose of my amendment is to give the Department of Defense reasonable leeway to make good use of excess equipment but, at the same time, prevent an unconstrained issue of this material to foreign countries. The Foreign Relations Committee insists upon exercising constraint and control in authorizing continuance of this program; I consider this to be entirely proper. But I am convinced that, at the figure proposed in the committee recommendation, it is overly constrained to a point that would be un-

necessarily damaging to our own interests as well as those of our foreign friends.

If limited to \$150 million, including equipment that might be needed by South Vietnam a little more than \$100 million will be available for other countries. I firmly believe that this is not enough and therefore am proposing that excess material given to South Vietnam not be counted under the authorization. This would eliminate any constraint on provision of excess material in support of the Vietnamization process and provide enough to meet the most pressing needs of other countries.

In concluding these remarks, I would like to underscore one final point. What I am proposing will cost the U.S. taxpayer nothing. To the contrary, it will inevitably save him money now or at some time in the future.

I support this amendment to eliminate South Vietnam from section 11 of the Foreign Assistance Act. Vietnam was not included under the ceiling on "no charge" excess defense articles last year because it was believed that Vietnam could not be looked upon as just another military aid recipient. Normal considerations simply do not apply in a shooting war.

This is as true this year as it was last year. The timely provision of excess defense articles to South Vietnam helps accelerate the pace of Vietnamization and the speed with which we can withdraw our troops there. So, while I can understand the desire of the Foreign Relations Committee to reduce the outward flow of arms to nations which are not involved in hostilities, I do not believe the same considerations apply in Vietnam. We should give the administration the legislative support which it needs to complete the Vietnamization program.

I hope very much that the distinguished manager of the bill will accept this amendment without forcing a vote on it.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I have discussed this matter with the Senator from Ohio. I think his amendment is entirely reasonable. Therefore, for myself, I am willing to accept the amendment.

Mr. SAXBE. I thank the Senator from Alabama.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment, as modified, of the Senator from Ohio.

The amendment, as modified, was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill is open to further amendment.

QUORUM CALL

Mr. SAXBE. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. EAGLETON). Without objection, it is so ordered.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

Messages in writing from the President of the United States were communicated to the Senate by Mr. Geisler, one of his secretaries.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

As in executive session, the Presiding Officer (Mr. EAGLETON) laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations, which were referred to the appropriate committees.

(The nominations received today are printed at the end of Senate proceedings.)

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1972

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill (S. 3390) to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill is open to further amendment.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I ask for a vote on the tax be amended at this time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment of the Senator from Ohio, as modified, has been agreed to.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Has it been agreed to on the Record?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Oh—well, I was not aware of that.

I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment, as modified, was agreed to.

Mr. SAXBE. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

QUORUM CALL

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I make the point of no quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Hackney, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had passed the bill (S. 3166) to amend the Small Business Act, with an amendment, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

The message also announced that the House had passed a bill (H.R. 12846) to amend title 10, United States Code, to authorize a treatment and rehabilita-

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discontinued
Oct 17

Senate Bars Asia Arms Aid

From News Dispatches

The Senate voted yesterday to uphold recommendations by its Foreign Relations Committee to cut off military aid to Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and other South Asian nations.

The Senate voted 44 to 41 for the cutoff provision, written by the committee as a reaction against the 1971 India-Pakistan war.

The provision would also affect Nepal, Ceylon, the Maldive Islands and Bhutan.

The measure was modified on the Senate floor to allow training assistance to the South Asian nations and permit commercial sales. But it would prohibit direct military-grant aid or American financing of arms sales.

The measure drafted by Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), must still survive a joint Senate-House conference committee

that will work out a final version of the aid bill.

Sen. Church, a senior member of the Foreign Relations Committee, told the Senate his provision was designed to ensure that "the U.S. not blunder again . . . as was witnessed in the 1955 war between India and Pakistan and in the Pakistan-Bangladesh-India wars in 1971."

The Senate rejected the Foreign Relations Committee's recommendations and voted to provide the full \$100 million for economic aid to Bangladesh that the administration requested.

In another action, the Senate struck down a provision of the foreign aid bill shifting U.S. military aid for South Vietnam and Laos from the defense budget to the foreign aid bill next year.

Chairman John Stennis (D-Miss.) of the Senate Armed

Services Committee said that as long as the Vietnamese war continues the military aid should be considered by his committee along with funding for the U.S. armed forces.

Stennis told the Senate he has no prophecies about the outcome of the war but "things are looking some better" for the South Vietnamese side.

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subcommittee in the 93d Congress. Therefore, it is to be hoped that any discussions among the parties will proceed expeditiously so that the outcome of these deliberations may be known in sufficient time to be considered in the draft being prepared by the subcommittee staff.

By Mr. McCLELLAN (for himself, Mr. BURDICK, Mr. JAVITS, Mr. PACKWOOD, Mr. SCHWEIKER, Mr. SCOTT, and Mr. TOWER):

S.J. Res. 248. A joint resolution to authorize and request the President to proclaim February 11 each year as "National Inventors Day." Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, as chairman of the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, I introduce, for appropriate reference, for myself, and the Senator from North Dakota (Mr. BURDICK), the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS), the Senator from Oregon (Mr. PACKWOOD), the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. SCHWEIKER), the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. SCOTT), and the Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER), a joint resolution to designate February 11 of each year as "National Inventors Day."

At a time when this country is quite properly concerned with improving its competitive position in international trade and encouraging needed innovation in important areas of public activity, it is appropriate for the Congress and the Nation to recognize the crucial role of inventors in contributing to the health, welfare, and pursuit of happiness of our citizens.

The observance of February 11 as "National Inventors Day" is particularly appropriate, for it is the anniversary of the birth in 1847 of Thomas A. Edison, our most prolific and famous inventor. Mr. Edison received his first patent in 1868 for an electrical recorder and obtained 1,033 patents during his life.

The President in the message on science and technology that was transmitted to the Congress on March 16 of this year announced his intention to institute a new program of awarding research and development prizes for outstanding achievements by individuals and institutions which foster useful innovation. I commend the President for his initiative in recognizing the contribution of inventors to meeting the scientific and technological challenges confronting this Nation. I suggest that it would be most appropriate for these awards to be presented each year on February 11 as a major feature of the annual observance of "National Inventors Day."

ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

S. 325

Mr. BEALL. Mr. President, I am pleased to announce that the distinguished Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER) has "officially" agreed to cosponsor S. 325, which would establish a survivor annuity program for widows of military personnel.

I say "officially" because Senator Gold-

WATER has been an active supporter of this legislation for some time and his advocacy of expanded widow's benefits is widely known. Certainly, as a member of the Armed Services Committee, he is a key to the success of this bill and those of us who hope that legislation will be enacted this year are delighted that he has added his name as a cosponsor. I am, of course, pleased that the chairman of the Armed Services Committee has announced that hearings will be held on this important measure this year.

S. 3598

At the request of Mr. WILLIAMS, the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. SCHWEIKER) was added as a cosponsor of S. 3598, the Retirement Income Security for Employees Act of 1972.

S. 3614

At the request of Mr. WILLIAMS, the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. HUMPHREY), the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. MCGEE), the Senator from California (Mr. TUNNEY), the Senator from Utah (Mr. MOSS), the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. BROOKE), the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES), the Senator from Alaska (Mr. STEVENS), the Senator from Michigan (Mr. HART), the Senator from Illinois (Mr. STEVENSON), the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS), the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PELL), and the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. SCHWEIKER) were added as cosponsors of S. 3614, the Education For All Handicapped Children Act.

S. 3639

At the request of Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD, the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PASTORE) was added as a cosponsor of S. 3639, a bill to amend the Food Stamp Act of 1964 to authorize the use of food stamps by elderly persons to purchase meals prepared and served by certain institutions.

S. 3644

At the request of Mr. HUGHES, the Senator from Utah (Mr. MOSS), the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. HOLLINGS), the Senator from Illinois (Mr. STEVENSON), the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PASTORE), the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. RANDOLPH), the Senator from Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD), the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PELL), the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. WILLIAMS), and the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. NELSON) were added as cosponsors of S. 3644, a bill to amend the Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilitation Act and other related Acts to concentrate the resources of the Nation against the problem of alcohol abuse and alcoholism.

S. 3659

At the request of Mr. WILLIAMS, the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. RANDOLPH) was added as a cosponsor of S. 3659, a bill to establish a commission to develop a plan leading to the conquest of multiple sclerosis.

S. 3670

Mr. BEALL. Mr. President, on June 5, 1972, I introduced S. 3670, which would amend the Washington Area Transit Authority Compact to require the inclusion

of rail commuter service in the mass transit plan.

I am pleased that Senators HARRY F. BYRD, JR., WILLIAM B. SPONG, JR., and LOWELL WEICKER have joined in sponsorship of this measure and I ask unanimous consent that their names be added at the next printing of the bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 228

At the request of Mr. HOLLINGS, the Senator from Delaware (Mr. BOGGS), the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. HANSEN), the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. HUMPHREY), the Senator from Utah (Mr. MOSS), the Senator from Maine (Mr. MUSKIE), the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PELL), the Senator from Ohio (Mr. TAFT), the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. THURMOND), the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. WILLIAMS), and the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOK) were added as cosponsors of Senate Joint Resolution 228, to pay tribute to law enforcement officers of this country on Law Day, May 1, 1973.

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 244

At the request of Mr. RIBICOFF, the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. RANDOLPH), the Senator from Alaska (Mr. STEVENS), the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. SCOTT), the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. CASE), the Senator from Illinois (Mr. STEVENSON), the Senator from Ohio (Mr. TAFT), the Senator from Utah (Mr. MOSS), the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. THURMOND), and the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PELL) were added as cosponsors of Senate Joint Resolution 244, calling for new efforts to protect international travelers from acts of violence and aerial piracy.

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 245

At the request of Mr. RANDOLPH, the Senator from Colorado (Mr. ALLOTT) and the Senator from Utah (Mr. MOSS) were added as cosponsors of Senate Joint Resolution 245, to designate the calendar month of September 1972 as "National Voter Registration Month."

SENATE RESOLUTION 322—SUBMISSION OF A RESOLUTION REFERRING A BILL FOR THE RELIEF OF THOMAS RAYMOND POMASKI TO THE COURT OF CLAIMS

(Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.)

Mr. PASTORE submitted the following resolution:

S. RES. 322

Resolved, That the bill (S. 3728) entitled "A bill for the relief of Thomas Raymond Pomaski", now pending in the Senate, together with all the accompanying papers, is hereby referred to the chief commissioner of the United States Court of Claims; and the chief commissioner shall proceed with the same in accordance with the provisions of sections 1492 and 2509 of title 28, United States Code, and report thereon to the Senate, at the earliest practicable date, giving such findings of fact and conclusions thereon as shall be sufficient to inform the Congress of the nature and character of the demand as a claim, legal or equitable, against the United States or a gratuity and the amount, if any, legally or equitably due from the United States to the claimant.

70. Asst. Sec.

S 9774

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

June 20, 1972

FOOD, DRUG, AND CONSUMER
PRODUCT SAFETY ACT OF 1972—
AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 1256

(Ordered to be printed and to lie on the table.)

Mr. ALLEN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill (S. 3419) to protect consumers against unreasonable risk of injury from hazardous products, and for other purposes.

AMENDMENT NO. 1258

(Ordered to be printed and to lie on the table.)

Mr. MOSS submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill (S. 3419), supra.

AMENDMENT NO. 1259

(Ordered to be printed and to lie on the table.)

Mr. PERCY, for himself and Mr. MAGNUSON, submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by them jointly to the bill (S. 3419), supra.

AMENDMENTS NOS. 1260 AND 1261

(Ordered to be printed and to lie on the table.)

Mr. GURNEY. Mr. President, I am today introducing two amendments to S. 3419, the Food, Drug, and Consumer Product Safety Act. The purpose of these two amendments is to provide for emergency protection of the public from any possible exposure to imminently hazardous products, while retaining the most efficient and reasonable enforcement procedures for laws and regulations administered under the supervision of the Food, Drug, and Consumer Product Agency.

The first of these two amendments, amendment No. 1260, the emergency protection amendment, would provide the Administrator of the Food, Drug, and Consumer Product Agency with clear authority to petition a court to stop immediately activities which, in the Administrator's opinion, could result in the public being exposed to imminently hazardous products. During the preliminary injunction period, the Food, Drug, and Consumer Product Agency would have adequate time to take proper administrative action in relation to these products without their continued or impending danger to the public.

The second amendment, amendment No. 1261, the efficient administration amendment, is a series of technical changes, predicated on the passage of the emergency protection amendment, which would avoid unnecessarily assigning to the Food, Drug, and Consumer Product Agency enforcement powers duplicative of those now administered by the Department of Justice.

The effect of both amendments would be to give the Administrator of the Food, Drug, and Consumer Product Agency the power directly to seek the extraordinary preliminary injunction remedy for the protection of consumers, as well as the power directly to seek enforcement of subpoenas and the issuance of inspection warrants, while providing for a more efficient separation of powers by assigning normal enforcement activities to the

Department of Justice. Having the direct and immediate powers to assure first, prevention of public availability of harmful products, and second, adequate access to and collection of information upon which the Food, Drug, and Consumer Product Agency can act in the public's interest, there is no need to modify further or interfere with traditional efficient law enforcement through the Government's lawyer, the Department of Justice.

Granting the Food, Drug, and Consumer Product Agency enforcement powers duplicative of those of the Justice Department beyond those proposed in these amendments would be not only contrary to the spirit of the Constitution, but would also be an extremely dangerous precedent, leading to fractionalization and hampering efficient and coordinated enforcement activities within the Justice Department. The substantive enforcement power is not changed by these amendments; only the duplication of enforcement responsibility between the Food, Drug, and Consumer Protection Agency, and the Department of Justice is eliminated.

Without these amendments, this legislation can well lead to extremely expensive and inefficient duplication of enforcement powers—it would not be unreasonable to expect a situation where in every Federal agency would maintain separate battalions of enforcement attorneys, with district offices throughout the Nation.

In addition to the need for avoiding inefficient duplication of enforcement activities, these amendments would work to separate the powers of regulation promulgation from those of legal enforcement. Maintaining this basic principle of separation of powers within a democratic government is extremely important as rapidly growing and multiplying Federal agencies tend more and more toward bureaucratic independence of congressional review.

I am confident that amendments similar to these, and very possibly several others involving judicial processes, would have been added by the Committee on the Judiciary had this legislation been considered by that committee. In light of this, I ask my colleagues to individually give careful consideration to the effects of the Food, Drug, and Consumer Product Act on Government enforcement procedures, and follow that consideration with approval of these amendments.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that these amendments be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

There being no objection, the amendments were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

AMENDMENT NO. 1260

On page 65, beginning with line 2, strike out through line 17 and insert in lieu thereof the following:

"Sec. 311. (a) Whenever the Administrator has reason to believe that a consumer product presents an unreasonable risk of injury or death, necessitating immediate action to protect adequately the public health and safety prior to the completion of administrative proceedings held pursuant to this Act, he or the Attorney General may bring suit in a

district court of the United States having venue thereof to enjoin any person from engaging in the manufacture for sale, sale, offering for sale or otherwise offering for public consumption, in commerce, or the importation into the United States of such an imminently hazardous consumer product. Upon a proper showing, and after notice to the defendant, a preliminary injunction may be granted without bond under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief against conduct or threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is granted by courts of equity. Notwithstanding the existence of a consumer product safety standard applicable to such product, such an action may be filed or the pendency of proceedings initiated pursuant to section 303 of this Act."

On page 65, line 21, strike out the words "or permanent".

On page 65, line 23, insert before the period "prior to completion of administrative proceedings held pursuant to this Act".

AMENDMENT NO. 1261

On page 2, line 13, strike out the word "enforce" and insert in lieu thereof the words "assure the enforcement of".

On page 2, line 15, strike out the first comma and the words "prosecute court actions".

On page 3, line 23, strike out "(17)" and insert in lieu thereof "(16)".

On page 12, beginning with line 22, strike out through line 2 on page 13.

On page 13, line 3, strike out "(17)" and insert in lieu thereof "(16)".

On page 13, line 12, strike out the word "enforce" and insert in lieu thereof "assure the enforcement of".

On page 13, line 16, strike out "(18)" and insert in lieu thereof "(17)".

On page 13, line 20, strike out "(19)" and insert in lieu thereof "(18)".

On page 29, line 12, strike out the words "of the Agency" and insert in lieu thereof the words "of this Act".

On page 73, beginning with the word "upon" in line 3, strike out through the word "the" the first time it appears in line 5, and insert in lieu thereof the following: "The".

On page 73, beginning with the word "on" in line 16, strike out through the comma in line 17.

AMENDMENT NO. 1263

(Ordered to be printed and to lie on the table.)

Mr. COTTON submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill (S. 3419), supra.

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF
1972—AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 1257

(Ordered to be printed and to lie on the table.)

Mr. DOMINICK, for himself, Mr. BENNETT, Mr. EASTLAND, Mr. STENNIS, Mr. TOWER, and Mr. YOUNG, submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by them jointly to the bill (S. 3390) to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and for other purposes.

AMENDMENT NO. 1262

(Ordered to be printed and to lie on the table.)

Mr. MCGEE submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill (S. 3390), supra.

AMENDMENT NO. 1264

(Ordered to be printed and to lie on the table.)

June 20, 1972

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 9775

REFUGEE ASSISTANCE TO CAMBODIA

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, on behalf of myself and my distinguished colleague on the Subcommittee on Refugees, Senator MATTHIAS, I am introducing today an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to provide \$2 million for humanitarian assistance to refugees and war victims in Cambodia. This amendment will simply earmark funds authorized under the supporting assistance program. I understand that a similar amendment is being proposed in the House by Congressman FRASER.

Nowhere has our sense of national priorities overseas, and the traditional humanitarian concern of the American people, been more distorted than in our aid program to Cambodia. Despite estimates which put the number of Cambodian refugees at more than 2 million in just 2 years, and the number of civilian war casualties in the thousands, our Government has not only rejected appeals for help, but the record suggests that it is our policy not to become "involved" with the problem of war victims in Cambodia. Yet, at the same time, we are willing to become "involved" in providing vast amounts of military hardware and supporting assistance which serves to fuel the war in Cambodia.

This policy of neglect was most evident during the recent hearings of the Subcommittee on Refugees. It was revealed during the hearing that a request from a Cambodian Government official for medical supplies was simply bucked back to Washington with no priority and no support. Months passed with no decision, and finally the request was sent over to the American Red Cross which responded by offering vitamin pills. This is the level of concern our Government now shows toward the humanitarian needs of the war victims in Cambodia.

Mr. President, I believe that until this tragic war comes to an end, our Nation bears a heavy responsibility to help repair the damage caused to the lives and land of the civilians of Cambodia. This amendment will provide the minimum funds necessary to help the war victims of Cambodia, and carry out our humanitarian responsibilities to them—through the Cambodian Government, private voluntary organizations, or international agencies.

This is a modest sum which I urge the Senate to authorize.

ADDITIONAL COSPONSOR OF AN AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 838

At the request of Mr. PERCY, the Senator from Kansas (Mr. PEARSON) was added as a cosponsor of amendment No. 838, intended to be offered to the bill (H.R. 1) to amend the Social Security Act to increase benefits and improve eligibility and computation methods under the OASDI program, to make improvements in the medicare, medical, and maternal and child health programs with emphasis on improvements in their operating effectiveness, to replace the existing Federal-State public assistance programs with a Federal program of adult assistance and a Federal program of benefits to low-income families with children with incentives and requirements for employment and training to improve the capacity for employment of members of such families, and for other purposes.

ANNOUNCEMENT OF HEARINGS BY THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COMMITTEE

Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, I wish to announce hearings on Thursday, June 22, 1972, at 9:30 a.m. in room 6226, New Senate Office Building, on the District of Columbia Police and Firemen's Salary Act Amendments by the Senate District of Columbia Committee.

Because this bill is still pending in the House and, therefore, the Senate District Committee technically has no bill before it, I ask unanimous consent that the legislation proposed by the Commissioner of the District of Columbia, along with a letter of transmittal and explanatory material be printed at this point in the Record. This legislative proposal will be the basis of these hearings.

Persons interested in testifying on this matter should contact Mr. Gene E. Godley, general counsel, in room 6222, New Senate Office Building.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

POLICE AND FIRE SALARY SCHEDULE I

"Salary class and title	Service								
	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	Step 4	Step 5	Step 6	Step 7	Step 8	Step 9
Class 1..... Fire private, police private.	\$9,500	\$9,785	\$10,260	\$10,735	\$11,495	\$12,255	\$12,730	\$13,205	\$13,680
Class 2..... Fire inspector.	10,900	11,520	12,140	12,760	13,380	14,000	14,620		
Class 3..... Detective, assistant pilot, assistant marine engineer.	11,875	12,470	13,065	13,660	14,255	14,850	15,445		
Class 4..... Fire sergeant, police sergeant, detective sergeant.	12,890	13,520	14,150	14,780	15,410	16,040			
Class 5..... Fire lieutenant, police lieutenant.	14,915	15,660	16,405	17,150	17,895				
Class 6..... Marine engineer, pilot.	16,230	17,040	17,850	18,660					
Class 7..... Fire captain, police captain.	17,550	18,425	19,300	20,175					
Class 8..... Battalion fire chief, police inspector.	20,535	21,560	22,585	23,610					
Class 9..... Deputy fire chief, deputy chief of police.	24,060	25,705	27,350	28,995					
Class 10..... Assistant chief of police, assistant fire chief, CO executive protection service, CO U.S. Park Police.	28,500	30,500	32,500						
Class 11..... Fire chief, chief of police.	33,000	35,000							

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
Washington, D.C., May 11, 1972.

THE PRESIDENT,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Commissioner of the District of Columbia has the honor to submit a draft bill "To amend the District of Columbia Police and Firemen's Salary Act of 1958 to increase salaries, and for other purposes", which may be cited as the "District of Columbia Police and Firemen's Salary Act Amendments of 1972".

The proposed bill would increase the salaries of police and firemen in the District of Columbia, make certain changes in their retirement benefits, and increase certain District of Columbia sales taxes to provide most of the revenue needed for these purposes.

For the reasons stated in the attached "Statement of Purpose and Justification", the Commissioner of the District of Columbia urges early and favorable consideration of this draft bill by the Congress. He believes action on this legislation is imperative in order to provide adequate compensation for policemen and firemen in the District of Columbia. Moreover, the bill would authorize a sufficient increase in local tax revenues to insure that the proposal is financially sound.

On May 8, 1972, the Federal Pay Board, pursuant to the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, indicated it had no objection to the submission of the attached proposed legislation.

Sincerely yours,
GRAHAM W. WATT,
Assistant to the Commissioner.

H.R. —

A bill to amend the District of Columbia Police and Firemen's Salary Act of 1958 to increase salaries, and for other purposes

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress Assembled.

TITLE I—SALARY INCREASES FOR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA POLICEMEN AND FIREMEN

SEC. 101. Section 101 of the District of Columbia Police and Firemen's Salary Act of 1958 (D.C. Code, sec. 4-823) is amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 101. (a) Effective on the first day of the first pay period beginning on or after the date on enactment of this title, the annual rate of basic compensation of the officers and members of the Metropolitan Police force and the Fire Department of the District of Columbia shall be fixed in accordance with the following schedule of rates:

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"(b) Effective on the first day of the first pay period beginning on or after July 1, 1972, such salary schedule is amended to read as follows:

POLICE AND FIRE SALARY SCHEDULE II

"Salary class and title	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	Step 4	Service Step 5	Step 6	Step 7	Step 8	Step 9
Class 1..... Fire private, police private.	\$10,000	\$10,300	\$10,800	\$11,300	\$12,100	\$12,900	\$13,400	\$13,900	\$14,400
Class 2..... Fire inspector.	11,400	12,100	12,800	13,500	14,200	14,900	15,600		
Class 3..... Detective, assistant pilot, assistant marine engineer.	12,500	13,125	13,750	14,375	15,000	15,625	16,250		
Class 4..... Fire sergeant, police sergeant, detective sergeant.	13,580	14,260	14,940	15,620	16,300	16,980			
Class 5..... Fire lieutenant, police lieutenant.	15,700	16,485	17,270	18,055	18,840				
Class 6..... Marine engineer, pilot.	17,150	18,005	18,860	19,715					
Class 7..... Fire captain, police captain.	18,600	19,530	20,460	21,390					
Class 8..... Battalion fire chief, police inspector.	21,560	22,640	23,720	24,800					
Class 9..... Deputy fire chief, deputy chief of police.	25,300	27,015	28,730	30,445					
Class 10..... Assistant chief of police, assistant fire chief, CO executive protection service, CO U.S. Park Police.	30,000	32,000	34,000						
Class 11..... Fire chief, chief of police."	34,700	36,800							

The salary for employees at this rate is limited to the rate for level V of the executive schedule.

Sec. 102 (a) Subsection (a) of section 201 of the District of Columbia Police and Firemen's Salary Act of 1958 (D.C. Code, sec. 4-824(a)) is amended to read as follows:

"(a) The rates of basic compensation of officers and members in service on the effective date of the salary schedule in section 101(a) of this Act shall be adjusted as follows:

"(1) Each officer or member receiving basic compensation immediately prior to such effective date at one of the scheduled service rates of subclass (a) or (b) of salary class 1 in the salary schedule in effect on the day next preceding such effective date shall be placed in and receive basic compensation in salary schedule in effect on and after such date, and each shall be placed at the respective service step in which he was serving immediately prior to such date. Each officer or member receiving basic compensation immediately prior to such date at one of the scheduled longevity rates of subclass (a) or (b) of salary class 1 in the salary schedule in effect on the day next preceding such effective date shall be placed in and receive basic compensation in salary class 1 in the salary schedule in effect on and after such date, and each shall be placed in a service step as follows:

From—Class 1, subclass (a) or (b): Longevity step A To—Class 1: Service step 7.

From—Class 1, subclass (a) or (b): Longevity step B To—Class 1: Service step 8.

From—Class 1, subclass (a) or (b): Longevity step C To—Class 1: Service step 9.

"(2) Each officer or member receiving basic compensation immediately prior to such effective date at one of the scheduled service rates of subclass (a) or (b) of salary class 2 in the salary schedule in effect on the day next preceding such effective date shall be placed in and receive basic compensation in salary class 2 in the salary schedule in effect on and after such date, and each shall be placed at the respective service step in which he was serving immediately prior to such date. Each officer or member receiving basic compensation immediately prior to such date at one of the scheduled longevity rates of subclass (a) or (b) of salary class 2 in the salary schedule in effect on the day next preceding such effective date shall be

placed in and receive basic compensation in salary class 2 in the salary schedule in effect on and after such date, and each shall be placed in a service step as follows:

From—Class 2, subclass (a) or (b): Longevity step A To—Class 2: Service step 5.

From—Class 2, subclass (a) or (b): Longevity step B To—Class 2: Service step 6.

From—Class 2, subclass (a) or (b): Longevity step C To—Class 2: Service step 7.

"(3) Each officer or member receiving basic compensation immediately prior to such effective date at one of the scheduled service rates of salary class 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, or 9 in the salary schedule in effect on the day next preceding such effective date shall receive a rate of basic compensation at the corresponding scheduled service step and salary class in the salary schedule in effect on and after such date. Each officer or member receiving basic compensation immediately prior to such date at one of the scheduled longevity rates of salary class 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, or 9 in the salary schedule in effect on the day next preceding such effective date shall receive basic compensation at the corresponding salary class in the salary schedule in effect on and after such date, and each shall be placed in a service step as follows:

From—Class 3: Longevity step A To—Class 3: Service step 5.

From—Class 3: Longevity step B To—Class 3: Service step 6.

From—Class 3: Longevity step C To—Class 3: Service step 7.

From—Class 5: Longevity steps A and B To—Class 5: Service step 5.

From—Class 6, 7, 8, or 9: Longevity steps A and B To—Class 6, 7, 8, or 9: Service step 4.

"(4) Each officer or member receiving basic compensation immediately prior to such effective date at one of the scheduled service rates of subclass (a), (b), or (c) of salary class 4 in the salary schedule in effect on the day next preceding such effective date shall be placed in and receive basic compensation in salary class 4 in the salary schedule in effect on and after such date, and each shall be placed at the respective service step in which he was serving immediately prior to such date. Each officer or member receiving basic compensation immediately prior to such date at one of the scheduled longevity

rates of subclass (a), (b), or (c) of salary class 4 in the salary schedule in effect on the day next preceding such effective date shall be placed in and receive basic compensation in salary class 4 in the salary schedule in effect on and after such date, and each shall be placed in a service step as follows:

From—Class 4, subclass (a), (b) or (c): Longevity step A To—Class 4: Service step 5.

From—Class 4, subclass (a), (b) or (c): Longevity steps B and C To—Class 4: Service step 6.

"(5) Each officer or member receiving basic compensation immediately prior to such effective date at one of the scheduled service rates of salary class 10 or 11 in the salary schedule in effect on the day next preceding such effective date shall receive a rate of basic compensation at the corresponding scheduled service step and salary class in the salary schedule in effect on and after such date, except that any such officer or member who immediately prior to such date was serving in service step 4 of salary class 10 or in service step 3 of salary class 11 shall be placed in and receive basic compensation in a service step as follows:

From—Class 10: Service step 4 To—Class 10: Service step 3.

From—Class 11: Service step 3 To—Class 11: Service step 2."

(b) Subsection (b) of section 201 of such Act (D.C. Code, sec. 4-824(b)) is amended to read as follows:

"(b) Each officer or member receiving basic compensation immediately prior to the effective date of the salary schedule in section 101(b) of this Act at one of the scheduled service rates of a salary class in the salary schedule in section 101(a) of this Act shall receive a rate of basic compensation at the corresponding scheduled service step in effect on and after such date."

Sec. 103. Section 202 of the District of Columbia Police and Firemen's Salary Act of 1958 (D.C. Code, section 4-825) is amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 202. Each officer or member of the Metropolitan Police force, Executive Protective Service, and United States Park Police force assigned to perform the duty of a helicopter pilot on or after the effective date of the salary schedule in section 101(a) of this Act shall receive in addition to his

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this bill will make important contributions to our national commitment to improve the quality of life and of our citizens and will help provide the basis on which American can remain strong among the nations of the world.

Third, the program authorized by S. 3511 will permit the Foundation to proceed with the development and implementation of a revitalized science education improvement program. The science education activities of the Foundation have undergone a major restructuring in order to bring these activities in line with the emerging needs of students, instructors, institutions, and our society in general. I want to stress that it is essential that the Foundation be provided the funding necessary to develop more diversity in the science education experience of students to broaden their range of career options and to better prepare science and nonscience students for a productive life in our highly industrialized and technologically advanced society. The bill, as proposed, will also help insure the Nation a flow of the very best of the Nation's science and engineering student population into the stream of science and engineering careers.

Finally, Mr. President, S. 3511 provides the necessary authorization to permit the Foundation to extend those programs that increase the exchange and accessibility of scientific knowledge on a national and global basis, and that will enhance capabilities for using computers to perform advanced research, and to make greater use of computers in the education process.

Taken together, Mr. President, the programs authorized by S. 3511 represent a strong commitment on the part of this Nation to the further development of the Nation's scientific and technological capabilities.

The amendment was agreed to.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1972

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill (S. 3390) to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may require.

This amendment raises the authorization for grant military assistance to \$725 million and the authorization for security supporting assistance to \$770 million, of which \$70 million is specifically earmarked for Israel.

First. The amendment restores \$125 million to the authorization for grant military assistance which was cut by the Foreign Relations Committee. This figure is still a reduction of over \$55 million from the administration's original request of \$780 million; but it will, if approved, provide a military assistance program which will give us an international environment in which our security interests will be protected.

As the Members of the Senate are well aware, the grant military assistance pro-

gram is the linchpin of the Nixon doctrine. It allows us to withdraw American forces from around the world by enabling allied and friendly governments to field armed forces which can bear an increasing share of the common defense burden. Now for the first time since the conclusion of World War II, we can look to our allies to bear the primary burden for meeting nonnuclear threats to the common peace. The millions we authorize for these grant military assistance programs save billions for the American taxpayer. It is conservatively estimated that it costs \$10,000 a year to keep an American soldier overseas, but only \$500 a year to train and equip a foreign soldier to take his place.

Cuts of the magnitude proposed in the bill as it now stands would stall the equipment modernization program for Korea, hence making it more difficult to reduce our military presence there in future years.

These cuts would also reduce our efforts to assist Cambodia in meeting North Vietnamese attacks. Cambodia's armed forces are tying down North Vietnamese, Vietcong troops which would otherwise be available for service in Vietnam.

Cuts of this magnitude would have a serious impact on Thailand as well, for a substantial cutback in our program there would set back Thailand's counterinsurgency efforts and could place in jeopardy the essential facilities in Thailand which are used by our forces operating in Southeast Asia.

In less than 3½ years, over half a million American military personnel have been withdrawn from the east Asia and Pacific area alone. The cost to the American taxpayer of the Vietnam war has dropped from \$29 billion in fiscal year 1968 to \$10 billion in fiscal year 1972. Yet because of our grant military assistance programs, the MASF funded defense appropriation, and the security supporting assistance program, others have been able to fill in behind us.

Second. On the security supporting assistance side, my amendment restores \$120 million which the Foreign Relations Committee cut from the administration's request. This is still a reduction of \$74 million from the administration's original request of \$884 million. This amendment, if adopted, would give us a continuing viable program. A program which would give us the resources to provide the economic support which allied and friendly governments in Southeast Asia need to allow them to carry on with the primary burden of their own defense as our involvement in Vietnam winds down. Funding at this level would also assure continued stability in the Mideast by assuring the economic viability of Israel and Jordan. I have specifically earmarked \$70 million of supporting assistance for Israel—\$20 million more than under present law—to assure that that Nation and her people will not lack resources during this continued twilight period of no war and no peace in the area.

Mr. President, my amendment will restore these programs to respectable levels, and in my view this restoration is justified. The administration is winding down the war in Vietnam in a respon-

sible manner. This administration is reducing America's share of the cost of common security programs. This administration has demonstrated that it has the capacity to devise new policies to meet changing world conditions. These new policies are working in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. And this bill will, if adequately funded, give us the resources we need to continue to make progress.

In the foreseeable future the hope for a better world will rest primarily as it has in the recent past upon the faith that other nations, friend and foe alike, have that this country will keep its word and honor its commitments.

The Nixon doctrine is moving the primary burden for meeting nonnuclear threats to the peace from us to others. This policy is working in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. And this legislation, if adequately funded, will enable us to complete the job.

Mr. President, one of the most important objectives of my amendment is to keep the Government's faith with the Republic of South Korea. As is well known, in order to reduce our forces generally overseas, we have reduced the sum of our presence in South Korea by a very substantial withdrawal of personnel. But in doing so, we have given our own word as a government to the Republic of South Korea that we will not allow them to be penalized by this withdrawal to the extent of being unable to defend their own country, and they have said to us that while they need our forces, they also understand our problem, and that if we will modernize their equipment and give them the tools to protect their own country, it will to some degree compensate them for the lowered American presence in the area.

Mr. President, I have been at the armistice line at Panmunjom. I have seen the Korean forces. I have reviewed their crack regiments myself. I have seen their men and their officers and their equipment, and their air forces.

These are among the bravest people in the world. Buffeted as they have been over the centuries by their neighbors, occupied for long periods of time by China and by Japan, brought into a condition of dependency for generation after generation, these people who early maintained an independent and magnificent culture of their own, from the time of the Silla Dynasty and before, on through the Koryo Dynasty, and down to the Yi Dynasty. These people who have maintained their national strength, whose culture and economic achievements have been a source of pride to civilization—those who value civilization—saw their future very much brightened after World War II when their independence was restored to them and they again became the Republic of Korea.

Then, one more time they were divided, this time by internal conflict, into two nations, a long and bloody conflict, in which the United States participated, which I had the opportunity to see briefly in uniform, on the ground, and in the air.

I talked to General Hodge before we withdrew the American presence there once before in Korea, in Seoul; and he said to me:

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If we withdraw these forces, it will only mean war.

A couple of years later, that is exactly what happened, in 1950. I think I talked to him in 1947 or 1949. Our complete withdrawal of the American presence did not contribute to peace. It actually encouraged the hostile forces of the north to move in. It encouraged subversion in both north and south.

As a result, the independence of Korea was threatened and the country ultimately was divided. The United States was forced into a war which could have been avoided had we not, in the late 1940's, hastily withdrawn all our troops, under our cry of, "Let's not be involved any more." So we decided not to be involved, and we became involved in one of the most costly conflicts in our history. That is the lesson of Korea.

I think we owe it to our own security and survival, and to theirs, and we owe it to our own sense of justice—we owe it to ourselves as a nation which has given its word to aid these people—to help them modernize their forces, if we are again in the process of withdrawal from the territory of a friendly nation. So I hope this amendment will be adopted.

I think the business of second-guessing your government on matters of this kind is highly risky. Where a government has been elected by the people, where it is carrying out the foreign policy of the nation where it makes commitments and pledges its word to governments, the Senate of the United States ought not come in and say, "Well, we think we can do better. We are better foreign policy experts than you are. Never mind what you said in South Korea. We just won't give them the money."

Not only would that damage us in South Korea; it would damage our credibility wherever else in the world the word of the United States is pledged and is felt to be as good as its bond. So I hope that the Senate will adopt this amendment, that we will do justice to Korea.

There is, of course, our obligation to assist Cambodia; because Cambodia is pinning down troops of the enemy which otherwise would be engaged in South Vietnam and prolong that conflict, which already has gone on much too long.

I have added \$20 million for Israel, because we want at least to continue to maintain the status quo, in the hope that Israel and the Arab nations finally will be able to convert the cease-fire into a permanent peace. We have a cease-fire and no peace in two parts of the world—in Korea and in the Middle East.

Our purpose in our foreign policy is to promote peace—to promote peace in Korea, to promote peace in Indochina, and to promote peace in the Middle East. Our best chance of doing so is to be prepared to keep our commitments and, in the case of Israel, the only democracy in the Middle East, to support its very valiant forces as they, by their very determination and readiness to defend themselves, deter aggressors, whether they be neighbors or whether they be great powers.

So it seems to me that this amendment is meritorious. It does not restore all

the money. It is realistic. It is a reduction from the amount which the administration asked, as I recited earlier. But it does restore it to a more viable level which would enable us at least to keep our commitments.

I hope, therefore, that the amendment will be adopted.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I rise in support of the amendment of the distinguished Republican leader which would restore a measure of the cuts in military and supporting assistance proposed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and earmark an additional \$20 million in supporting assistance for Israel. Total supporting assistance for Israel would then amount to \$70 million.

Although it would be a disservice to the cause of world peace to exaggerate or otherwise create undue optimism concerning recent international developments—developments largely resulting from U.S. initiatives—I think it is a fact that there exists in this country and in this body increased hope that after a quarter of a century the enmity of the cold war may be disintegrating. And one would also hope that developments on the world scene will have an impact on the conflict in Vietnam. But if there are significant movements toward peace today, it is because we and our allies have the strength which encourages those who have different views to seek to resolve our differences through peaceful means.

Nonetheless it is vitally important to remember that we will only be able to capitalize on such opportunities for peace if we and our allies can continue to negotiate from positions of strength. For more than 10 days, now, the Senate has been considering legislation which is crucial to the Nixon doctrine, which encourages our allies to assume greater responsibilities for their own defense, and to the maintenance of our allies' self-defense capabilities at sufficient strength to encourage the process of detente which President Nixon has so imaginatively pursued in recent months.

But severe cuts by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the supporting assistance and military assistance programs recommended by the administration jeopardize important U.S. security interests in Europe, the Middle East, as well as in Southeast Asia. Supporting assistance provides the economic support which Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Israel, Jordan, and others need to sustain their economies while they withstand military and political pressures from their adversaries. We have seen that the need to maintain strong military forces in the Middle East has created an economic strain on both Israel and Jordan which they cannot meet without outside assistance. The same is true in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, where the substantial amounts of military equipment which we are supplying to them will be far less effective if we do not provide an adequate level of economic aid which will permit them to mobilize their own manpower.

Supporting assistance also includes the financial support which we provide for the care of refugees and war casualties in Southeast Asia. The recent North

Vietnamese offensive caused an additional 800,000 refugees in Vietnam and an uncounted number of civilian war casualties. It is my impression that most Members of the Congress agree that support for this purpose should be adequate in all cases and even relatively generous.

The grant military assistance program is the linchpin of the Nixon doctrine. It provides allied and friendly governments with a portion of the equipment and training necessary to enable them to bear primary responsibility for their own defense.

A 23-percent cut in grant military assistance in fiscal year 1973, coming on top of a 28-percent cut in fiscal year 1972, would threaten the stability of Cambodia and Thailand; weaken the contribution Turkey can make to stability in the Middle East and the strength of the Mediterranean flank of NATO; set back our program to modernize Korea's armed forces; and weaken our relationships with a number of nations who permit us to station U.S. forces on their territory. With these reductions in effect, meaningful programs for such countries as China, Indonesia, the Philippines, Greece, and Ethiopia could not be completed, and important U.S. policy objectives in these countries would be imperiled.

This program cannot be viewed in isolation from other expenditures for national security. It is considerably less costly to train and equip an allied soldier than to station an American soldier overseas. Thus these programs provide a great advantage to wise allocation of defense funds and to effective distribution of the Nation's resources. As a direct result of this program and the Vietnamization program, we have been able to withdraw over half a million American personnel from East Asia and the Pacific thus saving both lives and dollars.

While the bill before us is an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, it is in fact almost exclusively a bill concerned with the international security program of our country. To maintain the position of strength essential to our country our allies and our friends in what we trust will prove to be a turning point toward peace, the Scott amendment would raise the authorization for grant military assistance to \$725 million and the authorization for security supporting assistance to \$770 million, of which \$70 million is specifically earmarked for Israel. I urge Senators to support the President's efforts for peace by supporting this amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me?

Mr. SCOTT. I yield.

Mr. SPARKMAN. As I understand it, the Senator's amendment provides for an amount, we may say, between what the administration requested and what the committee recommended.

Mr. SCOTT. That is correct. It restores a part of the fund, but it is a reduction of more than \$55 million from the original request of \$780 million, and it is a reduction—

Mr. SPARKMAN. From \$844 million.

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Mr. SCOTT. It is a reduction of \$74 million from the administration's original request of \$884 million.

Mr. SPARKMAN. That is, in supporting assistance.

Mr. SCOTT. Yes.

Mr. SPARKMAN. And \$55 million in military grant aid.

Mr. SCOTT. That is correct.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Did the Senator name the beneficiary nations?

Mr. SCOTT. I will be glad to do so.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I am not suggesting amounts, just the countries.

Mr. SCOTT. The beneficiary nations which particularly would be benefited here are the Republic of South Korea, the Government of Thailand, the Government of Cambodia, the State of Israel, and the Kingdom of Jordan.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Is it the Senator's contention that we have commitments to all those countries?

Mr. SCOTT. That is correct.

Mr. SPARKMAN. In the South Korea allotment—or whatever it is called—is the matter of modernizing their equipment involved?

Mr. SCOTT. It is. That is the principal purpose of the restoration, to enable us to keep the given word of the United States, that in consideration—in part, certainly—of the necessity for us to lower our profile in that area, to reduce our presence in that area, we have agreed to help them to modernize their means of defense.

Mr. SPARKMAN. That was really a part of the arrangement that was worked out, either formally or informally, making it possible for us to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea?

Mr. SCOTT. That is correct.

We are in the position of having gone ahead with the withdrawal of our troops, having taken the benefit of the agreement so far as America is concerned, and then being confronted with a hesitant situation in the Senate, as to whether we should keep our part of the bargain—the modernization of the equipment of the South Korea forces.

If I were a South Korean and heard that the Senate had gone ahead with the return of American soldiers and then had failed to supply the modernization of equipment is promised, not only would I have a low opinion of the Senate, but also, I would have a very low opinion of the word of the United States.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I may say this, that I have a strong feeling for the South Korean situation. I have visited there several times. I have been up on the DMZ area where the South Koreans have their divisions and we have our men. I have seen the equipment the South Koreans use. I know how badly they need modernization. I was pleased when our Government and the South Korean Government worked out an understanding to the effect that we would help them modernize.

Let me say to the Senator from Pennsylvania that I have asked someone who is opposed to this to come to the floor to handle the opposition. I am not in a position to oppose the position of the Senator from Pennsylvania because I think it is so important to all the coun-

tries the Senator named, but particularly is the importance to South Korea and Israel. The others may be just as important, I am sure.

Mr. SCOTT. The Senator is right about South Korea. I have already made the point that I served briefly in South Korea on the carrier *Valley Forge*.

I did see the fighting quality of the South Koreans. I have been honored by their government along with General Van Fleet on a subsequent occasion at the time of the inauguration of President Park. This might be said to dispose me even further in their favor, but what moves me is the keeping of a promise and my own personal observation of the gallantry and the determination of the South Koreans to preserve their independence.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I have shared similar recognition by the South Korean Government. I was also given an honorary degree by their National University. However, let me say that does not convince me on this. I am convinced on this by the absolute necessity of having a well-equipped force on the DMZ line, as long as we do not have some kind of agreement whereby peace can be assured. We are still there under the armistice; are we not?

Mr. SCOTT. Yes.

Mr. SPARKMAN. It is necessary to keep the force there. My own feeling is that we should have it there.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum and I ask unanimous consent that the time for the quorum be charged equally to both sides.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CHILES). Without objection, it is so ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Florida (Mr. GURNEY) be recognized for 5 minutes on the time of the Senator from Pennsylvania.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The Senator from Florida is recognized.

Mr. GURNEY. Mr. President, I strongly support the amendment of the distinguished minority leader to restore some of the military assistance funds cut by the Foreign Relations Committee.

First, this amendment will provide adequate economic supporting assistance to Israel—a nation whose continuing economic stability is crucial if peace is ever to be achieved in the Middle East. The recent activities of the Palestinian guerrillas and the tragic shootout at LOD Airport in Tel Aviv underscore the need for such assistance.

Second, this amendment will enable the administration to move ahead in implementing the Vietnamization program. It gives allies and friendly governments the assistance which they continue to need if North Vietnamese aggression is to be successfully contained.

Finally, it enables us to get on with the job of equipping and training allied and friendly government forces so that these forces, rather than U.S. forces, will be able, in the first instance, to meet conventional threats to the common peace.

Mr. President, these programs, which we are considering today, have been instrumental in creating the essential preconditions for a generation of peace. They have enabled us to bring American servicemen home—over half a million from the Pacific alone—and they have enabled us to leave local forces behind which are capable of defending their own governments and institutions.

I do not think there is any more dramatic and convincing evidence of that than what is going on in Vietnam at the present time. The North Vietnamese launched an invasion of South Vietnam and used practically all of their forces. These forces were as well equipped as any modern army. They used tanks and artillery pieces by the hundreds. Many of them were of the modern type of artillery. There were also rocket weapons.

The siege at An Loc ruined that village. Yet, despite that massive attack with the most modern of equipment, the South Vietnamese has not only been able to contain the aggression and turn back the attack, but in some cases they have made slight advances.

Mr. President, as I say, there is no more dramatic evidence that Vietnamization is working and that the training of the South Vietnamese troops to take over their own battles has been successful. That is what this foreign assistance program is all about. If we continue to do that at the level of spending the administration has recommended, it seems to me that servicemen other than the U.S. soldiers will do this kind of fighting, which is what ought to be done.

Mr. President, for the first time in over 25 years other nations are becoming increasingly able to stand on their own, militarily. Given this record of accomplishment, I believe that this military assistance program deserves our continued support. Deep cuts of the nature imposed by the Foreign Relations Committee would serve merely to cripple this administration's foreign policy without bringing forward valid alternative policies. As far as this Senator is concerned, such drastic cuts are neither justified or desirable.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. On whose time?

Mr. GURNEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time be equally divided between both sides.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I send to the desk a perfecting amendment to that offered by the distinguished minor-

ity leader, and ask that the amendment be stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is not in order, except by unanimous consent, until all time has been used on the pending amendment or has been yielded back.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, I have not seen the amendment, and I would rather defer—

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I ask that the amendment be returned in order that it may be examined by the distinguished minority leader.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may require.

Mr. President, I have reached an understanding with the distinguished minority leader and we are ready to yield back the remainder of the time on each side to bring up the perfecting amendment.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment I have offered may be called up and considered at this time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment will be stated.

The legislative clerk read the amendment offered by Mr. CHURCH for himself and Mr. BAYH to the Scott amendment (No. 1265) as follows:

Strike out the first paragraph of the amendment. In lieu of the language proposed to be inserted by the third paragraph of the amendment by Senator Scott insert the following: \$685,000,000, of which not less than \$85,000,000 shall be available solely for Israel."

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I yield myself 3 minutes on the substitute.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized for 3 minutes on the substitute or perfecting amendment.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, all the substitute does is to attempt what has often been tried in the Senate, and that is to increase the amount to Israel, hoping that all Senators who are motivated by the Jewish vote will immediately rush in and support the substitute, and, of course, the \$15 million additional can then be knocked out in conference and everybody will be happy.

Well, that is about all it is. My amendment, of course, adds \$20 million for Israel. To that the distinguished Senator from Idaho adds another \$15 million, but the price of his giving a little more money to Israel is that no more money goes to Korea, and no more money goes to any other country mentioned in my amendment—no more money goes to Jordan, no more money goes to the Middle East.

This is simply an attempt to say to Senators, as they walk through the door just before the vote, "We raise the amount of money for Israel. You want to vote for that don't you?", and in that way hope that Senators will thereby adopt the substitute and strike out what we are trying to do; namely, the restoration of all these other funds in the amendment.

So I do not think the substitute should be passed for that reason alone. Other-

wise we get into a bidding contest here, where each Senator who has an amendment offers to authorize more money for Israel, but always at the cost of cutting everybody else. I do not think the Government of Israel wants you to do that, and I do not think the Government of the United States wants you to do that.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 3 minutes have expired.

Mr. SCOTT. I yield myself 1 additional minute.

I do not think this is the way to legislate.

I realize that by being exceptionally candid on the floor I have abandoned the usual subterfuges which we interchange with each other so often, but that is all this is. When one examines the proposal, he will see that it is done for the purpose, when a Senator comes in and asks what this is all about, of being able to say, "Well, it is a substitute amendment to give Israel more money." This is a time when there is hardly anybody on the floor—there is nobody here now except us chickens—I am sorry; the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. McGEE) says that I should speak for myself—for us chickens and one rooster, then. [Laughter.]

There is nobody else here, so when they come in and they want to know what it is all about, unless somebody makes the record clear what it is all about, they will not know it is an attempt to keep face with South Korea and an attempt to shore up other nations who have been friendly to us, who are pinning down other nations who are not friendly to us, and as an attempt to continue peace in the Middle East—

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator is expired.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I yield myself 2 minutes so I may yield to the Senator from Missouri.

Mr. SYMINGTON. May I ask the Senator if he thinks that adding \$20 million for Israel will hurt the overall bill?

Mr. SCOTT. The overall bill?

Mr. SYMINGTON. Yes. Would adding \$20 million hurt the Senator's proposal? As long as nobody is here but "us chickens," I thought I might as well bring it up.

Mr. SCOTT. Yes. My proposal would help Jordan, Israel, Korea, Cambodia, and would ease tensions, I believe, in those areas of the world. I am so used to, as an old hand around here, almost going into my 30th year in Congress, all these substitute motions. The usual maneuver in the House is on a motion to recommit. Over here it is a motion to do something for Israel. That is all it is.

I hope the substitute will fail, for the reason that it does strike down our attempt to keep faith with the Government and people of South Korea and to maintain our foreign relations in those other areas.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Who yields time?

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, in the same spirit of candor that has been shown by the distinguished minority

leader, recent votes taken in the Senate have been against increasing the overall amount of this bill. For instance, only last week the Senate rejected attempts to increase military credit sales. Yet, at this point comes another attempt to increase the total amounts in the bill.

But this one has a sugar spoon attached, earmarking an additional \$20 million for Israel.

I would first point out that the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has earmarked \$50 million in the present bill for Israel. We wanted to make certain, given the present circumstances in the Middle East, that the military capabilities of Israel are sufficient to discourage another Arab attack on that country. We wanted to provide in various ways Israel the capability to secure its borders. If we are going to err, let us err on the side of generosity. Let us make certain that Israel's defense is adequate, particularly in view of the continuing Russian effort to rebuild the Arab military forces.

So, with respect to this one particular in the amendment offered by the Senator from Pennsylvania, I have no quarrel. The amount, in fact, could well be increased further. That is the reason that I have added an additional \$15 million, so that the increase for Israel is not the \$20 million provided in Senator Scott's amendment, but the \$35 million provided in the perfecting amendment.

That, I think, can be justified; but the rest cannot be justified. The rest of this amendment would increase the overall cost of this bill by \$245 million—nearly a quarter of a billion dollars would be added, if the Senate adopted the amendment offered by the minority leader—\$125 million for military grant assistance and \$120 million for economic supporting assistance.

The Senate bill is fully adequate. The committee took the evidence and heard the testimony; it has, in fact, increased the overall amount for military assistance above the levels of last year. The bill contains approximately \$100 million more in military assistance than the Senate approved last year. The committee feels that that is fully adequate to meet the need.

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CHURCH. I am happy to yield to the distinguished Senator from Indiana.

Mr. BAYH. I do not wish to interrupt the carefully considered remarks of one of the most distinguished and illustrious members of the Foreign Relations Committee, but as one who is not a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I must say that I find great logic in the presentation of the Senator from Idaho.

The Senator has stressed the difference between the committee's recommendations and the recommendations of our illustrious minority leader. From a slightly different perspective, I find it equally alarming to look at the trend of the last couple of years.

While, in the early years of this administration, there was established a doctrine known as the Nixon doctrine, which was designed to try to spread the burden of regional defense among the na-

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tions of that region. This policy goal made a great deal of sense to me since it would enhance international cooperation, and lessen the overloaded burden that existed on the backs of the taxpayers of the United States. Nevertheless, as I look at the figures that are before me, it seems as if the trend has been alarmingly in the opposite direction.

For 1970 we appropriated \$350 million in military grants, \$70 million in military credit sales, and \$395 million for supporting assistance; the amount requested by the administration for 1973, just 4 years later, is more than twice that amount—\$780 million in military grants, \$527 million in military credits, and \$844 million for supporting assistance.

The committee, in its wisdom, cut those figures back to \$600 million, \$400 million, and \$650 million respectively, but the Senator from Pennsylvania seeks again to raise that military grant figure to \$725 million and the supporting assistance figure to \$770 million. The committee has already doubled the amount which was appropriated for 1970; this amendment would add still another quarter of a billion dollars when we are trying to implement the Nixon doctrine by spreading the burden of defense costs.

Mr. CHURCH. The Senator is quite correct. All the committee is trying to do is hold the line rather modestly against this swelling program.

All these programs, as the Senator knows, get larger with each passing year through "bureaucratic momentum;" the committee is trying to put the brakes to this phenomena.

I call the Senator's attention to the fact that in so doing, we have had to yield some ground. There is \$100 million more in this bill than in last year's bill, to start with, for military assistance. The Senator from Pennsylvania, however, has added a quarter of a billion dollars more. As a consequence, unless we are just going to throw open the door and say, in effect, that any amount is acceptable to Congress, that we will no longer exercise our judgment or attempt to impose some reasonable restraint on behalf of the people we represent, who must pay the bill, then I would think it prudent for the Senate to support the committee.

Mr. BAYH. Will the Senator permit me to interrupt for just one last question, to get his thoughts?

Mr. CHURCH. I yield.

Mr. BAYH. This whole question of when and where to spend military funds has not been examined in the past as carefully as I think the Senate is determined to examine it in the future.

A fundamental principle which must be considered is the relationship of the expenditures to our national interest.

It is rather obvious to the Senator from Indiana, and I am sure to the Senator from Idaho, that what happens in the Middle East with respect to the security and continued freedom of the State of Israel is very much in our national interest, and that there is a great deal of sympathy in this country to support that small democracy and provide them the wherewithal to defend themselves. That is exactly what they are doing; we

are not asking for divisions or air support from the United States, but for the military hardware to defend themselves.

I do not want to be too harsh, but it appears almost as if this very important authorization to help sustain democracy in Israel is being used almost as a blackmail effort to get several times that amount to spend we know not where and we know not for what. Is the Senator from Indiana too harsh in his judgment?

Mr. CHURCH. The Senator is accurate in his observation, and his statement is certainly no more harsh than the opening remarks of the distinguished minority leader. The distinguished Senator from Indiana is quite right.

I have never had any difficulty when it comes to supplying military assistance or economic assistance, when needed, to Israel. Israel is a democratic country. It has the full and loyal support of its people. It has demonstrated again and again its capacity to defend itself, without ever calling upon a single American soldier.

My difficulty is with this tendency of ours, through this military assistance program and the foreign military sales effort, to supply 40 or 50 different governments in the world with our arms, and in the main, to supply various dictatorial regimes, all under the guise of anticommunism. However, most of these American financed and furnished weapons have been used by these regimes to hold their own people in check. We have allowed this to grow and grow until it has become global in its scope. It is now a monstrously immoral program.

I point out to the Senator that, insofar as the war theater is concerned, insofar as Laos and South Vietnam and Cambodia are concerned, whatever military assistance is needed for those countries is not covered by this bill, anyway. All of that—and it is a great deal, as the Senator knows—is covered in the so-called defense budget of the United States.

What is really being asked for here is a quarter of a billion dollars more to distribute to countries which, in the main, if not almost in the entirety, are reactionary, repressive regimes, and certainly by no stretch of the imagination could be compared to the kind of government or society represented by the free and sovereign State of Israel.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CHURCH. I yield.

Mr. SCOTT. Does the Senator include the Republic of South Korea as a reactionary, regressive regime?

Mr. CHURCH. The Senator from Idaho has no particular admiration for the Government of South Korea. There is a great difference between that government and the Government of Israel. I want to say that most emphatically. The two are not comparable at all.

Mr. SCOTT. The Senator has met the ruler of the Kingdom of Jordan. Does he include the Kingdom of Jordan as a reactionary and regressive or recessive regime?

Mr. CHURCH. I do not place it in the list of flourishing democracies in the world.

Mr. SCOTT. In other words, the Senator is condemning all these other countries which have been friends and allies of the United States and is using that as an argument for not keeping our given word, as in our promise to Korea to modernize their equipment.

Mr. CHURCH. The Senator from Idaho does not condemn any government. The Senator from Idaho is saying that the committee bill contains adequate money for these purposes and that it ought not be increased by another quarter of a billion dollars. It already has been increased by \$100 million, and nearly all the bill is directed toward such governments as those mentioned by the Senator from Pennsylvania. It is sufficient. It need not be increased.

A special case can be made for Israel, because it is a very special country, faced by a very difficult problem—the problem of Russian-supplied military arms and equipment to the surrounding Arab States which are unanimously hostile to Israel and against whom Israel has fought several wars.

Israel's position is a special one. We should be particularly careful to make certain that we earmark sufficient funds for Israel to maintain an effective and successful military deterrent against the outbreak of further warfare in the Middle East.

Mr. SCOTT. Would not the Senator, then agree, that it is necessary to help South Korea maintain an effective and successful military deterrent against those who might endanger its security?

Mr. CHURCH. The bill as reported by the committee contains adequate funding for that purpose.

Mr. SCOTT. I think it is obvious that we cannot agree—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time of the Senator from Idaho has expired. The Senator from Pennsylvania has 9 minutes remaining.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the motion to table.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The motion to table has not been offered.

Mr. CHURCH. I give notice that I shall ask for the yeas and nays when the motion is made.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania has 9 minutes remaining.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time, and I now move to table the substitute of the Senator from Idaho to the amendment of the Senator from Pennsylvania.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the motion to table.

The yeas and the nays were not ordered.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and the nays on the motion to table.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

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The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion to table. On this question the yeas and the nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from Georgia (Mr. GAMBRELL), the Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL), the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. HOLLINGS), the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES), the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. HUMPHREY), the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. INOUE), the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. JORDAN), the Senator from Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD), the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. MCCLELLAN), the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MCGOVERN), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. MCINTYRE), the Senator from Montana (Mr. METCALF), the Senator from Maine (Mr. MUSKIE), the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. RIBICOFF), and the Senator from Utah (Mr. MOSS) are necessarily absent.

I further announce that the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. ELLENDER) is absent on official business.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES), the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. HUMPHREY), the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MCGOVERN), the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. RIBICOFF), and the Senator from Georgia (Mr. GAMBRELL), would each vote "nay."

Mr. SCOTT. I announce that the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BROCK), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. CORTON), the Senator from Michigan (Mr. GRIFFIN), the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. HANSEN), the Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD), the Senator from Nebraska (Mr. HRUSKA), and the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) are necessarily absent.

The Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER) and the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MUNDT) are absent because of illness.

The Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. BELLMON) and the Senator from Ohio (Mr. TAFT) are detained on official business.

On this vote, the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER) is paired with the Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD). If present and voting, the Senator from Arizona would vote "yea" and the Senator from Oregon would vote "nay."

The result was announced—yeas 35, nays 18, as follows:

[No. 242 Leg.]

YEAS—35

Aiken	Dominick	Schweiker
Allen	Eastland	Scott
Allott	Ervin	Smith
Baker	Fannin	Sparkman
Beall	Fong	Stafford
Bennett	Gurney	Stennis
Boggs	Jordan, Idaho	Stevens
Buckley	Mathias	Talmadge
Cook	Miller	Thurmond
Cooper	Packwood	Tower
Curtis	Pearson	Young
Dole	Saxbe	

NAYS—38

Anderson	Burdick	Case
Bayh	Byrd	Chiles
Bentsen	Harry F. Jr.	Church
Bible	Byrd, Robert C.	Cranston
Brooke	Cannon	Eagleton

Fulbright
Harris
Hart
Hartke
Jackson
Javits
Kennedy
Long

Magnuson
McGee
Mondale
Montoya
Nelson
Pastore
Pell
Proxmire

Randolph
Roth
Spong
Stevenson
Symington
Tunney
Weicker
Williams

NOT VOTING—27

Bellmon
Brock
Cotton
Ellender
Gambrell
Goldwater
Gravel
Griffin
Hansen

Hatfield
Hollings
Hruska
Hughes
Humphrey
Inouye
Jordan, N.C.
Mansfield
McClellan

McGovern
McIntyre
Metcalfe
Moss
Mundt
Muskie
Percy
Ribicoff
Taft

So the motion to table the Church amendment was rejected.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. KENNEDY). The question occurs on agreeing to the Church amendment to the Scott amendment. All time has expired.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Pennsylvania, as modified. On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from Georgia (Mr. GAMBRELL), the Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL), the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. HOLLINGS), the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES), the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. HUMPHREY), the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. INOUE), the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. JORDAN), the Senator from Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD), the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. MCCLELLAN), the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MCGOVERN), the Senator from Montana (Mr. METCALF), the Senator from Utah (Mr. MOSS), the Senator from Maine (Mr. MUSKIE), the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. RIBICOFF), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. MCINTYRE), and the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. ELLENDER) are absent on official business.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES), the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. HUMPHREY), the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MCGOVERN), the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. RIBICOFF), and the Senator from Georgia (Mr. GAMBRELL) would each vote "yea."

Mr. SCOTT. I announce that the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BROCK), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. CORTON), the Senator from Michigan (Mr. GRIFFIN), the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. HANSEN), the Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD), the Senator from Nebraska (Mr. HRUSKA), and the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) are necessarily absent.

The Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER) and the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MUNDT) are absent because of illness.

On this vote, the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER) is paired with the Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD). If present and voting, the Senator from

Arizona would vote "nay" and the Senator from Oregon would vote "yea."

The result was announced—yeas 54, nays 21, as follows:

[No. 243 Leg.]

YEAS—54

Allott	Dole	Pell
Anderson	Eagleton	Proxmire
Baker	Eastland	Randolph
Bayh	Fulbright	Roth
Bentsen	Harris	Saxbe
Bible	Hart	Schweiker
Boggs	Hartke	Sparkman
Brooke	Jackson	Spong
Buckley	Javits	Stevens
Burdick	Kennedy	Stevenson
Byrd	Long	Symington
Harry F. Jr.	Magnuson	Talmadge
Byrd, Robert C.	Mathias	Thurmond
Cannon	Miller	Tower
Case	Mondale	Tunney
Chiles	Montoya	Weicker
Church	Nelson	Williams
Cook	Pastore	
Cranston	Pearson	

NAYS—21

Aiken	Dominick	Packwood
Allen	Ervin	Scott
Beall	Fannin	Smith
Bellmon	Fong	Stafford
Bennett	Gurney	Stennis
Cooper	Jordan, Idaho	Taft
Curtis	McGee	Young

NOT VOTING—25

Brock	Hollings	McIntyre
Cotton	Hruska	Metcalfe
Ellender	Hughes	Moss
Gambrell	Humphrey	Mundt
Goldwater	Inouye	Muskie
Gravel	Jordan, N.C.	Percy
Griffin	Mansfield	Ribicoff
Hansen	McClellan	
Hatfield	McGovern	

So Mr. CHURCH's amendment to the Scott amendment was agreed to.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment to the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. CHURCH. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question recurs on the Scott amendment, as amended.

Who yields time?

Mr. SCOTT. I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. CHURCH. I yield back the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the Scott amendment, as amended (cutting the question).

The amendment, as amended, was agreed to.

Mr. CHURCH. I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. JAVITS. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now proceed to the consideration of the amendment to be offered by the Senator from Colorado (Mr. DOMINICK).

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I send the amendment to the desk.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The amendment was read as follows:

On page 7, line 18, delete "(a)". On line 22, beginning with the word, "by" strike through

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the word, "funds" on line 24, and insert in lieu thereof: "in Thailand by any military forces, other than the national forces of Thailand or the United States,".

On page 8, line 1, insert a period after "purpose".

On page 8, line 1, beginning with the word, "and" strike through line 10.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, if I may have the attention of Senators I think we can be very brief on this amendment and, hopefully, with the cooperation of the Senator from New Jersey and the Senator from Idaho, we will be able to dispose of it rather rapidly.

Mr. President, my original amendment which was printed would have struck the total section 515 on pages 7 and 8. I have talked at length with members of the staff and with the Senator from New Jersey, and the amendment I have submitted is different in considerable substance from the amendment which was originally offered.

What we are doing in the amendment I have offered now is strike any reference either to combat or military operations in Laos or military operations in North Vietnam, leaving in, however, the proposed prohibition on the use of funds insofar as third countries are concerned in Thailand.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may we have quiet in the Senate? This is an important matter.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BURDICK). The Senate will be in order.

Mr. DOMINICK. As a result of this amendment, if agreed to, the provision which is before Senators on pages 7 and 8 would read as follows:

No funds authorized or appropriated under any provision of law shall be made available by any officer, employee, or agency of the United States Government, for the purpose of financing any military operations in Thailand by any military forces other than the national forces of Thailand or the United States . . .

Then it would read after that:

unless Congress has specifically authorized or specifically authorizes the making of funds available for such purpose.

And the remainder of the section would then be stricken.

The reason why we have done this is that the Armed Services Committee as such by, I believe, a general agreement between the Armed Services Committee Chairman and the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, has maintained jurisdiction in connection with Vietnam and with Laos.

The general military assistance jurisdiction is in the Foreign Relations Committee and would be applicable insofar as Thailand is concerned. So we are leaving Thailand in. But I want to make it explicit—and I think the Senator from New Jersey would agree with this—that there is no situation in Thailand at the present time which would lead to support of any third party troops in that area. We anticipate none. Consequently, this wording, although it may be important from the point of view of asserting jurisdiction in what we are doing in military operations country by country, is no more important for Thailand than it would be for India or Pakistan or any other

country in the world in which we do not contemplate doing this.

Personally, I feel the legislation as such is not what I would like to see in the bill, but almost all legislation in this body is a matter of compromise along these lines, and it may be that the question of whether this provision should be in at any point can be taken up, as it has been in the past, in conference, and then either knocked out or left in by the conferees.

It is, as I say, my feeling that this is a good substitute; that it takes care of the items which were of concern to me and the other distinguished members of this body who sponsored the original proposal that I put in, namely, Senators STENNIS, YOUNG, EASTLAND, BENNETT, TOWER, and DOLE. I believe, as far as I can ascertain, that this amendment would be satisfactory to those cosponsors. I tried to stay in touch with as many of them as I could. As I say, it does, in part at least, meet some of the purposes the Senator from New Jersey was seeking, but it does not any longer conflict with the jurisdiction we would otherwise have in the Armed Services Committee.

I am happy to yield at this point to the Senator from New Jersey.

Mr. CASE. I thank my colleague. His statement is accurate and very fair, as his statements always are. I would have preferred that the section the Senator from Colorado is amending remain in the bill as I introduced it and the Foreign Relations Committee approved it, but we cannot always get everything we want. I am glad, speaking for myself only, to accept the Senator's amendment as the best that we can get under the circumstances.

Mr. President, I am absolutely opposed to the United States carrying on large scale mercenary operations anywhere—Southeast Asia or anywhere else—without congressional authorization. I think that if our democracy and our Constitution mean anything, such authorization should be mandatory. But I think we cannot avoid the fact that there are ongoing mercenary operations in Laos and in North Vietnam financed by the United States. We know this. We know that Thai troops are in Laos because, after a long series of newspaper leaks and interviews with Thai troops themselves, the administration finally stated publicly last year that this was so. We know of the operations in North Vietnam only because of newspaper accounts. Perhaps some day we are going to be officially informed of the facts on American financed ground raids in North Vietnam.

But I do accept the fact that these operations exist, although I believe Congress should have been asked to authorize them. Congress unofficially has been aware of them. The Armed Services Committees have been advised about them. As I understand, the Appropriations Subcommittee dealing with defense appropriations has known about them. Appropriations have been made by Congress with this knowledge. So, in a sense—and I am sure this is the view of the majority of the Members of the Con-

gress—there is some feeling that these operations have been authorized by Congress and that the Senate is unwilling to stop them at this particular point, with hostilities continuing.

Recognizing that while not necessarily agreeing, I accept the suggestion offered by the Senator from Colorado (Mr. DOMINICK), although it goes against my grain to do so because of my general view of the undesirability of unauthorized mercenary operations; but I think he has proposed something which meets one of my main purposes, and that is to establish the fact that, in the future, specific congressional authorizations should be necessary.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I appreciate what the Senator has said. I know it has been a concern of his for a long period of time. It is my understanding, on reading this amendment—and I would like to have this colloquy with the Senator from New Jersey—that this would not prohibit the United States from supporting our ally Thailand within Thailand with some of the problems they may have. Is that correct?

Mr. CASE. This does not prevent American support in Thailand to Thai troops. That is quite correct.

Mr. DOMINICK. And it would not prohibit our support of what might be termed irregular troops who are nationals of Thailand?

Mr. CASE. Would the Senator repeat that?

Mr. DOMINICK. Yes. It would not prevent support of what might be termed irregular forces or nationals of Thailand. In other words, in case some of the tribesmen who are not part of the regular armed forces there should find themselves in problems because of invasion by some country, they could be supported, too?

Mr. CASE. It would be my feeling that the rationale of what we are doing would not prohibit American support to Thai regular or irregular troops in Thailand so long as they were under direction of the Thai Government.

Mr. DOMINICK. That is what I wanted to get as far as the Record is concerned. I am glad the Senator goes along with that, because that is my understanding of what the amendment would do.

It seems to me that the striking of lines 2 through 10, really, on page 8 is a significant compromise by the distinguished Senator from New Jersey—taking out reference to Laos and Vietnam.

I see my distinguished chairman here. I am sure he may have some questions or comments on it.

Mr. CASE. Would the Senator permit me to make one more observation before completing this colloquy? I think I should say I do not regard what we are doing here in any way to be an authorization of any kind for American assistance, but the elimination of new proscriptions against certain kinds of American assistance. That is the purpose of it.

Mr. DOMINICK. That is my understanding.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me?

Mr. DOMINICK. I am happy to yield.

Mr. STENNIS. I would like to make this comment. This is a subject of concern to all of us. It is a matter that is very difficult to handle, frankly. It is difficult for the Department of Defense or the Department of State, or whatever agency of government may be involved. We have had this problem before our committee many times, and will continue to have it.

I want to commend the Senator from Colorado, who is a very able member of our committee, for the work he has done in connection with this provision in the bill. I think he and the Senator from New Jersey have reached a very good adjustment of the situation without injury to the position we find ourselves in over there.

Believing that as I do, I am glad to join with him in the modification that he has proposed here, and am delighted to see, too, the Senator from New Jersey willing to meet the Senator and seek to accomplish something that I think will improve the situation without aggravating our present problem there.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I surely appreciate the support of the Senator from Mississippi and the Senator from North Dakota, who was one of the very prominent cosponsors of my originally proposed amendment.

I yield to the Senator from North Dakota.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. President, as I understand the modification, it would not run contrary to the Nixon foreign policy, which I believe is a good one, that of helping friendly nations throughout the world but not using our own troops. They would do their own fighting. I think from time to time it is helpful to give financial assistance to other countries and military supplies and money for economic and other purposes. I hope we will get away from this business of trying to fight the battles of the whole world. That is what the main part of the Nixon policy is about. I think the modification fits well into that foreign policy.

Mr. DOMINICK. I thank the Senator from North Dakota, and I completely agree with him.

As we all know, there are problems in Thailand. They are not nearly as serious as they are in some areas of Southeast Asia, but there are problems in both northeast and southeast Thailand. To date, their regular armed forces have been able to maintain this problem within a reasonable area. That would not prohibit us from giving adequate support, in case they need it, to provide the Thais, or nations in that area, the ability to do their own fighting, which I think we are all for.

So I thank the Senator from New Jersey, the Senator from Mississippi, and the Senator from North Dakota for their support, and I am happy to yield to the Senator from New York.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, as the Senator is limited in time, perhaps I had better seek time from the Senator from Arkansas. Will the Senator from Arkansas yield me some time?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield the Senator from New York whatever time he may require.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I am in agreement with the Senator from New Jersey that this is probably the best way now realistically available to us in which to resolve the question. I appreciate that in war, you use many means which may be distasteful. I am deeply opposed to our being in this war in Indochina, but that is neither here nor there on this issue. The important point here, Mr. President, is that we are, in a sense, condoning a lack of information to Congress.

We did not adopt this amendment lightly in the Foreign Relations Committee. We adopted it only in extremis, because the whole concept of advice and consent in consultation with the Committee on Foreign Relations has broken down in a very serious way. I hope that seeing these evidences of it—which are numerous, not just this alone; the Azores and Bahrain provision, the executive agreements provision, and other matters with which we have dealt, reflect that as well. It will be seen that the situation might have been otherwise had the administration kept us closely informed of what it was doing and why.

I see no reason why it should not have done so. This idea that only the President and his people can be trusted with a secret has already been exploded by the revelations of the Pentagon papers, the Jack Anderson disclosures, the daily trickle of official "leaks" and so on.

The Joint Atomic Energy Committee is entrusted, we believe, with the very highest secrets of government, at least what are alleged to be the highest secrets of government, without qualm. What is it that seems to create a barrier between the Committee on Foreign Relations and the administration, in respect of accountability and responsibility for "classified" information? I think that is what is at the base of this provision, and I deprecate it.

Mr. President, beyond that, we have ongoing activities in Cambodia which raise very serious questions about the good faith with which the administration is sticking by the provisions of the law, including the amendment of Senator COOPER and Senator CHURCH with respect to the range of activities to go on in Cambodia with our backing, and my own amendment making clear in law that we have no commitment to the defense of the Government of Cambodia nor does our aid imply or authorize any such inference.

Yet, the evidence continues to mount that there is a real effort to sort of get around those particular provisions with respect to Cambodia. The press has reported that American advisers—prohibited by law in Cambodia—hover off the ground in helicopters, so their feet do not touch the earth while they direct operations. Such maneuvers to avoid one of the inhibitions of the law raised serious questions of the integrity of the law and the authority of Congress, somewhat like General Lavelle's unauthorized raids.

It is this kind of thing, Mr. President, which deeply troubles Members of Congress and deeply troubles the relationships which are involved here with the executive department, and which cause such deep concern with respect to the

whole Indochina involvement. Mr. President, if there is one thing we have now learned, and the decisive passage by the Senate of the War Powers Act is a clear indication of that, it is that we do not want to back into another Vietnam, or be drawn into it, because the progress of events is such as to make it inevitable.

In 1970, following the Lon Nol coup d'etat against Sihanouk's neutralist government and the attack he ordered against the Communist staging bases along the Cambodia border, President Nixon sent U.S. forces into Cambodia—in that much disputed action. In his April 30 address announcing this attack, the President justified it as a move "to protect our men who are in Vietnam and to guarantee the continued success of our withdrawal programs."

The attack in Cambodia was described as a one-shot affair and subsequent requests to Congress for military aid funds for Cambodia were portrayed as being short term measures related to Vietnamization and withdrawal of U.S. forces. On May 14, Secretary Rogers said that the defense of the Cambodian Government was not the primary purpose of the actions taken, and "that will not be our purpose in the future."

When Congress first authorized the Cambodian assistance request of President Nixon, I authored an amendment which was included in the law, and which has been retained in slightly reworded form since. My amendment, section 7(b), stated:

Military and economic assistance provided by the United States to Cambodia and authorized or appropriated pursuant to this or any other Act shall not be construed as a commitment by the United States to Cambodia for its defense.

The initial administration request for military assistance to Cambodia, on May 12, 1970, was for \$7.9 million but grew by the end of the year to \$155 million. In 1971 it grew to \$246.4 million, and this year the request was \$300 million for military aid and \$30 million in economic aid.

This pattern of logarithmic growth of U.S. military support and involvement in Cambodia would have been cause for grave concern in and of itself. But then, on March 14, 1972, Secretary Rogers stated to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, in support of the Cambodian aid request:

As you know, one of the reasons we have increased the request for Cambodia assistance is that we are anxious to see that the Government in Cambodia survives.

Mr. President, what has become of the provision written into law from the outset, and retained in law ever since, establishing that we have no commitment to Cambodia—or to the Government of Cambodia—for its defense?

I do not think we are being kept candidly informed about what is going on in Cambodia. I have doubts that the thrust of U.S. programs in Cambodia square with the spirit, intent, and letter of the law. Moreover, the question is not merely an academic one. It is a very important one closely related to our whole Indochina experience. The situation in Cambodia, according to a June 6,

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1972, New York Times report, is disquietingly like the situation in Vietnam in the early 1960's. I include this report as part of my text:

CAMBODIA SEEMS ADRIFT AFTER 2 YEARS AS REPUBLIC

(By Craig R. Whitney)

PNOMPENH, CAMBODIA, June 5.—From a start full of hope two years ago, Cambodia has sunk into a deep malaise, without confidence in her leadership, institutions, or ability to decide her own future, in the assessment of a wide range of Cambodians and foreign diplomats.

The malaise has been months in developing, but has had a chance to take root in the last two months, during which the Government of President Lon Nol has been virtually paralyzed by its attempts to legitimize itself as a popularly elected presidential regime.

Yesterday the country held its first presidential election. Marshall Lon Nol was ahead in preliminary results today with 58 per cent of the vote, while his closest contender, In Tam, had 24 per cent, and the marshal will almost certainly turn out to be the winner when the final results of the light voting are proclaimed by the Government in a few days.

He proclaimed himself President March 13 after dissolving what remained of the Cambodian legislature, with Mr. In Tam at its head, and bowed to student pressure to eliminate his friend and closest adviser, Lieut. Gen. Sisowath Sirik Matak, from the Government. The next legislative elections will not take place for three months.

The beginning of the worst part of the decline in Cambodia's morale seems to date from the disastrous rout of Cambodian troops trying to clear Route 6 north of Phnompenh in December. Since that operation, called Tchenla 2, the Cambodian Army has made no new offensive sweeps except unsuccessful ones around the temples of Angkor.

In recent weeks the Cambodians have, almost without a fight, given up most of the territory east of the Mekong River that North Vietnamese and Vietcong troops are using as a staging area for the offensive in South Vietnam.

AMERICAN OFFICIAL GLOOMY

A high American official, speaking of the United States' \$200-million military aid program in Cambodia, shrugged his shoulders as if in despair and said: "I don't see any vigorous prosecution of the war in the cards. Tchenla 2 caused a certain lack of confidence on the part of Lon Nol and the army and the Communists' use of tanks and large amounts of heavy ammunition in their offensive has just indicated to the Khmer that they are no match for the North Vietnamese.

It was also the failure of Tchenla 2 that caused the exacerbation of political strains, but that had been growing quietly ever since March, 1970, when Marshal Lon Nol enjoyed seemingly unanimous backing at the beginning of the republic. The trend since then has been one of centralized rule in his weak hands, but with growing frustration and, with the elections of the weekend, open opposition by some who supported the President in the beginning.

Marshal Lon Nol's principal opponent in the election, Mr. In Tam, was president of the Cambodian National Assembly at the time of the overthrow of Prince Narodom Sihanouk and was one of the three principal figures of the new republic in 1970—along with the President and his close friend, General Sirik Matak.

What has happened to Mr. In Tam and to General Sirik Matak shows, in some ways, the deterioration of the regime. In the summer of 1971, Mr. In Tam became Minister of the Interior, but asked to resign and was dismissed last September as his differences with the marshal grew. He became president

of the renamed Constituent Assembly in November after Marshal Lon Nol took away the legislature's law-making powers and told it to proceed with the drafting of a constitution.

But in March, after student demonstrations against General Sirik Matak, who was Lon Nol's premier and, in effect, the man who had ruled Cambodia since the marshal's stroke more than a year ago, the President bowed to these outside pressures, took General Sirik Matak out of the Government and abolished the Constituent Assembly.

Within 10 days, he had his subordinates draft a constitution to his liking, establishing a presidential form of government with a Cabinet answerable to him and to the two-house legislature, and submitted it to a nationwide referendum, which approved it April 30.

Since March, the Government has been headed by the only man Lon Nol could get to accept the job, Son Ngoc Thanh, a shadowy figure who was on the side of the anti-Sihanouk forces at the beginning of the republic but whose allegiance is now believed to be mostly to the forms and trappings of the republican Government.

"The Government has been virtually paralyzed for the past two months while Lon Nol has been trying to secure his political future," a senior diplomat said. "I would hope he'd start to govern again rather quickly after the elections."

Indeed, in the last few days in Phnompenh have been devoted almost entirely to political activities. A giant parade of military vehicles filled with soldiers bearing placards has circled the city almost every morning, blaring Marshal Lon Nol's political propaganda and DC-3 aircraft have dropped thousands of little pictures of the marshal—similar to those printed on the ballots—all over the city.

During the voting yesterday, Mr. In Tam charged that the Government was making it difficult for his supporters to vote for him, and that his pollwatchers had not been permitted in some of the places where military people, who strongly support Marshall Lon Nol, were voting. Today, he said he would contest the results as "fraudulent and anti-democratic." There has been talk of a coup d'etat by disgruntled elements, but Mr. In Tam refused, in an interview, to go that far.

The third candidate, Keo Ann, was the dean of the Faculty of law of Phnompenh, whose students led the fight against General Sirik Matak in the spring, but he did not campaign prominently and was expected to get less than 5 per cent of the vote.

Mr. In Tam campaigned actively, but one Western diplomat said: Even if In Tam said nothing, a lot of people would vote for him. There's a feeling that the Government has not kept any of the promises it had made, and that it is corrupt.

NOT ENTIRELY BLEAK

In the preliminary results, Mr. Keo Ann did better than expected and the two opposition candidates together had almost 42 per cent.

American officials here point out that the situation is not entirely bleak, and say that a series of monetary reforms and changes in Government policy have staved off a serious rice shortage that seemed to be inevitable last fall. In fact, only 20,000 tons of rice was imported and only 10,000 tons had to be used, according to American economists.

The Nixon Administration has asked Congress for \$75-million in economic aid to Cambodia for the fiscal year beginning July 1, twice this fiscal year's amount.

But the Cambodian budget is at a large deficit because of the war, and unrest is growing among low-paid civil servants and salaried workmen whose pay has not kept up with inflation. In the last few weeks, for example, there have been a series of strikes

for higher wages in Government ministries—something inconceivable in the early days of the republic.

The unrest within the Government and in political movements outside it has been matched by a growth in the ranks of the Cambodian Communists, who are fighting against the Government forces alongside the North Vietnamese and Vietcong in the occupied parts of the country.

The number of members of Khmer Rouge, the Cambodian Communist force, is now estimated at at least 30,000. "There has been a growth, a development of the movement, which, we think, has serious longer-term meaning for the country," an American diplomat said. "But the Government seems to resist the notion that the way to stand up to them is to fight them hard."

Both Mr. In Tam and Marshal Lon Nol, in their campaign statements, emphasized that they wished for a reconciliation with the Cambodian Communists but neither offered any detailed proposals for achieving a reconciliation. One Western diplomat even said, "I don't think it's certain that even if the Vietnam war ended by negotiations, the war in Cambodia would necessarily end at the same time."

All the Cambodian factions seem to realize that, ever since Tchenla 2, it is futile to talk of chasing the North Vietnamese out of the country and that peace will not come to Cambodia before it comes to Vietnam—in the framework of an internationally guaranteed settlement.

The outlook for the future, according to diplomats here, is that the Cambodian forces will offer only token resistance to the Vietnamese Communists, reoccupying lost territory only when the enemy abandons it, and leaving again—as the Cambodian Army has done in the last two months in Svayrieng and Preyeng provinces near the Vietnamese border—when the North Vietnamese want that territory. It is already a kind of de facto truce.

Mr. President there is another aspect of the situation there which gives me concern. I had a colloquy with Senator SPARKMAN and Senator MANSFIELD, concerning the handling of our military assistance in Cambodia. This colloquy took place on December 22, 1970 when the conference report on the first Cambodian aid authorization was adopted in the Senate. The focus of the colloquy was on the question of avoiding the establishment of a large U.S. military organization in Cambodia to run the MAP program. I quote that colloquy because it is quite interesting and instructive in light of the actual situation we find today:

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I am very interested to know whether the statement made by the managers on the part of the House, which is now before the Senate on this Cambodian matter, would or would not contemplate the existence of what is called the MAG—that is, a Military Assistance Group—in Cambodia. There is much concern here that once one of these Military Assistance Groups is put in, it is the beginning of a chain of action that leads to troops.

The particular statement on the part of the managers relates to U.S. military personnel provided to supervise the distribution and care of U.S. military supplies and equipment delivered to Cambodia.

That can be done, of course, by individuals operating out of the military section of the embassy or by a MAG.

Mr. MANSFIELD. It is my understanding that it does not include a MAG, that it will

be done by the military attachés in the Embassy.

Mr. JAVITS. I thank the Senator.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JAVITS. I yield.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I am glad the Senator brought that up. As a matter of fact, I was going to bring it up.

Of course, the Senator knows that the managers on the part of the Senate do not file a report or a statement. The managers on the part of the House do.

I am certain that the Senator will agree with me that their statement does not necessarily constitute law. That just happens to be a unilateral interpretation that they have given to this, and we certainly had nothing of this in mind. In fact, I believe it was clearly stated in our discussions in the committee that this work would be handled by aides out of the Embassy.

Mr. JAVITS. That is the important point.

Mr. SPARKMAN. They have it, for one thing, in the latter part, where it refers to training Cambodians in South Vietnam. There is nothing in the measure that would point this up or that would dispute it. It is my understanding that we are doing that now. This measure, as I interpret it, does not affect that.

Mr. JAVITS. I should like to say to the Senator that I support the conference report, that I think they have rendered the country a great service in settling this matter.

I understand Senator ARKEN's worries, and I agree with him. But I believe that, as we talked originally in an effort to settle this matter, when things lean on each other, they probably will work out. We have many other recourses if they do not.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Speaking of these reports, I think it is understandable that reports of different kinds and rumors get out. During the last several days, under the management of our coach and general manager, we have had many conferences—sometimes several conferences in the same day—and it is very easy for rumors or reports to get out which do not necessarily state the true conditions.

Mr. JAVITS. I think it is important for the Senate that Senator SPARKMAN and Senator MANSFIELD express it authoritatively, that this language does not indicate the existence of any understanding that there will be a MAG; but, on the contrary, that an understanding does exist that if any military personnel are required, it will be personnel operating out of the military section of the embassy.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Of course, the effect of a statement such as this, or a statement by one of us, if we made it, would affect the legislation only in the event that it is ambiguous. I do not think the proposed legislation is ambiguous. Certainly, we threshed it out thoroughly on the floor of the Senate when we were debating the measure. I think it is clear and can be understood easily.

Mr. JAVITS. I think the Senator has made a fine record on it, and I thank him very much.

Mr. President, the situation seems to have turned out quite differently from what we intended. In this regard, let me quote briefly from a recent report of the Foreign Relations Committee:

On January 31, 1971, a Military Equipment Delivery Team Cambodia (MEDTC) was formed to administer the program. The Chief of the MEDTC and his staff were located in Saigon, but 16 and later an additional 7 MEDTC officers were stationed in Phnom Penh. In July 1971, the MEDTC Chief, a Brigadier General, moved to Phnom Penh, and the MEDTC element in Cambodia was raised to its present strength. In Phnom Penh, there are now 43 MEDTC personnel (50 are authorized and up to 12 more have been approved by the Executive Branch). There are 63 other MEDTC personnel at MACV in

Saigon. Of the 12 new personnel, 4 will be used to monitor third-country national contracts (50 additional third-country nationals will be hired to train Cambodians in logistics), 4 to monitor training, 3 to be assigned to help advise on port operations at Kompong Som and 1 will be a fiscal specialist who will monitor the military uses portion of the Public Law 480 agreements (these agreements are discussed below).

Although American military personnel in the MEDTC seem to be acutely aware of the prohibition against their acting as advisors or participants in the planning and execution of tactical operations, they are nevertheless deeply involved as advisors or organizers in activities such as force planning, military budgeting, logistics and training. As noted above, 11 of the 12 new MEDTC personnel will be involved in logistics and training activities.

I have heard that the spirit of the law has been stretched even further in that U.S. military personnel who are training Cambodian troops in South Vietnam sometimes accompany those Cambodian forces back to Cambodia, and at the border these U.S. trainers become members of MEDTC. If this is so, I question whether it is not tantamount to a violation of the law.

I know we are at war, and I am in favor of supporting the South Vietnamese financially, assuming they can remain viable. I know that could include ARVN military actions in Cambodia. I have no objection per se to that, Mr. President; and I believe that is probably the generality of opinion in the Senate.

But that is a very different thing from backing into a war by getting involved ourselves in Cambodia, whether directly or indirectly through advisors or in some other way, so that we inevitably somehow acquire a "national commitment," and it is said the national "honor" is at stake, as the President has expressed it, or his honor as President is at stake, and the powers of his office. We get all involved in our own dialectic, and next thing you know you have had it, you are in another Vietnam fighting to honor another "commitment."

Mr. President, I make these remarks only by way of expressing the hope that provisions such as the ones addressed by Senator DOMINICK's amendment may be obviated by a much closer relation, between the appropriate committees of Congress, in this case, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I do not relish the idea of locking this into law, which does have a tendency to put U.S. policy in something of a bind—Senator DOMINICK and his associates are strongly calling our attention to that, and I understand it perfectly—but it is brought about by a long-standing and long proceeding series of events which erode a sense of feeling on the part of those who have responsibility to the Senate for foreign policy, insofar as we ourselves participate in it, that they really know what is going on.

As regards the Cambodia situation, I am considering whether there is an appropriate amendment to introduce to clear up the anomalies and ambiguities I have discussed.

Mr. President, I hope very much it is in this area that we can make the most progress, and can be instructed by what has here occurred, in showing how ur-

gently necessary it is that we be informed.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will someone yield me 3 or 4 minutes?

Mr. DOMINICK. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Kentucky.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, first I wish to ask a question of the distinguished Senator from Colorado. Does the Senator's amendment strike subsection (b) on page 8 also?

Mr. DOMINICK. Yes, it does.

Mr. COOPER. I am glad it does, because even if we had to vote on the total section, I intended to ask that (a) and (b) be severed for a separate vote. I do not believe we have a constitutional right to require the President of the United States to provide the Congress to report, at least in advance, on detailed military operations.

But to go to the subject which the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS) has just been ably discussing.

I should like to point out that we learned—I am sure that some Members of the Senate knew before—sometime in 1967 and 1968 about our operations in Laos. These operations began in 1962 or 1963 under the administration of President Kennedy, and have continued since that time.

I recall that on August 12, 1968, I offered an amendment to prohibit the use of any U.S. forces in support of Thailand or Laos, to prevent the expansion of the Vietnam war, excluding Cambodia, because at that time Cambodia was considered a neutral country. The amendment was adopted unanimously by the Senate, although we were told at that time by Senator STENNIS that Secretary Laird had reported that it was not of any effect. Later I discovered why it was not—because my use of the term "U.S. Forces" evidently did not include the use of CIA forces.

I support the modification of the Senator from Colorado, but I do want to point out a contradictory position. Evidently, we are supporting this amendment because we are at war and operations are going on in Laos which we are not willing to interrupt because we are at war, and evidently because we consider it would endanger our forces, whether CIA in Laos or regular U.S. forces in South Vietnam, are not willing to strike all funds for Laos and to stop this operation.

I simply point out that it is contradictory to adopt this kind of measure with respect to Laos, and to vote then for an amendment to take our troops out of Vietnam by August 31, 1972, where they are certainly at war and could be greatly endangered by a sudden evacuation. I have supported most of such proposals, with the exception of the Hatfield-McGovern amendments and then because of my opposition to a fixed date I have always believed that the flat and clear way is to adopt an amendment which says, "Take all our forces out. Stop the war and prohibit funds except for withdrawal." I have believed there would be a greater possibility of getting prisoners of war back and of having a peaceful settlement. The situation since the massive attack by North Vietnam has

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changed and our remaining forces have been placed in danger. This is evidently recognized by the pending amendment. The same argument must be considered when the Mansfield amendment comes up.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Kentucky for his support.

I think it is only proper to say that a number of difficulties are involved in the proposal as it was originally written in this bill, not the least of which, of course, is the question of jurisdiction, as to who is going to take care of the situation with regard to Laos and Vietnam. I appreciate the Senator's support.

I can understand the concern of a number of Senators as to whether or not we are getting involved. I think it is only fair to say, in support of the President, that he has been getting us disinvolved, as opposed to involved, compared to what was going on in previous years. His thesis is that if we are going to maintain the opportunity of freedom in these areas, the only way it can be done properly is by giving assistance, so that the governments which are trying to provide a method of dignity and decent livelihood for their people will have both the economic and the military strength to offset attacks from outside. This seems to me to be a far more fruitful way, so far as we are concerned, than sending our own troops in and trying to contain something in the event of an actual battle.

I thank the Senator from Kentucky. I just wanted to make those few remarks for the Record.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, the Case amendment, as included in the committee bill, did not prohibit financing foreign troops in Laos, South Vietnam, or Thailand. All it did was to require prior congressional authorization.

I say in all sincerity, however, that it does not really make much difference what type and character of legislation we pass on this floor with respect to such a matter, because the record will show that regardless, the administration will do what it wants to do, in spite of any legislation, even though that legislation has been signed by the President.

This matter came up in last year's across-the-board reduction in supporting assistance which, of course, included Vietnam, and was enacted into law. It is interesting to note, what has happened in the course of the past year in connection with the assistance that has been given Vietnam.

Direct gross economic assistance now being asked for is the most ever, more than three quarters of a billion dollars.

In previous years, the United States has supported the economy of Vietnam in three principal ways—through the commercial import program, through Public Law 480, and through the purchase of piasters by the Department of Defense and American servicemen. The last of these sources, which in the past financed a large share of the deficit in the Government of Vietnam's balance of trade—\$700 million in imports versus \$13 million in exports last year—no doubt

will decline in 1972 because of the reduction of American Forces.

The decline in Vietnamese dollar earnings from the Department of Defense and U.S. troop spending had been expected to begin in 1971; but, as a result of congressional decided upon reductions in the fiscal year 1972 aid program, several interesting steps were taken to maintain Vietnamese dollar earnings from these sources at high levels.

Defense Department procurement practices were changed to increase in-country contracting and purchases. The exchange rate for official purchases of piasters was kept at a level of 118 to the dollar rather than being increased as had been planned, thus in effect providing right there the Vietnamese Government with a substantial additional subsidy.

As a result of these policies, official U.S. Government dollar expenditures in 1971 amounted to a total of \$271 million. If the official exchange rate had been changed to the 275 rate used in other transactions, Defense Department expenditures could have been reduced to \$116 million. The expenditures in Vietnam would have been even lower if procurement policies had not been changed.

While the official exchange rate remained at 118 until April 1972, the exchange rate for personal purchase of piasters for dollars was increased to 275 in October 1970. This change brought about a great increase in personal exchange transactions in 1971 which provided \$132 million in dollar exchange for the use of the Vietnamese Government. These various moves, that is, \$132 million in personal dollar exchanges and the \$271 million in Department of Defense purchases involving Defense Department and personnel spending and Vietnamese exchange rates brought Vietnamese dollar earnings in 1971 to an all time high of \$403 million despite the congressional cut in aid funds.

In other words, I say again that it does not really make any difference what we do here on this floor. The matter will be handled by the administration the way they see fit regardless of any legislation. From the standpoint of the constitutional rights of the Senate, however that should give us cause for thought.

For example, last year this administration spent more than \$100 million in financing Thai troops in Laos. We had passed a law providing that that type and character of payment to mercenaries could not be made. The law says mercenaries cannot be financed by the United States to fight in Laos.

When we heard Thais were fighting in Laos, and paid by the United States, we sent out investigators. They went up to one Thai soldier and said, "Why are you here?" The soldier replied, "Because I was ordered to come here." The investigator said, "Well, is that the only reason you are here?" The soldier replied, "Why would I want to come if I was not ordered to do so?"

They asked another Thai soldier, supposed to be a volunteer—and that word "volunteer" is the word used to evade the law—"Why are you here?" The sol-

dier replied, "Because I could not find a job to support my family if I did not accept their request to come here."

So there you have the reason Thai soldiers are fighting in Laos.

This year, again, we are asking for about the same amount of heavy money to keep these mercenaries fighting in Laos.

Let me ask what the function of the Senate is, if we pass laws that stipulate one thing as to how the taxpayers money is used, but, regardless of the law, the administration does what it pleases.

In this case, it actually goes beyond that particular aspect. In order to avoid the reduction the Congress made in the AID program, the administration has manipulated the exchange rates to the point where the dollar earnings of the Vietnam Government were kept at an all time high, despite the congressional reduction.

Many people, when you ask them to name the country that has received the most aid, will say, "Yes." When you say "Which one?" they generally say "India." But that is not true. The country that has received by far the most economic and military aid from the United States, aside from the cost of the war, is South Vietnam.

That does not worry me so much as the fact that, after we pass a law and it is clear what the intent of that law is, our investigators find that law has been deliberately violated.

That is why I support the Case amendment. Mr. President, if the press is right, and the press has been right more times than anyone else, we have no more combat ground troops in Vietnam. So what we are supporting now is the great air and naval war, air conducted in the main out of Thailand; much bigger than before. The naval war conducted off the shores, in the Gulf of Tonkin, is much bigger than ever before. Now we are even asking for about the same money as last year to finance mercenaries in Laos, still against the law.

This unfortunate development is one which every Senator, regardless of party, should give serious consideration; that is the reason he is here in the Senate.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I recognize the situation. I only wish to make the comment that I think the first effort in trying to restrict the use of American funds to pay for mercenaries fighting in Laos was an amendment which I offered. The intent of that amendment has been evaded by the Government, by semantic gymnastics, calling the mercenaries "local forces." We are all familiar with that, so I am under no illusions that what we put into the law will be carried out.

With respect to the provision sponsored by the Senator from New Jersey, which amendment I am in great sympathy with and approve of but, nevertheless, I recognize his reasons—everyone looks at this matter from his own point of view. I have no criticism of his being willing to accept the provisions of the amendment offered by the Senator from Colorado, but I personally oppose the amendment, because I think that this program of continuing to spend ever-

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increasing amounts of money to hire mercenaries to fight in a lost cause will only serve to bankrupt the Nation and prolong the agony of the war in Vietnam and Indochina. I have very little hope that these troops will make a decisive difference. The reports from Laos support this view. In fact, I do not understand quite why the Government continues the war in Indochina. It is becoming more and more difficult for me to understand what purpose they have in mind by continuing the war and not bringing it to a close. But that is a broad question.

On the pending amendment, I oppose it, for whatever it is worth. I oppose it on the principle that I do not think our country should spend the kind of money it is spending to hire Thai soldiers to fight in a cause which we initiated in Laos. Nor do I approve of hiring Thais or Koreans to fight in Vietnam or in Cambodia.

We have debated this matter before. We put a prohibition in the law and the administration has found a way of evading it. I thought it was rather interesting that the Senator from Colorado himself referred to these troops as "foreign troops," whereas the administration, in its evasion of the original provision, has called them "local forces."

It is about the same sort of difference between a "bombing raid" and a "protective reaction strike." The terms are identical but they are used to hoodwink the public.

I do not know that there is anything further to say, except that I disapprove of the use of our money as now estimated to be over \$100 million in payment to Thai troops to fight in Laos. I thoroughly disapprove of it.

That is about all I care to say at this time.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator from Arkansas yield for a question?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. The able Senator from Arkansas, a former chairman of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, knows plenty about our financial situation. He knows also that the House has just passed a bill which we understand is favored by the administration, to give \$29 billion back to the States in the form of revenue sharing. He knows that, whereas 20 years ago we had \$25 billion in gold and owed but \$7 billion redeemable in gold, today we have \$10 billion in gold and owe—depending on how one figures it—from \$35 billion to \$60 billion. He knows, too, that the mayors of nearly all our large cities are frank in saying their cities are bankrupt. He knows that the States cannot spend more money, under their State constitutions, than they take in in taxes.

I would ask the able former chairman of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, does he know where we are going to get the money to continue these gigantic expenditures in Cambodia, Thailand, Laos, and various other countries with whom we are not yet at war. As a matter of fact, we are not officially at war in Vietnam, either. In any case, does not the Senator agree that it is easier to get \$1 billion to put into this

military effort in the Far East than to get, say, \$100,000 for schools and roads in the Senator's State of Arkansas, or roads and schools for Missouri?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator from Missouri is absolutely right. Senators can get up on the floor of the Senate and propose an amendment increasing the amount for military programs without any hearings, without any evidence whatever, and get it adopted.

We cannot begin to get \$100,000 for the State of Missouri or for the State of Arkansas without long hearings, plus an authorization bill and an appropriation bill. There is quite an obsession in Congress with regard to anything of a foreign, military nature. Such a matter can be easily passed here. We have done it time and again.

I thought about this this morning on my way to work. I was caught in the traffic jam like nearly everyone else. We see examples where there is a rainstorm and everything is disrupted. With the great technological advances that the United States has made, we can get to the moon. However, we cannot make arrangements to get to our offices under adverse weather conditions. It normally takes me 10 minutes. However, this morning it took me over an hour because of the recent storm.

It is amazing when one considers how this Nation has wasted its resources all around the world. The pending amendment is an example of it. What good does it do to pay more money to hire people to fight a war which we want to end?

The taxpayers must bear the cost of all of this. And if the cost is not paid out of their taxes, some money is borrowed, and our children and grandchildren will pay for it.

I have no idea what good can come out of hiring Thais to fight in Laos.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Does not the former chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency believe that a viable economy, with a sound dollar, is as important to true national security of the United States as is defending the countries of Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, South Vietnam with billions upon billions of dollars, and little or no help from our allies? Even that help we pay for.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, indeed they are. On the other hand Laos has not the slightest relation to our own security, none whatever.

The soundness of our economy is the basis of our strength. The idea has somehow developed that national security is solely military in character, which is simply not true. The military itself is dependent on a strong economy to pay for their expenditures. We are sacrificing for the military by exaggerating the significance of this war.

Our nuclear weapons are a good example. We do not dare to use them. We could drop an atomic bomb on North Vietnam. We could incinerate it all at once. Instead, we are doing it piecemeal.

These countries are not significant to our security. I do not think that anyone can make a case that they are.

Laos does not make any difference at

all to the security of our Nation. I do not believe it makes any difference to the United States what happens to Laos. Does the Senator from Missouri think that it does?

Mr. SYMINGTON. It does not. The able Senator from Arkansas has expressed my position better than I have.

Does the Senator from Arkansas believe we will continue to spend our dollars at the rate of more than \$100 million a year to finance these troops in Laos after we possibly have reached some agreement with North Vietnam? What are the ideas of the able Senator with respect to our employing our own military forces and mercenaries in the Far East despite the increasing surge of various demands at home, even if we do reach an agreement to end this Vietnam tragedy?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That depends on the election this fall. I have no control over that. If President Nixon wins reelection, we will continue to be there, I suppose. For what reason I do not understand.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Nor do I at this stage.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. If the country wishes to discontinue this kind of policy, it can express itself. We will have an opportunity to do so this fall.

We have tried to stop the war. The Senator from Missouri has been one of the leading figures in trying to bring this war to an end, and to show the disastrous effects of it. But we have been unable to do it. It is up to the American people in November to make their choice as to whether they want to continue the war and to continue our sacrifices, not being able to do what we want to do and not having decent roads and transportation systems here at home.

I heard on the radio this morning, having to listen to it in the car, that towns in Virginia and Pennsylvania are without water and without water systems. Their bridges are out.

All of this is obviously a sign that someone had not foreseen and prepared for an emergency of this kind. In the meantime, we are engaged in the war in Vietnam, and I guess the cost now would approach \$200 billion. We are pouring out money in the amount of hundreds of millions of dollars. The Senator from Missouri knows it better than anyone else. It is so incomprehensible and irrational that I do not know how to comment on it in a reasonable way. It is almost impossible to do so.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I remember, back in 1961 at the time General Taylor and Mr. Rostow made their famous trip to Saigon. I was there then also and a member of the AID program said, "Let me show you the way the taxpayers' money is being spent out here." We went out and saw a beautiful cloverleaf on one of the roads, the type you see where there is heavy traffic in this country. We took out our watches to observe the amount of traffic. With this beautiful addition to the roads and economy of Vietnam, to the profit of certain American contractors and others, exactly three cars utilized that cloverleaf in 15 minutes. That was in 1961, at the very

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beginning of what has been going on ever since.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I can agree with the Senator on the absurdity of such extravagance. However, I believe that is better than the cost of these 20 million craters that we have made in Vietnam. Those craters are 20 feet deep and 30 or 40 feet across. They are all across that country. I think that even the example of the cloverleaf, while it is an excellent example, is a little less extravagant than the craters we have formed in that country and the forests that we have destroyed and defoliated. I would rather have the cloverleaf than the other.

The whole thing is so irrational in my mind. People cannot believe it. It is so far out that most American people refuse to believe it. It revolts them so that they will not believe it. They think that it could not be true that their country would do a thing like that.

Mr. President, I would venture to say that if we could really look into the minds of the American people, the majority of them would say that this could not be true, that their country would not do such a thing.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I ask the Senator from Arkansas, the former chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency if he does not believe the time will soon come when the American people will be forced to believe it because our economy is suffering so heavily as a result of the tremendous export of jobs and dollars. This has been going on now to the tune of tens of billions of dollars a year for over a quarter of a century.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator from Missouri is correct. Because of our accumulated wealth 15 or 20 years ago, it is hard for the people to believe what has happened in the last decade.

We are going through a period of inflation and enormous budget deficits. We are adding daily to the national debt. The administration is now asking for another \$15 billion increase. They want an overall debt ceiling of \$465 billion.

The situation may not appear quite so bad because during an inflationary period, people think that they are getting richer. They look at the price of stocks and at the price of land. They think that they are better off. The collapse will come later.

As the Senator from Missouri knows, it has taken place time after time in other countries. At the moment, people think that we are fairly well off. We see the reports in the newspaper prophesizing better business conditions. It will be some time before we have to pay for the kind of extravagance we have been going through in the last 10 years. But the day of reckoning will come.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Is it not true that the interest on the debt today is the third largest component cost to the American taxpayer in the Federal budget?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes; some \$20 billion. The Senator is correct. That is payment for past military expenditures. At present it is \$83 billion. Those figures do not include, for example, the care for veterans, which will go on for the next 50 years.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield the floor, if the Senator wishes. Or does the Senator wish to ask a question?

Mr. CASE. I just want to say a few things. First, I appreciate very much the friendly reference to my participation in the particular amendment and the understanding of my position, which the Senator has expressed.

I understand fully his unwillingness to go along with it, especially because of his experience with the 1970 amendment of which he was the sponsor and by which Congress directed that money not be spent for mercenaries in Laos.

The Dominick amendment would limit the effectiveness of the particular section to Thailand. In the judgment of the Senator from New Jersey, and this is his only difference with his chairman, it is worth getting that restriction into law, and getting that restriction into law is better than getting nothing.

For that reason the Senator from New Jersey has agreed to this compromise.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I want to make it clear that everyone tries to do what he can. I think the Senator's objective is the same as mine.

I have about given up hope of influencing the administration. We already have a prohibition in the law but by semantic gymnastics the administration has evaded it; they pay no attention to it. I do not know how we can do any more.

I go along with the Senator's original effort, and I do not question this modification in any way.

Ever since I was in grade school and read about the Hessians I have had a fixation about mercenaries. I think it unfair that we have other people to fight wars. If people believe in it they should fight the wars themselves.

Evidently, we do not believe in it; we hold back, but at the same time we pay these poor people in Thailand to go there and fight. They do not do a good job. Their hearts are not in it. They pick up a few hundred dollars. I am sure they are not going to prevail and win freedom for Laos any more than the Hessians did for England.

It is a futile operation to try to get this administration to abide by existing law, but we do the best we can.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, at the request of the distinguished Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER), I ask unanimous consent that a statement by him in support of my amendment be printed in the Record.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

STATEMENT BY SENATOR BAKER

I support the compromise amendment offered by the distinguished junior Senator from Colorado regarding Section 515 of the Foreign Assistance Bill. That section, which would require prior Congressional authorization for U.S. assistance to foreign troops operating in Laos, Thailand, and North Vietnam, comes at a very delicate time in the tragic history of U.S. involvement in that conflict for seldom, if ever, have conditions been as conducive to bringing a just and honorable end to the war as they are today. I realize, of course, that hopes have been falsely raised many times before and I am not

contending that peace in Southeast Asia is just around the corner, but I am saying that there is substantial reason for hope and that hope can only be enhanced by not limiting the power of the President which is what Section 515 would do. A brief examination of the record should help prove why recent developments make striking Section 515 of the bill a reasonable and responsible thing to do.

On the military front, after 71 long and courageous days of fighting, the siege at An Loc has been lifted. Kontum, which at one point appeared destined to fall, now seems to be in no immediate danger. The prized provincial capital of Hue which also appeared doomed for destruction now seems to have been converted from a defensive fortress into a staging ground for sporadic attacks by the South Vietnamese Army into enemy-held Quang Tri province—attacks which, though limited, have succeeded in keeping the North Vietnamese army off guard.

In addition, the massive bombing of enemy targets in the North and South combined with the comprehensive mining of North Vietnamese waters has served to significantly reduce the strength of the North Vietnamese invasion as well as cause some disagreement over current policy among Hanoi's top officials. It would be historically naive, perhaps, to believe that the increased bombing and mining had broken the will of the North Vietnamese, but it is safe to say that it has caused a careful re-examination of their policies, especially in light of other diplomatic activity.

The President's trip to Moscow apparently convinced the Soviet leadership that he was totally serious about ending the war and that seriousness was later conveyed to the Hanoi leadership when Soviet President Podgorny visited North Vietnam for several days of talks last week. Upon the conclusion of those talks, President Podgorny said that the Soviet Union "will do everything possible for a de-escalation of the Vietnam war." Such a desire on the part of the Soviets is entirely consistent with their increasing interest in reducing spending in Southeast Asia to meet more pressing needs in other parts of the world and at home.

Moreover, Dr. Henry Kissinger is currently in Peking conducting substantive discussions with the Chinese leadership in an effort to obtain a commitment to de-escalate, similar to that of the Soviet Union. Although it most likely will be very difficult to determine whether we actually received such a clear commitment, the Chinese also have domestic needs that require greater attention and there is certainly reason to believe that the Chinese will be interested in ending the Vietnam War.

All of these factors are reasons why the North Vietnamese might, in the near future, be willing to seriously discuss the President's latest peace proposals and if such willingness is forthcoming, we should be prepared. The President's latest offer would most likely leave the North Vietnamese in control of most or all of the territory they have gained or held since the offensive began and in an effort to minimize their gains, it is necessary to continue assistance to the Thai irregulars who are fighting with Lao and tribal forces to keep Laos from falling to the North Vietnamese. Their success as a fighting force has helped protect not only Thailand, but also South Vietnam as well.

Section 515 of the Foreign Assistance Bill would require Congressional authorization for these on-going, vital efforts and such a process could be extremely time-consuming and costly at this very delicate point in the war. I do not object specifically to the intention of Section 515 in involving the Congress in future such operations, but under the circumstances of this situation, I feel very strongly that an attempt to limit the President's power at this time would be the height of irresponsibility and it is for this reason

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that I support the compromise offered by the Senator from Colorado.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, if there are no further comments I move that the amendment be agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment. (Putting the question.)

The yeas appear to have it.

Mr. YOUNG. I ask for a division.

Mr. DOMINICK. I did not understand what the Chair said.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The yeas appear to have it.

Mr. YOUNG. I am on my feet asking for a division.

Mr. DOMINICK. Let us have a standing vote.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All in favor of the amendment will stand and be counted.

Mr. YOUNG. I ask for the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The yeas and nays are requested. Is there a sufficient second? There is not a sufficient second.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. DOMINICK. Standing vote, Mr. President.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The absence of a quorum has been suggested. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I ask for a division on the vote.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. A division has been requested. All in favor of the amendment will please stand. Those opposed will please stand.

The amendment is agreed to.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. PASTORE. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Messages in writing from the President of the United States, submitting nominations, were communicated to the Senate by Mr. Geisler, one of his secretaries.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

As in executive session, the Presiding Officer (Mr. FANNIN) laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations, which were referred to the appropriate committees.

(The nominations received today are printed at the end of Senate proceedings.)

ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY AMENDMENTS OF 1972

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now

proceed to the consideration of S. 3010, which the clerk will state by title.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (S. 3010) to provide for the continuation of programs authorized under the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, and for other purposes.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, under the order, the distinguished Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER) was to be recognized at this time for the purpose of calling up his amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct. The Senator from Texas is not in the Chamber.

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I call attention to the absence of a quorum.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Without prejudice to the Senator from Texas.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask that the distinguished junior Senator from Texas (Mr. BENTSEN) may be recognized at this time for the purpose of calling up an amendment without prejudice to the distinguished senior Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER) who, under the order, was to be recognized to call up two amendments in succession.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. TOWER. I do not object.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized.

AMENDMENT NO. 1237

Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment and ask that it be stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The amendment was read as follows:

At the end of the bill add the following new section:

AMENDMENT CONCERNING CERTAIN TRAINING PROGRAMS FOR YOUTH

Sec. 26. Section 125(a) of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sentence: "The Director shall insure that low-income persons who reside in public or private institutions shall be eligible for participation in programs under this part."

Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. President, at the outset I commend the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. NELSON) for his work on the economic opportunity amendments.

The committee which he chairs has brought an urgently needed bill to the Senate for approval. It has been refined and perfected to meet the President's objections and it should receive overwhelming approval in this body. The programs contained in the 1972 economic opportunity amendments are vitally important to the poor in this Nation, and they must be continued.

Mr. President, my amendment is very brief and is directed at the section of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, which concerns eligibility for the Neighborhood

Youth Corps and other youth employment programs.

Essentially, the amendment would insure that low-income persons who reside in a public or private institution such as an orphanage or a penal or correctional institution would be eligible for participation in training and employment programs for youth.

I note with some satisfaction that the committee has increased the authorization for the Neighborhood Youth Corps by some \$500 million to create 100,000 work and training opportunities in this very vital program.

We know what the Neighborhood Youth Corps can do, and we know how much it has meant to low-income youth. We also know that unemployment among 16 to 19 year olds has risen steadily since 1966 and that present projections indicate that it will total over 1,800,000 in 1972, more than a 100-percent increase since 1966.

At the same time, Mr. President, I have been distressed by recent administrative decisions by the Department of Labor, and in particular the regional office in Dallas. These decisions have led me to offer my amendment.

On March 29, 1972, the Labor Department's Manpower Administration in Dallas issued a memorandum to sponsors of youth employment programs indicating that prospective enrollees in the Neighborhood Youth Corps who regularly live in institutions, such as orphanages or correctional institutions, would no longer be eligible for enrollment in the programs.

Mr. President, this seems to be a particularly insensitive action. It is very difficult for me to rationalize, and the rationale offered by the Labor Department is completely unconvincing. I received a letter from the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Manpower, who said that:

Residents of State or private child care and correctional institutions are not eligible to participate in the program since it is presumed that the supporting agency has allocated resources to maintain their residents while in high school or for the duration of their internment.

Mr. President, if I may say so, this is a rather shaky presumption. Letters I have received from orphanages in Texas indicate that the Labor Department's reading of the situation is inaccurate at best.

One letter from St. Margaret's Center for Children in El Paso indicates that six of the eight teenagers living there are in the custody of the El Paso Child Welfare Department and that the county pays approximately \$2 a day for their upkeep.

The orphanage, which has to serve as a substitute parent, must constantly be searching for other resources to meet the needs of the children in its care.

The truth is, Mr. President, that conditions in various public and private institutions vary, and there is no reason to assume that a child living in an orphanage, a correctional institution, or any other public or private institution is being given the kind of resources he needs to give him an even break in schooling. To exclude all of these chil-

tions of that region. This policy goal made a great deal of sense to me since it would enhance international cooperation, and lessen the overloaded burden that existed on the backs of the taxpayers of the United States. Nevertheless, as I look at the figures that are before me, it seems as if the trend has been alarmingly in the opposite direction.

For 1970 we appropriated \$350 million in military grants, \$70 million in military credit sales, and \$395 million for supporting assistance; the amount requested by the administration for 1973, just 4 years later, is more than twice that amount—\$780 million in military grants, \$527 million in military credits, and \$844 million for supporting assistance.

The committee, in its wisdom, cut those figures back to \$600 million, \$400 million, and \$650 million respectively, but the Senator from Pennsylvania seeks again to raise that military grant figure to \$725 million and the supporting assistance figure to \$770 million. The committee has already doubled the amount which was appropriated for 1970; this amendment would add still another quarter of a billion dollars when we are trying to implement the Nixon doctrine by spreading the burden of defense costs.

Mr. CHURCH. The Senator is quite correct. All the committee is trying to do is hold the line rather modestly against this swelling program.

All these programs, as the Senator knows, get larger with each passing year through "bureaucratic momentum;" the committee is trying to put the brakes to this phenomena.

I call the Senator's attention to the fact that in so doing, we have had to yield some ground. There is \$100 million more in this bill than in last year's bill, to start with, for military assistance. The Senator from Pennsylvania, however, has added a quarter of a billion dollars more. As a consequence, unless we are just going to throw open the door and say, in effect, that any amount is acceptable to Congress, that we will no longer exercise our judgment or attempt to impose some reasonable restraint on behalf of the people we represent, who must pay the bill, then I would think it prudent for the Senate to support the committee.

Mr. BAYH. Will the Senator permit me to interrupt for just one last question, to get his thoughts?

Mr. CHURCH. I yield.

Mr. BAYH. This whole question of when and where to spend military funds has not been examined in the past as carefully as I think the Senate is determined to examine it in the future.

A fundamental principle which must be considered is the relationship of the expenditures to our national interest.

It is rather obvious to the Senator from Indiana, and I am sure to the Senator from Idaho, that what happens in the Middle East with respect to the security and continued freedom of the State of Israel is very much in our national interest, and that there is a great deal of sympathy in this country to support that small democracy and provide them the wherewithal to defend themselves. That is exactly what they are doing; we

are not asking for divisions or air support from the United States, but for the military hardware to defend themselves.

I do not want to be too harsh, but it appears almost as if this very important authorization to help sustain democracy in Israel is being used almost as a black-mail effort to get several times that amount to spend we know not where and we know not for what. Is the Senator from Indiana too harsh in his judgment?

Mr. CHURCH. The Senator is accurate in his observation, and his statement is certainly no more harsh than the opening remarks of the distinguished minority leader. The distinguished Senator from Indiana is quite right.

I have never had any difficulty when it comes to supplying military assistance or economic assistance, when needed, to Israel. Israel is a democratic country. It has the full and loyal support of its people. It has demonstrated again and again its capacity to defend itself, without ever calling upon a single American soldier.

My difficulty is with this tendency of ours, through this military assistance program and the foreign military sales effort, to supply 40 or 50 different governments in the world with our arms, and in the main, to supply various dictatorial regimes, all under the guise of anticommunism. However, most of these American financed and furnished weapons have been used by these regimes to hold their own people in check. We have allowed this to grow and grow until it has become global in its scope. It is now a monstrously immoral program.

I point out to the Senator that, insofar as the war theater is concerned, insofar as Laos and South Vietnam and Cambodia are concerned, whatever military assistance is needed for those countries is not covered by this bill, anyway. All of that—and it is a great deal, as the Senator knows—is covered in the so-called defense budget of the United States.

What is really being asked for here is a quarter of a billion dollars more to distribute to countries which, in the main, if not almost in the entirety, are reactionary, repressive regimes, and certainly by no stretch of the imagination could be compared to the kind of government or society represented by the free and sovereign State of Israel.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CHURCH. I yield.

Mr. SCOTT. Does the Senator include the Republic of South Korea as a reactionary, regressive regime?

Mr. CHURCH. The Senator from Idaho has no particular admiration for the Government of South Korea. There is a great difference between that government and the Government of Israel. I want to say that most emphatically. The two are not comparable at all.

Mr. SCOTT. The Senator has met the ruler of the Kingdom of Jordan. Does he include the Kingdom of Jordan as a reactionary and regressive or recessive regime?

Mr. CHURCH. I do not place it in the list of flourishing democracies in the world.

Mr. SCOTT. In other words, the Senator is condemning all these other countries which have been friends and allies of the United States and is using that as an argument for not keeping our given word, as in our promise to Korea to modernize their equipment.

Mr. CHURCH. The Senator from Idaho does not condemn any government. The Senator from Idaho is saying that the committee bill contains adequate money for these purposes and that it ought not be increased by another quarter of a billion dollars. It already has been increased by \$100 million, and nearly all the bill is directed toward such governments as those mentioned by the Senator from Pennsylvania. It is sufficient. It need not be increased.

A special case can be made for Israel, because it is a very special country, faced by a very difficult problem—the problem of Russian-supplied military arms and equipment to the surrounding Arab States which are unanimously hostile to Israel and against whom Israel has fought several wars.

Israel's position is a special one. We should be particularly careful to make certain that we earmark sufficient funds for Israel to maintain an effective and successful military deterrent against the outbreak of further warfare in the Middle East.

Mr. SCOTT. Would not the Senator, then agree, that it is necessary to help South Korea maintain an effective and successful military deterrent against those who might endanger its security?

Mr. CHURCH. The bill as reported by the committee contains adequate funding for that purpose.

Mr. SCOTT. I think it is obvious that we cannot agree—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time of the Senator from Idaho has expired. The Senator from Pennsylvania has 9 minutes remaining.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the motion to table.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The motion to table has not been offered.

Mr. CHURCH. I give notice that I shall ask for the yeas and nays when the motion is made.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania has 9 minutes remaining.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time, and I now move to table the substitute of the Senator from Idaho to the amendment of the Senator from Pennsylvania.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the motion to table.

The yeas and the nays were not ordered.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and the nays on the motion to table.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

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The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion to table. On this question the yeas and the nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from Georgia (Mr. GAMBRELL), the Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL), the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. HOLLINGS), the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES), the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. HUMPHREY), the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. INOUE), the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. JORDAN), the Senator from Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD), the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. McCLELLAN), the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. McGOVERN), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. MCINTYRE), the Senator from Montana (Mr. METCALF), the Senator from Maine (Mr. MUSKIE), the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. RIBICOFF), and the Senator from Utah (Mr. MOSS) are necessarily absent.

I further announce that the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. ELLENDER) is absent on official business.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES), the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. HUMPHREY), the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. McGOVERN), the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. RIBICOFF), and the Senator from Georgia (Mr. GAMBRELL), would each vote "nay."

Mr. SCOTT. I announce that the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BROCK), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. CORTON), the Senator from Michigan (Mr. GRIFFIN), the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. HANSEN), the Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD), the Senator from Nebraska (Mr. HRUSKA), and the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) are necessarily absent.

The Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER) and the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MUNDT) are absent because of illness.

The Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. BELLMON) and the Senator from Ohio (Mr. TAFT) are detained on official business.

On this vote, the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER) is paired with the Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD). If present and voting, the Senator from Arizona would vote "yea" and the Senator from Oregon would vote "nay."

The result was announced—yeas 35, nays 38, as follows:

[No. 242 Leg.]

YEAS—35

Aiken	Dominick	Schweiker
Allen	Eastland	Scott
Allott	Ervin	Smith
Baker	Fannin	Sparkman
Beall	Fong	Stafford
Bennett	Gurney	Stennis
Boggs	Jordan, Idaho	Stevens
Buckley	Mathias	Talmadge
Cook	Miller	Thurmond
Cooper	Packwood	Tower
Curtis	Pearson	Young
Dole	Saxbe	

NAYS—38

Anderson	Burdick	Case
Bayh	Byrd	Chiles
Bentsen	Harry F., Jr.	Church
Bible	Byrd, Robert C.	Cranston
Brooke	Cannon	Bagleton

Fulbright	Magnuson	Randolph
Harris	McGee	Roth
Hart	Mondale	Spong
Hartke	Montoya	Stevenson
Jackson	Nelson	Symington
Javits	Pastore	Tunney
Kennedy	Pell	Weicker
Long	Proxmire	Williams

NOT VOTING—27

Bellmon	Hatfield	McGovern
Brock	Hollings	McIntyre
Cotton	Hruska	Metcalfe
Ellender	Hughes	Moss
Gambrell	Humphrey	Mundt
Goldwater	Inouye	Muskie
Gravel	Jordan, N.C.	Percy
Griffin	Mansfield	Ribicoff
Hansen	McClellan	Taft

So the motion to table the Church amendment was rejected.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. KENNEDY). The question occurs on agreeing to the Church amendment to the Scott amendment. All time has expired.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Pennsylvania, as modified. On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from Georgia (Mr. GAMBRELL), the Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL), the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. HOLLINGS), the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES), the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. HUMPHREY), the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. INOUE), the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. JORDAN), the Senator from Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD), the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. McCLELLAN), the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. McGOVERN), the Senator from Montana (Mr. METCALF), the Senator from Utah (Mr. MOSS), the Senator from Maine (Mr. MUSKIE), the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. RIBICOFF), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. MCINTYRE), and the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. ELLENDER) are absent on official business.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES), the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. HUMPHREY), the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. McGOVERN), the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. RIBICOFF), and the Senator from Georgia (Mr. GAMBRELL) would each vote "yea."

Mr. SCOTT. I announce that the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BROCK), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. CORTON), the Senator from Michigan (Mr. GRIFFIN), the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. HANSEN), the Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD), the Senator from Nebraska (Mr. HRUSKA), and the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) are necessarily absent.

The Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER) and the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MUNDT) are absent because of illness.

On this vote, the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER) is paired with the Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD). If present and voting, the Senator from

Arizona would vote "nay" and the Senator from Oregon would vote "yea."

The result was announced—yeas 54, nays 21, as follows:

[No. 243 Leg.]

YEAS—54

Allott	Dole	Pell
Anderson	Bagleton	Proxmire
Baker	Eastland	Randolph
Bayh	Fulbright	Roth
Bentsen	Harris	Saxbe
Bible	Hart	Schweiker
Boggs	Hartke	Sparkman
Brooke	Jackson	Spong
Buckley	Javits	Stevens
Burdick	Kennedy	Stevenson
Byrd	Long	Symington
Harry F., Jr.	Magnuson	Talmadge
Byrd, Robert C.	Mathias	Thurmond
Cannon	Miller	Tower
Case	Mondale	Tunney
Chiles	Montoya	Weicker
Church	Nelson	Williams
Cook	Pastore	
Cranston	Pearson	

NAYS—21

Aiken	Dominick	Packwood
Allen	Ervin	Scott
Beall	Fannin	Smith
Bellmon	Fong	Stafford
Bennett	Gurney	Stennis
Cooper	Jordan, Idaho	Taft
Curtis	McGee	Young

NOT VOTING—25

Brock	Hollings	McIntyre
Cotton	Hruska	Metcalfe
Ellender	Hughes	Moss
Gambrell	Humphrey	Mundt
Goldwater	Inouye	Muskie
Gravel	Jordan, N.C.	Percy
Griffin	Mansfield	Ribicoff
Hansen	McClellan	
Hatfield	McGovern	

So Mr. CHURCH's amendment to the Scott amendment was agreed to.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment to the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. CHURCH. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question recurs on the Scott amendment, as amended.

Who yields time?

Mr. SCOTT. I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. CHURCH. I yield back the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the Scott amendment, as amended (putting the question).

The amendment, as amended, was agreed to.

Mr. CHURCH. I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. JAVITS. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now proceed to the consideration of the amendment to be offered by the Senator from Colorado (Mr. DOMINICK).

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I send the amendment to the desk.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The amendment was read as follows:

On page 7, line 18, delete "(a)". On line 22, beginning with the word, "by" strike through

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the word, "funds" on line 24, and insert in lieu thereof: "in Thailand by any military forces, other than the national forces of Thailand or the United States."

On page 8, line 1, insert a period after "purpose".

On page 8, line 1, beginning with the word, "and" strike through line 10.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, if I may have the attention of Senators I think we can be very brief on this amendment and, hopefully, with the cooperation of the Senator from New Jersey and the Senator from Idaho, we will be able to dispose of it rather rapidly.

Mr. President, my original amendment which was printed would have struck the total section 515 on pages 7 and 8. I have talked at length with members of the staff and with the Senator from New Jersey, and the amendment I have submitted is different in considerable substance from the amendment which was originally offered.

What we are doing in the amendment I have offered now is strike any reference either to combat or military operations in Laos or military operations in North Vietnam, leaving in, however, the proposed prohibition on the use of funds insofar as third countries are concerned in Thailand.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may we have quiet in the Senate? This is an important matter.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BURDICK). The Senate will be in order.

Mr. DOMINICK. As a result of this amendment, if agreed to, the provision which is before Senators on pages 7 and 8 would read as follows:

No funds authorized or appropriated under any provision of law shall be made available by any officer, employee, or agency of the United States Government, for the purpose of financing any military operations in Thailand by any military forces other than the national forces of Thailand or the United States . . .

Then it would read after that:

unless Congress has specifically authorized or specifically authorizes the making of funds available for such purpose.

And the remainder of the section would then be stricken.

The reason why we have done this is that the Armed Services Committee as such by, I believe, a general agreement between the Armed Services Committee Chairman and the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, has maintained jurisdiction in connection with Vietnam and with Laos.

The general military assistance jurisdiction is in the Foreign Relations Committee and would be applicable insofar as Thailand is concerned. So we are leaving Thailand in. But I want to make it explicit—and I think the Senator from New Jersey would agree with this—that there is no situation in Thailand at the present time which would lead to support of any third party troops in that area. We anticipate none. Consequently, this wording, although it may be important from the point of view of asserting jurisdiction in what we are doing in military operations country by country, is no more important for Thailand than it would be for India or Pakistan or any other

country in the world in which we do not contemplate doing this.

Personally, I feel the legislation as such is not what I would like to see in the bill, but almost all legislation in this body is a matter of compromise along these lines, and it may be that the question of whether this provision should be in at any point can be taken up, as it has been in the past, in conference, and then either knocked out or left in by the conferees.

It is, as I say, my feeling that this is a good substitute; that it takes care of the items which were of concern to me and the other distinguished members of this body who sponsored the original proposal that I put in, namely, Senators STENNIS, YOUNG, EASTLAND, BENNETT, TOWER, and DOLE. I believe, as far as I can ascertain, that this amendment would be satisfactory to those cosponsors. I tried to stay in touch with as many of them as I could. As I say, it does, in part at least, meet some of the purposes the Senator from New Jersey was seeking, but it does not any longer conflict with the jurisdiction we would otherwise have in the Armed Services Committee.

I am happy to yield at this point to the Senator from New Jersey.

Mr. CASE. I thank my colleague. His statement is accurate and very fair, as his statements always are. I would have preferred that the section the Senator from Colorado is amending remain in the bill as I introduced it and the Foreign Relations Committee approved it, but we cannot always get everything we want. I am glad, speaking for myself only, to accept the Senator's amendment as the best that we can get under the circumstances.

Mr. President, I am absolutely opposed to the United States carrying on large scale mercenary operations anywhere—Southeast Asia or anywhere else—without congressional authorization. I think that if our democracy and our Constitution mean anything, such authorization should be mandatory. But I think we cannot avoid the fact that there are ongoing mercenary operations in Laos and in North Vietnam financed by the United States. We know this. We know that Thai troops are in Laos because, after a long series of newspaper leaks and interviews with Thai troops themselves, the administration finally stated publicly last year that this was so. We know of the operations in North Vietnam only because of newspaper accounts. Perhaps some day we are going to be officially informed of the facts on American financed ground raids in North Vietnam.

But I do accept the fact that these operations exist, although I believe Congress should have been asked to authorize them. Congress unofficially has been aware of them. The Armed Services Committee has been advised about them. As I understand, the Appropriations Subcommittee dealing with defense appropriations has known about them. Appropriations have been made by Congress with this knowledge. So, in a sense—and I am sure this is the view of the majority or the Members of the Con-

gress—there is some feeling that these operations have been authorized by Congress and that the Senate is unwilling to stop them at this particular point, with hostilities continuing.

Recognizing that while not necessarily agreeing, I accept the suggestion offered by the Senator from Colorado (Mr. DOMINICK), although it goes against my grain to do so because of my general view of the undesirability of unauthorized mercenary operations; but I think he has proposed something which meets one of my main purposes, and that is to establish the fact that, in the future, specific congressional authorizations should be necessary.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I appreciate what the Senator has said. I know it has been a concern of his for a long period of time. It is my understanding, on reading this amendment—and I would like to have this colloquy with the Senator from New Jersey—that this would not prohibit the United States from supporting our ally Thailand within Thailand with some of the problems they may have. Is that correct?

Mr. CASE. This does not prevent American support in Thailand to Thai troops. That is quite correct.

Mr. DOMINICK. And it would not prohibit our support of what might be termed irregular troops who are nationals of Thailand?

Mr. CASE. Would the Senator repeat that?

Mr. DOMINICK. Yes. It would not prevent support of what might be termed irregular forces or nationals of Thailand. In other words, in case some of the tribesmen who are not part of the regular armed forces there should find themselves in problems because of invasion by some country, they could be supported, too?

Mr. CASE. It would be my feeling that the rationale of what we are doing would not prohibit American support to Thai regular or irregular troops in Thailand so long as they were under direction of the Thai Government.

Mr. DOMINICK. That is what I wanted to get as far as the RECORD is concerned. I am glad the Senator goes along with that, because that is my understanding of what the amendment would do.

It seems to me that the striking of lines 2 through 10, really, on page 8 is a significant compromise by the distinguished Senator from New Jersey—taking out reference to Laos and Vietnam.

I see my distinguished chairman here. I am sure he may have some questions or comments on it.

Mr. CASE. Would the Senator permit me to make one more observation before completing this colloquy? I think I should say I do not regard what we are doing here in any way to be an authorization of any kind for American assistance, but the elimination of new prescriptions against certain kinds of American assistance. That is the purpose of it.

Mr. DOMINICK. That is my understanding.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me?

Mr. DOMINICK. I am happy to yield.

Mr. STENNIS. I would like to make this comment. This is a subject of concern to all of us. It is a matter that is very difficult to handle, frankly. It is difficult for the Department of Defense or the Department of State, or whatever agency of government may be involved. We have had this problem before our committee many times, and will continue to have it.

I want to commend the Senator from Colorado, who is a very able member of our committee, for the work he has done in connection with this provision in the bill. I think he and the Senator from New Jersey have reached a very good adjustment of the situation without injury to the position we find ourselves in over there.

Believing that as I do, I am glad to join with him in the modification that he has proposed here, and am delighted to see, too, the Senator from New Jersey willing to meet the Senator and seek to accomplish something that I think will improve the situation without aggravating our present problem there.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I surely appreciate the support of the Senator from Mississippi and the Senator from North Dakota, who was one of the very prominent cosponsors of my originally proposed amendment.

I yield to the Senator from North Dakota.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. President, as I understand the modification, it would not run contrary to the Nixon foreign policy, which I believe is a good one, that of helping friendly nations throughout the world but not using our own troops. They would do their own fighting. I think from time to time it is helpful to give financial assistance to other countries and military supplies and money for economic and other purposes. I hope we will get away from this business of trying to fight the battles of the whole world. That is what the main part of the Nixon policy is about. I think the modification fits well into that foreign policy.

Mr. DOMINICK. I thank the Senator from North Dakota, and I completely agree with him.

As we all know, there are problems in Thailand. They are not nearly as serious as they are in some areas of Southeast Asia, but there are problems in both northeast and southeast Thailand. To date, their regular armed forces have been able to maintain this problem within a reasonable area. That would not prohibit us from giving adequate support, in case they need it, to provide the Thais, or nations in that area, the ability to do their own fighting, which I think we are all for.

So I thank the Senator from New Jersey, the Senator from Mississippi, and the Senator from North Dakota for their support, and I am happy to yield to the Senator from New York.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, as the Senator is limited in time, perhaps I had better seek time from the Senator from Arkansas. Will the Senator from Arkansas yield me some time?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield the Senator from New York whatever time he may require.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I am in agreement with the Senator from New Jersey that this is probably the best way now realistically available to us in which to resolve the question. I appreciate that in war, you use many means which may be distasteful. I am deeply opposed to our being in this war in Indochina, but that is neither here nor there on this issue. The important point here, Mr. President, is that we are, in a sense, condoning a lack of information to Congress.

We did not adopt this amendment lightly in the Foreign Relations Committee. We adopted it only in extremis, because the whole concept of advice and consent in consultation with the Committee on Foreign Relations has broken down in a very serious way. I hope that seeing these evidences of it—which are numerous, not just this alone; the Azores and Bahrain provision, the executive agreements provision, and other matters with which we have dealt, reflect that as well. It will be seen that the situation might have been otherwise had the administration kept us closely informed of what it was doing and why.

I see no reason why it should not have done so. This idea that only the President and his people can be trusted with a secret has already been exploded by the revelations of the Pentagon papers, the Jack Anderson disclosures, the daily trickle of official "leaks" and so on.

The Joint Atomic Energy Committee is entrusted, we believe, with the very highest secrets of government, at least what are alleged to be the highest secrets of government, without qualm. What is it that seems to create a barrier between the Committee on Foreign Relations and the administration, in respect of accountability and responsibility for "classified" information? I think that is what is at the base of this provision, and I deprecate it.

Mr. President, beyond that, we have ongoing activities in Cambodia which raise very serious questions about the good faith with which the administration is sticking by the provisions of the law, including the amendment of Senator COOPER and Senator CHURCH with respect to the range of activities to go on in Cambodia with our backing, and my own amendment making clear in law that we have no commitment to the defense of the Government of Cambodia nor does our aid imply or authorize any such inference.

Yet, the evidence continues to mount that there is a real effort to sort of get around those particular provisions with respect to Cambodia. The press has reported that American advisers—prohibited by law in Cambodia—hover off the ground in helicopters, so their feet do not touch the earth while they direct operations. Such maneuvers to avoid one of the inhibitions of the law raised serious questions of the integrity of the law and the authority of Congress, somewhat like General Lavelle's unauthorized raids.

It is this kind of thing, Mr. President, which deeply troubles Members of Congress and deeply troubles the relationships which are involved here with the executive department, and which cause such deep concern with respect to the

whole Indochina involvement. Mr. President, if there is one thing we have now learned, and the decisive passage by the Senate of the War Powers Act is a clear indication of that, it is that we do not want to back into another Vietnam, or be drawn into it, because the progress of events is such as to make it inevitable.

In 1970, following the Lon Nol coup d'etat against Sihanouk's neutralist government and the attack he ordered against the Communist staging bases along the Cambodia border, President Nixon sent U.S. forces into Cambodia—in that much disputed action. In his April 30 address announcing this attack, the President justified it as a move "to protect our men who are in Vietnam and to guarantee the continued success of our withdrawal programs."

The attack in Cambodia was described as a one-shot affair and subsequent requests to Congress for military aid funds for Cambodia were portrayed as being short term measures related to Vietnamization and withdrawal of U.S. forces. On May 14, Secretary Rogers said that the defense of the Cambodian Government was not the primary purpose of the actions taken, and "that will not be our purpose in the future."

When Congress first authorized the Cambodian assistance request of President Nixon, I authored an amendment which was included in the law, and which has been retained in slightly reworded form since. My amendment, section 7(b), stated:

Military and economic assistance provided by the United States to Cambodia and authorized or appropriated pursuant to this or any other Act shall not be construed as a commitment by the United States to Cambodia for its defense.

The initial administration request for military assistance to Cambodia, on May 12, 1970, was for \$7.9 million but grew by the end of the year to \$155 million. In 1971 it grew to \$246.4 million, and this year the request was \$300 million for military aid and \$30 million in economic aid.

This pattern of logarithmic growth of U.S. military support and involvement in Cambodia would have been cause for grave concern in and of itself. But then, on March 14, 1972, Secretary Rogers stated to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, in support of the Cambodian aid request:

As you know, one of the reasons we have increased the request for Cambodia assistance is that we are anxious to see that the Government in Cambodia survives.

Mr. President, what has become of the provision written into law from the outset, and retained in law ever since, establishing that we have no commitment to Cambodia—or to the Government of Cambodia—for its defense?

I do not think we are being kept candidly informed about what is going on in Cambodia. I have doubts that the thrust of U.S. programs in Cambodia square with the spirit, intent, and letter of the law. Moreover, the question is not merely an academic one. It is a very important one closely related to our whole Indochina experience. The situation in Cambodia, according to a June 6,

June 23, 1972

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1972, New York Times report, is disquietingly like the situation in Vietnam in the early 1960's. I include this report as part of my text:

CAMBODIA SEEMS ADRIPT AFTER 2 YEARS AS
REPUBLIC

(By Craig R. Whitney)

PNOMPENH, CAMBODIA, June 5.—From a start full of hope two years ago, Cambodia has sunk into a deep malaise, without confidence in her leadership, institutions, or ability to decide her own future, in the assessment of a wide range of Cambodians and foreign diplomats.

The malaise has been months in developing, but has had a chance to take root in the last two months, during which the Government of President Lon Nol has been virtually paralyzed by its attempts to legitimize itself as a popularly elected presidential regime.

Yesterday the country held its first presidential election. Marshall Lon Nol was ahead in preliminary results today with 58 per cent of the vote, while his closest contender, In Tam, had 24 per cent, and the marshal will almost certainly turn out to be the winner when the final results of the light voting are proclaimed by the Government in a few days.

He proclaimed himself President March 13 after dissolving what remained of the Cambodian legislature, with Mr. In Tam at its head, and bowed to student pressure to eliminate his friend and closest adviser, Lieut. Gen. Sisowath Sirik Matak, from the Government. The next legislative elections will not take place for three months.

The beginning of the worst part of the decline in Cambodia's morale seems to date from the disastrous rout of Cambodian troops trying to clear Route 6 north of Phnompenh in December. Since that operation, called Tchenla 2, the Cambodian Army has made no new offensive sweeps except unsuccessful ones around the temples of Angkor.

In recent weeks the Cambodians have, almost without a fight, given up most of the territory east of the Mekong River that North Vietnamese and Vietcong troops are using as a staging area for the offensive in South Vietnam.

AMERICAN OFFICIAL GLOOMY

A high American official, speaking of the United States' \$200-million military aid program in Cambodia, shrugged his shoulders as if in despair and said: "I don't see any vigorous prosecution of the war in the cards. Tchenla 2 caused a certain lack of confidence on the part of Lon Nol and the army and the Communists' use of tanks and large amounts of heavy ammunition in their offensive has just indicated to the Khmer that they are no match for the North Vietnamese.

It was also the failure of Tchenla 2 that caused the exacerbation of political strains, but that had been growing quietly ever since March, 1970, when Marshal Lon Nol enjoyed seemingly unanimous backing at the beginning of the republic. The trend since then has been one of centralized rule in his weak hands, but with growing frustration and, with the elections of the weekend, open opposition by some who supported the President in the beginning.

Marshal Lon Nol's principal opponent in the election, Mr. In Tam, was president of the Cambodian National Assembly at the time of the overthrow of Prince Narodom Sihanouk and was one of the three principal figures of the new republic in 1970—along with the President and his close friend, General Sirik Matak.

What has happened to Mr. In Tam and to General Sirik Matak shows, in some ways, the deterioration of the regime. In the summer of 1971, Mr. In Tam became Minister of the Interior, but asked to resign and was dismissed last September as his differences with the marshal grew. He became president

of the renamed Constituent Assembly in November after Marshal Lon Nol took away the legislature's law-making powers and told it to proceed with the drafting of a constitution.

But in March, after student demonstrations against General Sirik Matak, who was Lon Nol's premier and, in effect, the man who had ruled Cambodia since the marshal's stroke more than a year ago, the President bowed to these outside pressures, took General Sirik Matak out of the Government and abolished the Constituent Assembly.

Within 10 days, he had his subordinates draft a constitution to his liking, establishing a presidential form of government with a Cabinet answerable to him and to the two-house legislature, and submitted it to a nationwide referendum, which approved it April 30.

Since March, the Government has been headed by the only man Lon Nol could get to accept the job, Son Ngoc Thanh, a shadowy figure who was on the side of the anti-Sihanouk forces at the beginning of the republic but whose allegiance is now believed to be mostly to the forms and trappings of the republican Government.

"The Government has been virtually paralyzed for the past two months while Lon Nol has been trying to secure his political future," a senior diplomat said. "I would hope he'd start to govern again rather quickly after the elections."

Indeed, in the last few days in Phnompenh have been devoted almost entirely to political activities. A giant parade of military vehicles filled with soldiers bearing placards has circled the city almost every morning, blaring Marshal Lon Nol's political propaganda and DC-3 aircraft have dropped thousands of little pictures of the marshal—similar to those printed on the ballots—all over the city.

During the voting yesterday, Mr. In Tam charged that the Government was making it difficult for his supporters to vote for him, and that his pollwatchers had not been permitted in some of the places where military people, who strongly support Marshall Lon Nol, were voting. Today, he said he would contest the results as "fraudulent and anti-democratic." There has been talk of a coup d'etat by disgruntled elements, but Mr. In Tam refused, in an interview, to go that far.

The third candidate, Keo Ann, was the dean of the Faculty of law of Phnompenh, whose students led the fight against General Sirik Matak in the spring, but he did not campaign prominently and was expected to get less than 5 per cent of the vote.

Mr. In Tam campaigned actively, but one Western diplomat said: Even if In Tam said nothing, a lot of people would vote for him. There's a feeling that the Government has not kept any of the promises it had made, and that it is corrupt.

NOT ENTIRELY BLEAK

In the preliminary results, Mr. Keo Ann did better than expected and the two opposition candidates together had almost 42 per cent.

American officials here point out that the situation is not entirely bleak, and say that a series of monetary reforms and changes in Government policy have staved off a serious rice shortage that seemed to be inevitable last fall. In fact, only 20,000 tons of rice was imported and only 10,000 tons had to be used, according to American economists.

The Nixon Administration has asked Congress for \$75-million in economic aid to Cambodia for the fiscal year beginning July 1, twice this fiscal year's amount.

But the Cambodian budget is at a large deficit because of the war, and unrest is growing among low-paid civil servants and salaried workmen whose pay has not kept up with inflation. In the last few weeks, for example, there have been a series of strikes

for higher wages in Government ministries—something inconceivable in the early days of the republic.

The unrest within the Government and in political movements outside it has been matched by a growth in the ranks of the Cambodian Communists, who are fighting against the Government forces alongside the North Vietnamese and Vietcong in the occupied parts of the country.

The number of members of Khmer Rouge, the Cambodian Communist force, is now estimated at at least 30,000. "There has been a growth, a development of the movement, which, we think, has serious longer-term meaning for the country," an American diplomat said. "But the Government seems to resist the notion that the way to stand up to them is to fight them hard."

Both Mr. In Tam and Marshal Lon Nol, in their campaign statements, emphasized that they wished for a reconciliation with the Cambodian Communists but neither offered any detailed proposals for achieving a reconciliation. One Western diplomat even said, "I don't think it's certain that even if the Vietnam war ended by negotiations, the war in Cambodia would necessarily end at the same time."

All the Cambodian factions seem to realize that, ever since Tchenla 2, it is futile to talk of chasing the North Vietnamese out of the country and that peace will not come to Cambodia before it comes to Vietnam—in the framework of an internationally guaranteed settlement.

The outlook for the future, according to diplomats here, is that the Cambodian forces will offer only token resistance to the Vietnamese Communists, reoccupying lost territory only when the enemy abandons it, and leaving again—as the Cambodian Army has done in the last two months in Svayrieng and Preyveing provinces near the Vietnamese border—when the North Vietnamese want that territory. It is already a kind of de facto truce.

Mr. President there is another aspect of the situation there which gives me concern. I had a colloquy with Senator SPARKMAN and Senator MANSFIELD, concerning the handling of our military assistance in Cambodia. This colloquy took place on December 22, 1970 when the conference report on the first Cambodian aid authorization was adopted in the Senate. The focus of the colloquy was on the question of avoiding the establishment of a large U.S. military organization in Cambodia to run the MAP program. I quote that colloquy because it is quite interesting and instructive in light of the actual situation we find today:

MR. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

MR. MANSFIELD. I yield.

MR. JAVITS. Mr. President, I am very interested to know whether the statement made by the managers on the part of the House, which is now before the Senate on this Cambodian matter, would or would not contemplate the existence of what is called the MAG—that is, a Military Assistance Group—in Cambodia. There is much concern here that once one of these Military Assistance Groups is put in, it is the beginning of a chain of action that leads to troops.

The particular statement on the part of the managers relates to U.S. military personnel provided to supervise the distribution and care of U.S. military supplies and equipment delivered to Cambodia.

That can be done, of course, by individuals operating out of the military section of the embassy or by a MAG.

MR. MANSFIELD. It is my understanding that it does not include a MAG, that it will

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be done by the military attachés in the Embassy.

Mr. JAVITS. I thank the Senator.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JAVITS. I yield.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I am glad the Senator brought that up. As a matter of fact, I was going to bring it up.

Of course, the Senator knows that the managers on the part of the Senate do not file a report or a statement. The managers on the part of the House do.

I am certain that the Senator will agree with me that their statement does not necessarily constitute law. That just happens to be a unilateral interpretation that they have given to this, and we certainly had nothing of this in mind. In fact, I believe it was clearly stated in our discussions in the committee that this work would be handled by aides out of the Embassy.

Mr. JAVITS. That is the important point.

Mr. SPARKMAN. They have it, for one thing, in the latter part, where it refers to training Cambodians in South Vietnam. There is nothing in the measure that would point this up or that would dispute it. It is my understanding that we are doing that now. This measure, as I interpret it, does not affect that.

Mr. JAVITS. I should like to say to the Senator that I support the conference report, that I think they have rendered the country a great service in settling this matter.

I understand Senator ARKEN's worries, and I agree with him. But I believe that, as we talked originally in an effort to settle this matter, when things lean on each other, they probably will work out. We have many other recourses if they do not.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Speaking of these reports, I think it is understandable that reports of different kinds and rumors get out. During the last several days, under the management of our coach and general manager, we have had many conferences—sometimes several conferences in the same day—and it is very easy for rumors or reports to get out which do not necessarily state the true conditions.

Mr. JAVITS. I think it is important for the Senate that Senator SPARKMAN and Senator MANSFIELD express it authoritatively, that this language does not indicate the existence of any understanding that there will be a MAG; but, on the contrary, that an understanding does exist that if any military personnel are required, it will be personnel operating out of the military section of the embassy.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Of course, the effect of a statement such as this, or a statement by one of us if we made it, would affect the legislation only in the event that it is ambiguous. I do not think the proposed legislation is ambiguous. Certainly, we threshed it out thoroughly on the floor of the Senate when we were debating the measure. I think it is clear and can be understood easily.

Mr. JAVITS. I think the Senator has made a fine record on it, and I thank him very much.

Mr. President, the situation seems to have turned out quite differently from what we intended. In this regard, let me quote briefly from a recent report of the Foreign Relations Committee:

On January 31, 1971, a Military Equipment Delivery Team Cambodia (MEDTC) was formed to administer the program. The Chief of the MEDTC and his staff were located in Saigon, but 16 and later an additional 7 MEDTC officers were stationed in Phnom Penh. In July 1971, the MERTC Chief, a Brigadier General, moved to Phnom Penh, and the MERTC element in Cambodia was raised to its present strength. In Phnom Penh, there are now 43 MEDTC personnel (50 are authorized and up to 12 more have been approved by the Executive Branch). There are 63 other MEDTC personnel at MACV in

Saigon. Of the 12 new personnel, 4 will be used to monitor third-country national contracts (50 additional third-country nationals will be hired to train Cambodians in logistics), 4 to monitor training, 3 to be assigned to help advise on port operations at Kompong Som and 1 will be a fiscal specialist who will monitor the military uses portion of the Public Law 480 agreements (these agreements are discussed below).

Although American military personnel in the MEDTC seem to be acutely aware of the prohibition against their acting as advisors or participants in the planning and execution of tactical operations, they are nevertheless deeply involved as advisors or organizers in activities such as force planning, military budgeting, logistics and training. As noted above, 11 of the 12 new MEDTC personnel will be involved in logistics and training activities.

I have heard that the spirit of the law has been stretched even further in that U.S. military personnel who are training Cambodian troops in South Vietnam sometimes accompany those Cambodian forces back to Cambodia, and at the border these U.S. trainers become members of MEDTC. If this is so, I question whether it is not tantamount to a violation of the law.

I know we are at war, and I am in favor of supporting the South Vietnamese financially, assuming they can remain viable. I know that could include ARVN military actions in Cambodia. I have no objection per se to that, Mr. President; and I believe that is probably the generality of opinion in the Senate.

But that is a very different thing from backing into a war by getting involved ourselves in Cambodia, whether directly or indirectly through advisers or in some other way, so that we inevitably somehow acquire a "national commitment," and it is said the national "honor" is at stake, as the President has expressed it, or his honor as President is at stake, and the powers of his office. We get all involved in our own dialectic, and next thing you know you have had it, you are in another Vietnam fighting to honor another "commitment."

Mr. President, I make these remarks only by way of expressing the hope that provisions such as the ones addressed by Senator DOMINICK's amendment may be obviated by a much closer relation, between the appropriate committees of Congress, in this case, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I do not relish the idea of locking this into law, which does have a tendency to put U.S. policy in something of a bind—Senator DOMINICK and his associates are strongly calling our attention to that, and I understand it perfectly—but it is brought about by a long-standing and long proceeding series of events which erode a sense of feeling on the part of those who have responsibility to the Senate for foreign policy, insofar as we ourselves participate in it, that they really know what is going on.

As regards the Cambodia situation, I am considering whether there is an appropriate amendment to introduce to clear up the anomalies and ambiguities I have discussed.

Mr. President, I hope very much it is in this area that we can make the most progress, and can be instructed by what has here occurred, in showing how ur-

gently necessary it is that we be informed.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will someone yield me 3 or 4 minutes?

Mr. DOMINICK. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Kentucky.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, first I wish to ask a question of the distinguished Senator from Colorado. Does the Senator's amendment strike subsection (b) on page 8 also?

Mr. DOMINICK. Yes, it does.

Mr. COOPER. I am glad it does, because even if we had to vote on the total section, I intended to ask that (a) and (b) be severed for a separate vote. I do not believe we have a constitutional right to require the President of the United States to provide the Congress to report, at least in advance, on detailed military operations.

But to go to the subject which the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS) has just been ably discussing.

I should like to point out that we learned—I am sure that some Members of the Senate knew before—sometime in 1967 and 1968 about our operations in Laos. These operations began in 1962 or 1963 under the administration of President Kennedy, and have continued since that time.

I recall that on August 12, 1968, I offered an amendment to prohibit the use of any U.S. forces in support of Thailand or Laos, to prevent the expansion of the Vietnam war, excluding Cambodia, because at that time Cambodia was considered a neutral country. The amendment was adopted unanimously by the Senate, although we were told at that time by Senator STENNIS that Secretary Laird had reported that it was not of any effect. Later I discovered why it was not—because my use of the term "U.S. Forces" evidently did not include the use of CIA forces.

I support the modification of the Senator from Colorado, but I do want to point out a contradictory position. Evidently, we are supporting this amendment because we are at war and operations are going on in Laos which we are not willing to interrupt because we are at war, and evidently because we consider it would endanger our forces, whether CIA in Laos or regular U.S. forces in South Vietnam, are not willing to strike all funds for Laos and to stop this operation.

I simply point out that it is contradictory to adopt this kind of measure with respect to Laos, and to vote then for an amendment to take our troops out of Vietnam by August 31, 1972, where they are certainly at war and could be greatly endangered by a sudden evacuation. I have supported most of such proposals, with the exception of the Hatfield-McGovern amendments and then because of my opposition to a fixed date I have always believed that the flat and clear way is to adopt an amendment which says, "Take all our forces out. Stop the war and prohibit funds except for withdrawal." I have believed there would be a greater possibility of getting prisoners of war back and of having a peaceful settlement. The situation since the massive attack by North Vietnam has

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changed and our remaining forces have been placed in danger. This is evidently recognized by the pending amendment. The same argument must be considered when the Mansfield amendment comes up.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Kentucky for his support.

I think it is only proper to say that a number of difficulties are involved in the proposal as it was originally written in this bill, not the least of which, of course, is the question of jurisdiction, as to who is going to take care of the situation with regard to Laos and Vietnam. I appreciate the Senator's support.

I can understand the concern of a number of Senators as to whether or not we are getting involved. I think it is only fair to say, in support of the President, that he has been getting us disinvolved, as opposed to involved, compared to what was going on in previous years. His thesis is that if we are going to maintain the opportunity of freedom in these areas, the only way it can be done properly is by giving assistance, so that the governments which are trying to provide a method of dignity and decent livelihood for their people will have both the economic and the military strength to offset attacks from outside. This seems to me to be a far more fruitful way, so far as we are concerned, than sending our own troops in and trying to contain something in the event of an actual battle.

I thank the Senator from Kentucky. I just wanted to make those few remarks for the Record.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, the Case amendment, as included in the committee bill, did not prohibit financing foreign troops in Laos, South Vietnam or Thailand. All it did was to require prior congressional authorization.

I say in all sincerity, however, that it does not really make much difference what type and character of legislation we pass on this floor with respect to such a matter, because the record will show that regardless, the administration will do what it wants to do, in spite of any legislation, even though that legislation has been signed by the President.

This matter came up in last year's across-the-board reduction in supporting assistance which, of course, included Vietnam, and was enacted into law. It is interesting to note, what has happened in the course of the past year in connection with the assistance that has been given Vietnam.

Direct gross economic assistance now being asked for is the most ever, more than three quarters of a billion dollars.

In previous years, the United States has supported the economy of Vietnam in three principal ways—through the commercial import program, through Public Law 480, and through the purchase of piasters by the Department of Defense and American servicemen. The last of these sources, which in the past financed a large share of the deficit in the Government of Vietnam's balance of trade—\$700 million in imports versus \$13 million in exports last year—no doubt

will decline in 1972 because of the reduction of American Forces.

The decline in Vietnamese dollar earnings from the Department of Defense and U.S. troop spending had been expected to begin in 1971; but, as a result of congressional decision upon reductions in the fiscal year 1972 aid program, several interesting steps were taken to maintain Vietnamese dollar earnings from these sources at high levels.

Defense Department procurement practices were changed to increase in-country contracting and purchases. The exchange rate for official purchases of piasters was kept at a level of 118 to the dollar rather than being increased as had been planned, thus in effect providing right there the Vietnamese Government with a substantial additional subsidy.

As a result of these policies, official U.S. Government dollar expenditures in 1971 amounted to a total of \$271 million. If the official exchange rate had been changed to the 275 rate used in other transactions, Defense Department expenditures could have been reduced to \$116 million. The expenditures in Vietnam would have been even lower if procurement policies had not been changed.

While the official exchange rate remained at 118 until April 1972, the exchange rate for personal purchase of piasters for dollars was increased to 275 in October 1970. This change brought about a great increase in personal exchange transactions in 1971 which provided \$132 million in dollar exchange for the use of the Vietnamese Government. These various moves, that is, \$132 million in personal dollar exchanges and the \$271 million in Department of Defense purchases involving Defense Department and personnel spending and Vietnamese exchange rates brought Vietnamese dollar earnings in 1971 to an all time high of \$403 million despite the congressional cut in aid funds.

In other words, I say again that it does not really make any difference what we do here on this floor. The matter will be handled by the administration the way they see fit regardless of any legislation. From the standpoint of the constitutional rights of the Senate, however that should give us cause for thought.

For example, last year this administration spent more than \$100 million in financing Thai troops in Laos. We had passed a law providing that that type and character of payment to mercenaries could not be made. The law says mercenaries cannot be financed by the United States to fight in Laos.

When we heard Thais were fighting in Laos, and paid by the United States, we sent out investigators. They went up to one Thai soldier and said, "Why are you here?" The soldier replied, "Because I was ordered to come here." The investigator said, "Well, is that the only reason you are here?" The soldier replied, "Why would I want to come if I was not ordered to do so?"

They asked another Thai soldier, supposed to be a volunteer—and that word "volunteer" is the word used to evade the law—"Why are you here?" The sol-

dier replied, "Because I could not find a job to support my family if I did not accept their request to come here."

So there you have the reason Thai soldiers are fighting in Laos.

This year, again, we are asking for about the same amount of heavy money to keep these mercenaries fighting in Laos.

Let me ask what the function of the Senate is, if we pass laws that stipulate one thing as to how the taxpayers money is used, but, regardless of the law, the administration does what it pleases.

In this case, it actually goes beyond that particular aspect. In order to avoid the reduction the Congress made in the AID program, the administration has manipulated the exchange rates to the point where the dollar earnings of the Vietnam Government were kept at an all time high, despite the congressional reduction.

Many people, when you ask them to name the country that has received the most aid, will say, "Yes." When you say "Which one?" they generally say "India." But that is not true. The country that has received by far the most economic and military aid from the United States, aside from the cost of the war, is South Vietnam.

That does not worry me so much as the fact that, after we pass a law and it is clear what the intent of that law is, our investigators find that law has been deliberately violated.

That is why I support the Case amendment. Mr. President, if the press is right, and the press has been right more times than anyone else, we have no more combat ground troops in Vietnam. So what we are supporting now is the great air and naval war, air conducted in the main out of Thailand; much bigger than before. The naval war conducted off the shores, in the Gulf of Tonkin, is much bigger than ever before. Now we are even asking for about the same money as last year to finance mercenaries in Laos, still against the law.

This unfortunate development is one which every Senator, regardless of party, should give serious consideration; that is the reason he is here in the Senate.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I recognize the situation. I only wish to make the comment that I think the first effort in trying to restrict the use of American funds to pay for mercenaries fighting in Laos was an amendment which I offered. The intent of that amendment has been evaded by the Government, by semantic gymnastics, calling the mercenaries "local forces." We are all familiar with that, so I am under no illusions that what we put into the law will be carried out.

With respect to the provision sponsored by the Senator from New Jersey, which amendment I am in great sympathy with and approve of but, nevertheless, I recognize his reasons—everyone looks at this matter from his own point of view. I have no criticism of his being willing to accept the provisions of the amendment offered by the Senator from Colorado, but I personally oppose the amendment, because I think that this program of continuing to spend ever-

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increasing amounts of money to hire mercenaries to fight in a lost cause will only serve to bankrupt the Nation and prolong the agony of the war in Vietnam and Indochina. I have very little hope that these troops will make a decisive difference. The reports from Laos support this view. In fact, I do not understand quite why the Government continues the war in Indochina. It is becoming more and more difficult for me to understand what purpose they have in mind by continuing the war and not bringing it to a close. But that is a broad question.

On the pending amendment, I oppose it, for whatever it is worth. I oppose it on the principle that I do not think our country should spend the kind of money it is spending to hire Thai soldiers to fight in a cause which we initiated in Laos. Nor do I approve of hiring Thais or Koreans to fight in Vietnam or in Cambodia.

We have debated this matter before. We put a prohibition in the law and the administration has found a way of evading it. I thought it was rather interesting that the Senator from Colorado himself referred to these troops as "foreign troops," whereas the administration, in its evasion of the original provision, has called them "local forces."

It is about the same sort of difference between a "bombing raid" and a "protective reaction strike." The terms are identical but they are used to hoodwink the public.

I do not know that there is anything further to say, except that I disapprove of the use of our money as now estimated to be over \$100 million in payment to Thai troops to fight in Laos. I thoroughly disapprove of it.

That is about all I care to say at this time.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator from Arkansas yield for a question?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. The able Senator from Arkansas, a former chairman of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, knows plenty about our financial situation. He knows also that the House has just passed a bill which we understand is favored by the administration, to give \$29 billion back to the States in the form of revenue sharing. He knows that, whereas 20 years ago we had \$25 billion in gold and owed but \$7 billion redeemable in gold, today we have \$10 billion in gold and owe—depending on how one figures it—from \$35 billion to \$60 billion. He knows, too, that the mayors of nearly all our large cities are frank in saying their cities are bankrupt. He knows that the States cannot spend more money, under their State constitutions, than they take in in taxes.

I would ask the able former chairman of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, does he know where we are going to get the money to continue these gigantic expenditures in Cambodia, Thailand, Laos, and various other countries with whom we are not yet at war. As a matter of fact, we are not officially at war in Vietnam, either. In any case, does not the Senator agree that it is easier to get \$1 billion to put into this

military effort in the Far East than to get, say, \$100,000 for schools and roads in the Senator's State of Arkansas, or roads and schools for Missouri?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator from Missouri is absolutely right. Senators can get up on the floor of the Senate and propose an amendment increasing the amount for military programs without any hearings, without any evidence whatever, and get it adopted.

We cannot begin to get \$100,000 for the State of Missouri or for the State of Arkansas without long hearings, plus an authorization bill and an appropriation bill. There is quite an obsession in Congress with regard to anything of a foreign, military nature. Such a matter can be easily passed here. We have done it time and again.

I thought about this this morning on my way to work. I was caught in the traffic jam like nearly everyone else. We see examples where there is a rainstorm and everything is disrupted. With the great technological advances that the United States has made, we can get to the moon. However, we cannot make arrangements to get to our offices under adverse weather conditions. It normally takes me 10 minutes. However, this morning it took me over an hour because of the recent storm.

It is amazing when one considers how this Nation has wasted its resources all around the world. The pending amendment is an example of it. What good does it do to pay more money to hire people to fight a war which we want to end?

The taxpayers must bear the cost of all of this. And if the cost is not paid out of their taxes, some money is borrowed, and our children and grandchildren will pay for it.

I have no idea what good can come out of hiring Thais to fight in Laos.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Does not the former chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency believe that a viable economy, with a sound dollar, is as important to true national security of the United States as is defending the countries of Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, South Vietnam with billions upon billions of dollars, and little or no help from our allies? Even that help we pay for.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, indeed they are. On the other hand Laos has not the slightest relation to our own security, none whatever.

The soundness of our economy is the basis of our strength. The idea has somehow developed that national security is solely military in character, which is simply not true. The military itself is dependent on a strong economy to pay for their expenditures. We are sacrificing for the military by exaggerating the significance of this war.

Our nuclear weapons are a good example. We do not dare to use them. We could drop an atomic bomb on North Vietnam. We could incinerate it all at once. Instead, we are doing it piecemeal.

These countries are not significant to our security. I do not think that anyone can make a case that they are.

Laos does not make any difference at

all to the security of our Nation. I do not believe it makes any difference to the United States what happens to Laos. Does the Senator from Missouri think that it does?

Mr. SYMINGTON. It does not. The able Senator from Arkansas has expressed my position better than I have.

Does the Senator from Arkansas believe we will continue to spend our dollars at the rate of more than \$100 million a year to finance these troops in Laos after we possibly have reached some agreement with North Vietnam? What are the ideas of the able Senator with respect to our employing our own military forces and mercenaries in the Far East despite the increasing surge of various demands at home, even if we do reach an agreement to end this Vietnam tragedy?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That depends on the election this fall. I have no control over that. If President Nixon wins reelection, we will continue to be there, I suppose. For what reason I do not understand.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Nor do I at this stage.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. If the country wishes to discontinue this kind of policy, it can express itself. We will have an opportunity to do so this fall.

We have tried to stop the war. The Senator from Missouri has been one of the leading figures in trying to bring this war to an end, and to show the disastrous effects of it. But we have been unable to do it. It is up to the American people in November to make their choice as to whether they want to continue the war and to continue our sacrifices, not being able to do what we want to do and not having decent roads and transportation systems here at home.

I heard on the radio this morning, having to listen to it in the car, that towns in Virginia and Pennsylvania are without water and without water systems. Their bridges are out.

All of this is obviously a sign that someone had not foreseen and prepared for an emergency of this kind. In the meantime, we are engaged in the war in Vietnam, and I guess the cost now would approach \$200 billion. We are pouring out money in the amount of hundreds of millions of dollars. The Senator from Missouri knows it better than anyone else. It is so incomprehensible and irrational that I do not know how to comment on it in a reasonable way. It is almost impossible to do so.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I remember, back in 1961 at the time General Taylor and Mr. Rostow made their famous trip to Saigon, I was there then also and a member of the AID program said, "Let me show you the way the taxpayers' money is being spent out here." We went out and saw a beautiful cloverleaf on one of the roads, the type you see where there is heavy traffic in this country. We took out our watches to observe the amount of traffic. With this beautiful addition to the roads and economy of Vietnam, to the profit of certain American contractors and others, exactly three cars utilized that cloverleaf in 15 minutes. That was in 1961, at the very

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beginning of what has been going on ever since.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I can agree with the Senator on the absurdity of such extravagance. However, I believe that is better than the cost of these 20 million craters that we have made in Vietnam. Those craters are 20 feet deep and 30 or 40 feet across. They are all across that country. I think that even the example of the cloverleaf, while it is an excellent example, is a little less extravagant than the craters we have formed in that country and the forests that we have destroyed and defoliated. I would rather have the cloverleaf than the other.

The whole thing is so irrational in my mind. People cannot believe it. It is so far out that most American people refuse to believe it. It revolts them so that they will not believe it. They think that it could not be true that their country would do a thing like that.

Mr. President, I would venture to say that if we could really look into the minds of the American people, the majority of them would say that this could not be true, that their country would not do such a thing.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I ask the Senator from Arkansas, the former chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency if he does not believe the time will soon come when the American people will be forced to believe it because our economy is suffering so heavily as a result of the tremendous export of jobs and dollars. This has been going on now to the tune of tens of billions of dollars a year for over a quarter of a century.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator from Missouri is correct. Because of our accumulated wealth 15 or 20 years ago, it is hard for the people to believe what has happened in the last decade.

We are going through a period of inflation and enormous budget deficits. We are adding daily to the national debt. The administration is now asking for another \$15 billion increase. They want an overall debt ceiling of \$465 billion.

The situation may not appear quite so bad because during an inflationary period, people think that they are getting richer. They look at the price of stocks and at the price of land. They think that they are better off. The collapse will come later.

As the Senator from Missouri knows, it has taken place time after time in other countries. At the moment, people think that we are fairly well off. We see the reports in the newspaper prophesizing better business conditions. It will be some time before we have to pay for the kind of extravagance we have been going through in the last 10 years. But the day of reckoning will come.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Is it not true that the interest on the debt today is the third largest component cost to the American taxpayer in the Federal budget?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes; some \$20 billion. The Senator is correct. That is payment for past military expenditures. At present it is \$83 billion. Those figures do not include, for example, the care for veterans, which will go on for the next 50 years.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield the floor, if the Senator wishes. Or does the Senator wish to ask a question?

Mr. CASE. I just want to say a few things. First, I appreciate very much the friendly reference to my participation in the particular amendment and the understanding of my position, which the Senator has expressed.

I understand fully his unwillingness to go along with it, especially because of his experience with the 1970 amendment of which he was the sponsor and by which Congress directed that money not be spent for mercenaries in Laos.

The Dominick amendment would limit the effectiveness of the particular section to Thailand. In the judgment of the Senator from New Jersey, and this is his only difference with his chairman, it is worth getting that restriction into law, and getting that restriction into law is better than getting nothing.

For that reason the Senator from New Jersey has agreed to this compromise.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I want to make it clear that everyone tries to do what he can. I think the Senator's objective is the same as mine.

I have about given up hope of influencing the administration. We already have a prohibition in the law but by semantic gymnastics the administration has evaded it; they pay no attention to it. I do not know how we can do any more.

I go along with the Senator's original effort, and I do not question this modification in any way.

Ever since I was in grade school and read about the Hessians I have had a fixation about mercenaries. I think it unfair that we have other people to fight wars. If people believe in it they should fight the wars themselves.

Evidently, we do not believe in it; we hold back, but at the same time we pay these poor people in Thailand to go there and fight. They do not do a good job. Their hearts are not in it. They pick up a few hundred dollars. I am sure they are not going to prevail and win freedom for Laos any more than the Hessians did for England.

It is a futile operation to try to get this administration to abide by existing law, but we do the best we can.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, at the request of the distinguished Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER), I ask unanimous consent that a statement by him in support of my amendment be printed in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

STATEMENT BY SENATOR BAKER

I support the compromise amendment offered by the distinguished junior Senator from Colorado regarding Section 515 of the Foreign Assistance Bill. That section, which would require prior Congressional authorization for U.S. assistance to foreign troops operating in Laos, Thailand, and North Vietnam, comes at a very delicate time in the tragic history of U.S. involvement in that conflict for seldom, if ever, have conditions been as conducive to bringing a just and honorable end to the war as they are today. I realize, of course, that hopes have been falsely raised many times before and I am not

contending that peace in Southeast Asia is just around the corner, but I am saying that there is substantial reason for hope and that hope can only be enhanced by not limiting the power of the President which is what Section 515 would do. A brief examination of the record should help prove why recent developments make striking Section 515 of the bill a reasonable and responsible thing to do.

On the military front, after 71 long and courageous days of fighting, the siege at An Loc has been lifted. Kontum, which at one point appeared destined to fall, now seems to be in no immediate danger. The prized provincial capital of Hue which also appeared doomed for destruction now seems to have been converted from a defensive fortress into a staging ground for sporadic attacks by the South Vietnamese Army into enemy-held Quang Tri province—attacks which, though limited, have succeeded in keeping the North Vietnamese army off guard.

In addition, the massive bombing of enemy targets in the North and South combined with the comprehensive mining of North Vietnamese waters has served to significantly reduce the strength of the North Vietnamese invasion as well as cause some disagreement over current policy among Hanoi's top officials. It would be historically naive, perhaps, to believe that the increased bombing and mining had broken the will of the North Vietnamese, but it is safe to say that it has caused a careful re-examination of their policies, especially in light of other diplomatic activity.

The President's trip to Moscow apparently convinced the Soviet leadership that he was totally serious about ending the war and that seriousness was later conveyed to the Hanoi leadership when Soviet President Podgorny visited North Vietnam for several days of talks last week. Upon the conclusion of those talks, President Podgorny said that the Soviet Union "will do everything possible for a de-escalation of the Vietnam war." Such a desire on the part of the Soviets is entirely consistent with their increasing interest in reducing spending in Southeast Asia to meet more pressing needs in other parts of the world and at home.

Moreover, Dr. Henry Kissinger is currently in Peking conducting substantive discussions with the Chinese leadership in an effort to obtain a commitment to de-escalate, similar to that of the Soviet Union. Although it most likely will be very difficult to determine whether we actually received such a clear commitment, the Chinese also have domestic needs that require greater attention and there is certainly reason to believe that the Chinese will be interested in ending the Vietnam War.

All of these factors are reasons why the North Vietnamese might, in the near future, be willing to seriously discuss the President's latest peace proposals and if such willingness is forthcoming, we should be prepared. The President's latest offer would most likely leave the North Vietnamese in control of most or all of the territory they have gained or held since the offensive began and in an effort to minimize their gains, it is necessary to continue assistance to the Thai irregulars who are fighting with Lao and tribal forces to keep Laos from falling to the North Vietnamese. Their success as a fighting force has helped protect not only Thailand, but also South Vietnam as well.

Section 515 of the Foreign Assistance Bill would require Congressional authorization for these on-going, vital efforts and such a process could be extremely time-consuming and costly at this very delicate point in the war. I do not object specifically to the intention of Section 515 in involving the Congress in future such operations, but under the circumstances of this situation, I feel very strongly that an attempt to limit the President's power at this time would be the height of irresponsibility and it is for this reason

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that I support the compromise offered by the Senator from Colorado.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, if there are no further comments I move that the amendment be agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment. (Putting the question.)

The noes appear to have it.

Mr. YOUNG. I ask for a division.

Mr. DOMINICK. I did not understand what the Chair said.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The noes appear to have it.

Mr. YOUNG. I am on my feet asking for a division.

Mr. DOMINICK. Let us have a standing vote.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All in favor of the amendment will stand and be counted.

Mr. YOUNG. I ask for the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The yeas and nays are requested. Is there a sufficient second? There is not a sufficient second.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. DOMINICK. Standing vote, Mr. President.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The absence of a quorum has been suggested. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I ask for a division on the vote.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. A division has been requested. All in favor of the amendment will please stand. Those opposed will please stand.

The amendment is agreed to.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. PASTORE. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Messages in writing from the President of the United States, submitting nominations, were communicated to the Senate by Mr. Geisler, one of his secretaries.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

As in executive session, the Presiding Officer (Mr. FANNIN) laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations, which were referred to the appropriate committees.

(The nominations received today are printed at the end of Senate proceedings.)

ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY AMENDMENTS OF 1972

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now

proceed to the consideration of S. 3010, which the clerk will state by title.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (S. 3010) to provide for the continuation of programs authorized under the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, and for other purposes.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, under the order, the distinguished Senator from Texas (Mr. Tower) was to be recognized at this time for the purpose of calling up his amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct. The Senator from Texas is not in the Chamber.

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I call attention to the absence of a quorum.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Without prejudice to the Senator from Texas.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask that the distinguished junior Senator from Texas (Mr. BENTSEN) may be recognized at this time for the purpose of calling up an amendment without prejudice to the distinguished senior Senator from Texas (Mr. Tower) who, under the order, was to be recognized to call up two amendments in succession.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. TOWER. I do not object.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized.

AMENDMENT NO. 1237

Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment and ask that it be stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The amendment was read as follows:

At the end of the bill add the following new section:

AMENDMENT CONCERNING CERTAIN TRAINING PROGRAMS FOR YOUTH

SEC. 26. Section 125(a) of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sentence: "The Director shall insure that low-income persons who reside in public or private institutions shall be eligible for participation in programs under this part."

Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. President, at the outset I commend the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. NELSON) for his work on the economic opportunity amendments.

The committee which he chairs has brought an urgently needed bill to the Senate for approval. It has been refined and perfected to meet the President's objections and it should receive overwhelming approval in this body. The programs contained in the 1972 economic opportunity amendments are vitally important to the poor in this Nation, and they must be continued.

Mr. President, my amendment is very brief and is directed at the section of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, which concerns eligibility for the Neighborhood

Youth Corps and other youth employment programs.

Essentially, the amendment would insure that low-income persons who reside in a public or private institution such as an orphanage or a penal or correctional institution would be eligible for participation in training and employment programs for youth.

I note with some satisfaction that the committee has increased the authorization for the Neighborhood Youth Corps by some \$500 million to create 100,000 work and training opportunities in this very vital program.

We know what the Neighborhood Youth Corps can do, and we know how much it has meant to low-income youth. We also know that unemployment among 16 to 19 year olds has risen steadily since 1966 and that present projections indicate that it will total over 1,800,000 in 1972, more than a 100-percent increase since 1966.

At the same time, Mr. President, I have been distressed by recent administrative decisions by the Department of Labor, and in particular the regional office in Dallas. These decisions have led me to offer my amendment.

On March 29, 1972, the Labor Department's Manpower Administration in Dallas issued a memorandum to sponsors of youth employment programs indicating that prospective enrollees in the Neighborhood Youth Corps who regularly live in institutions, such as orphanages or correctional institutions, would no longer be eligible for enrollment in the programs.

Mr. President, this seems to be a particularly insensitive action. It is very difficult for me to rationalize, and the rationale offered by the Labor Department is completely unconvincing. I received a letter from the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Manpower, who said that:

Residents of State or private child care and correctional institutions are not eligible to participate in the program since it is presumed that the supporting agency has allocated resources to maintain their residents while in high school or for the duration of their internment.

Mr. President, if I may say so, this is a rather shaky presumption. Letters I have received from orphanages in Texas indicate that the Labor Department's reading of the situation is inaccurate at best.

One letter from St. Margaret's Center for Children in El Paso indicates that six of the eight teenagers living there are in the custody of the El Paso Child Welfare Department and that the county pays approximately \$2 a day for their upkeep.

The orphanage, which has to serve as a substitute parent, must constantly be searching for other resources to meet the needs of the children in its care.

The truth is, Mr. President, that conditions in various public and private institutions vary, and there is no reason to assume that a child living in an orphanage, a correctional institution, or any other public or private institution is being given the kind of resources he needs to give him an even break in schooling. To exclude all of these chil-

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PRESIDENT GETS BILL ON BENEFITS AS CONGRESS LAGS

Spending Compromise Voted
by House—Resistance Is
Expected in the Senate

By JOHN W. FINNEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 17 —

The 92d Congress, stumbling toward adjournment, passed and sent to the White House today a \$6-billion welfare-social security bill stripped of the President's welfare reform proposals.

The House, meanwhile, approved compromise legislation giving the President his requested authority to impose a \$250-billion ceiling on Federal spending in the current fiscal year. The legislation, however, appeared headed for further controversy and possibly rejection by the Senate, thus further delaying the adjournment schedule.

As a result, a weary, discouraged Congress tonight had to extend its session into tomorrow and perhaps Thursday. While the Senate debated the spending issue, an impatient House decided to recess until tomorrow.

Debate Goes On

As the debate droned on, Senator Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, the Senate Republican leader, arose to observe:

"It's so late in the session that words fail me. I suggest the same course for my colleagues."

The compromise version of the welfare-social security bill was one of the last major measures that Congress had to pass before adjournment. It was approved by the House by a vote of 305 to 1, with only Representative Olin E. Teague of Texas, a Democrat, voting nay, and then by the Senate by a vote of 61 to 0.

The legislation started out nearly two years ago as a measure incorporating the President's welfare reform proposal to provide a guaranteed annual income to poor families. The concept was accepted by the House but rejected by the Senate.

As the bill emerged from a Senate-House conference committee in the form approved today, it was stripped of the guaranteed annual income features, although it would provide a first step toward a Federal take-over of the entire welfare program, now financed jointly by the Federal Government and the states.

Instead, the bill became primarily a Social Security measure, providing \$6-billion in increased benefits for the aged, blind and disabled. To finance the new benefits, the bill provides for an increase in Social Security taxes next year along with an increase in the taxable wage base.

Representative Wilbur D

Mills, chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, ran into objections when he attempted to rush through compromise legislation establishing the \$250-billion spending ceiling. The ceiling has been attached as an amendment to a bill that must be passed before Congress adjourns, a bill that temporarily increases the ceiling on the national debt to \$465-billion.

Mr. Mills, who normally has his way on the House floor, attempted to call up the debt and spending ceiling bill for immediate consideration. But under parliamentary rules requiring unanimous consent, Representative William D. Ford of Michigan, one of the Democratic liberals who fear that the spending ceiling will mean cuts in educational and social programs, entered an objection. This Mr. Mills first attempted to overlook and, then, finally acknowledged.

As a result, the Arkansas democrat who had expected to rush the bill through, had to scurry upstairs to a hastily called meeting of the Rules Committee to obtain rule permitting consideration of the measure. "I am getting groggy," Mr. Mills observed, as he headed back to the floor, with the necessary rule in hand.

After less than hour of debate, Mr. Mills prevailed upon the House to accept the compromise bill by a vote of 166 to 137.

The House action, however, could prove to be a superfluous exercise, since both Democratic and Republican leaders believe absenteeism a factor there are

enough votes in the Senate to defeat the spending ceiling amendment. With many Senators leaving town in anticipation of adjournment, the outcome depends largely upon absenteeism when the issue comes to a vote in the Senate.

Among liberals and conservatives in the Senate there were concerted objections that the compromise had gone too far in giving the President authority to cut Congressionally approved programs. This, in their view, encroaches upon Congress's constitutional control over the purse strings.

Activity in Senate

The compromise permits the President to cut up to 20 per cent in each of 50 broad functional categories in the budget. Within each category, however, there is no limitation on how much the President can cut in individual programs.

Within the Senate, therefore, an attempt is under way to de-

feat the compromise and send the bill back to conference with instructions to work out a more restrictive formula.

If no new formula that is acceptable both to the House conferees and the Administration can be worked out, it is the intention of the Senate Democratic leadership to pass legislation raising the debt limit and to drop the spending ceiling issue.

Conferees of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees meanwhile, struck a compromise on a stop-gap resolution financing the foreign aid program, another potential adjournment obstacle. The resolution became necessary after the Senate for the second consecutive year blocked the regular foreign aid legislation.

The so-called continuing resolution would permit the economic and military aid programs to continue spending until Feb. 28 at an annual rate of \$3.65-billion.

The rate was considerably below what was wanted by the Administration, which had originally requested \$5.2-billion in appropriations for the economic and foreign aid programs in the current fiscal year.

The compromise rate was \$357-million less than approved by the House and \$158-million more than approved by the Senate. The hope of the conferees was that the concessions toward the lower Senate figures would mollify the foreign aid critics in the Senate, in particular Senator J. W. Fulbright who was threatening to raise last minute objections that could further delay adjournment.

Meanwhile, legislation that would have empowered the Environmental Protection Agency to set noise pollution standards for new equipment, including aircraft, died on the House floor when an objection was raised to consideration of a conference committee agreement.

Form aid Bill

NEW YORK TIMES

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SENATE SLASHES FOREIGN AID BILL

Cut of \$515.4-Million May
Threaten Adjournment

WASHINGTON, Oct. 16 (AP) — ~~The Senate voted a sharp cut in foreign aid appropriations today, adding another potential roadblock to efforts to conclude the business of the 92d Congress tomorrow night.~~

The Senate stripped \$515.4-million from the \$4-billion annual foreign-aid spending level voted by the House Saturday night in adopting a resolution to permit continued spending until Feb. 28.

The amendment was proposed by Senator Daniel K. Inouye, Democrat of Hawaii, chairman of the Senate Appropriations subcommittee on foreign operations, and adopted by the full committee and the Senate by voice vote.

Warning From Fulbright

~~I. W. Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, warned that if the bill came back from a House-Senate conference with substantial increases over the Senate's total of \$3.4-billion, he would "do everything possible to prevent its adoption."~~ Mr. Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas, said that he would like to limit military-aid portions of the measure to administrative expenses and to phase out the grant program with the \$1.8-billion still in the pipeline.

~~The Senate, with little else to do, had recessed for several hours, waiting for a recommendation from its appropriate committee on foreign aid.~~

~~The dispute arose over a resolution continuing authority for foreign aid programs in the absence of a new authorization bill for military assistance.~~

A prior resolution, continuing the programs since July 1 at an annual rate of \$2.9-billion, expired Saturday midnight. President Nixon's budget for foreign aid this year is \$5.1-billion. Last year's appropriation was \$3.1-billion.

Cut Based on Lowest Items

The effect of the resolution passed by the House would be to continue foreign aid spending until next Feb. 28 at a \$4-billion annual rate. Senator Inouye's amendment would cut the spending level to \$3.48-billion, based on the lowest items in the House resolution or in last year's appropriation bill.

The Inouye proposal reduced allowances approved by the House for foreign development loans by \$150-million, direct grants for foreign military forces by \$99.4-million, security-supporting assistance grants by \$135-million and military credit sales by \$35-million.

The need to rely on a continuing resolution, rather than let foreign aid die, resulted from a House-Senate Conference deadlock on an unrelated issue in the foreign military aid bill.

The House conferees refused to accept and the Senate conferees refused to yield on a provision passed by the Senate requiring the President to submit all future agreements for overseas military bases to the Senate for ratification as treaties by a two-thirds vote.

Present law requires only that the President report to Congress on arrangements made.

Foreign Aid Bill

THE WASHINGTON POST Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP74B00615R000600080026-6

SENATE KILLS FOREIGN AID BILL

VOTE

END WAR AMENDMENT

By Spencer Rich
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Senate killed the foreign aid bill, 48 to 42, last night after critics of President Nixon's Vietnam policies had succeeded for the first time in adding a mandatory end-the-war amendment on a 49-to-46 roll-call vote.

The end-the-war language required a pullout of all U.S. land, sea and air forces from Indochina within four months, provided North Vietnam first released American prisoners.

Never before had the Senate voted to cut off funds and impose a flat, binding withdrawal requirement. All previous successful end-the-war votes were merely declarations or sense-of-the-Senate provisions and weren't binding because they didn't provide for any enforcement mechanism if the President chose to ignore them.

However, adoption of the end-the-war language led directly to the defeat of the \$1.8 billion foreign military aid authorization to which it was attached.

Immediately after the 49-to-46 vote approving the fund cutoff, Minority Leader Hugh Scott (Pa.) rose to warn that the Senate was "inviting a veto" of the aid bill. Scott said he would vote against the bill and would vote for its defeat.

The Republican leader said the end-the-war language would undermine the President's efforts to negotiate an honorable peace.

On the final 48-to-42 vote, a number of administration loyalists like Scott and Republican Whip Robert P. Griffin (Mich.) linked up with traditional foes of the aid program and former supporters who are now critical of supporting military dictatorships.

By the time the vote came, shortly after 9 p.m., a number of senators who might have supported the bill—like vice presidential candidate Thomas F. Eagleton (D-Mo.) and Edmund S. Muskie (D-Maine)—had left the chamber in the assumption that passage would come easily on a routine vote. Presidential candidate George McGovern (D-S.D.) was absent and missed all votes yesterday.

Scott said after the vote that while he favors foreign aid, the end-the-war language made the bill unacceptable. He said it would now be necessary either to report out a new bill from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, wait for a bill to come over from the House and then have the Foreign Relations Committee take it up, or continue the aid program by a "continuing resolution"—a special resolution to allow spending by agencies whose regular appropriations have not been approved.

The administration wants a foreign-aid measure eventually because the bill provides nearly \$300 million in military and economic aid to Cambodia, \$250 million for Korea and substantial amounts for Thailand, Greece, Turkey and other allies.

Sen. J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.), foreign aid critic who voted for the end-the-war amendment and then against the bill, said he has no desire to report out a new measure. It had been before the Senate since June 8 in a debate over the end-the-war language.

Last year, the Senate, in a move that reflected the deepening congressional dislike of the foreign aid program, defeated the aid authorization measure by a 41-to-27 vote on Oct. 29. But new bills with deep slashes were eventually sent to the floor and ultimately passed.

A substantial number of members of Congress have always opposed foreign aid as a giveaway and a waste. To this bloc, in recent years, have been added members who see the program as financing corrupt dictatorships and "client" states and as fueling an endless war in Southeast Asia.

On last night's 48-to-42 vote, only 14 Republicans voted for passage of the \$1.8 billion measure. Charles McC. Mathias Jr. (R-Md.) was the only Maryland or Virginia senator who voted for final passage.

The key vote on the end-the-war amendment came on a motion by Sen. John Stennis (D-Miss.), chairman of the Armed Services Committee, to strike all end-the-war language from the bill, leaving it, 49 to 46.

Stennis said the four-month pullout requirement contingent only upon North Vietnam's prior release of U.S. prisoners would undermine the President's attempts to achieve a negotiated peace allowing the United States to withdraw with dignity and without humiliation.

Before the Stennis vote, the Senate on a 50-to-45 roll call had adopted an amendment by John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) which displaced somewhat stronger end-the-war language originally inserted in the bill, by Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (Mont.).

Cooper's substitute, as he first proposed it, called for a mandatory pullout within four months of enactment of the bill, without any preconditions. This was changed, however,

on an amendment by Sen. Edward W. Brooke (R-Mass.), adopted 62 to 33, which added the requirement of prior release of prisoners. The Stennis amendment represented the administration's last chance to kill the whole end-the-war package prior to the final vote on the bill.

Cooper voted against the Brooke amendment and then against his own amendment after the Brooke language was added. He said the prior release requirement had made his pullout language meaningless, since North Vietnam would never release prisoners while the U.S. was still actively engaged in combat.

The Cooper-Brooke language, as approved before the whole bill was killed, read:

"Funds authorized by or appropriated by this or any other act for U.S. forces with respect to military actions in Indochina may be used only for the purpose of withdrawing all U.S. ground, naval and air forces from Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, and protecting such forces as they are withdrawn. The withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia shall be carried out within four months after the date of enactment of this act, provided there has been a release of all American prisoners of war held by the government of North Vietnam or any government allied with them."

Two months ago, the administration won a similar close, crucial vote on the same issue by a vote of 47 to 43.

Yesterday, however, a big bloc of senators, mostly Democrats, who voted with Mr. Nixon last time went against him. They include Lloyd M. Bentsen (D-Tex.), Alan Bible (D-Nev.), Howard W. Cannon (D-Nev.), Ernest F. Hollings (D-S.C.), James B. Pearson (R-Kan.), William B. Spong (D-Va.) and Robert T. Stafford (R-Vt.).

Sens. Herman E. Talmadge (D-Ga.), Ted Stevens (R-Alaska) and Daniel K. Inouye (D-Hawaii), who were absent last time, also voted for the end-the-war language yesterday.

Sens. Spong and Mathias supported the end-the-war language, while Harry Flood Byrd Jr. (Ind.-Va.) and J. Glenn Beall (R-Md.) opposed it.

The original Mansfield language in the aid bill, added in the Foreign Relations Committee, called for a pullout of all U.S. forces from Vietnam by Aug. 31, with removal of U.S. forces from the remainder of Indochina once the United States and North Vietnam had arranged a truce and reached agreement on release of U.S. prisoners and an accounting for persons listed as missing in action.

The President called this language unacceptable, because it didn't include his requirement for an Indochina-wide cease-fire, rather than just a cease-fire between the United States and North Vietnam, and because it merely called for arrangements for release of prisoners without requiring an actual release prior to the U.S. pullout.

Critics of Mr. Nixon's peace

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proposals, however, said the requirement of an all-Indochina cease-fire that would include Saigon as well as Hanoi as parties to the agreement would merely allow Saigon to stall and veto any agreement, and also said the President's language implied that the final cease-fire must assure the continued survival of the Saigon regime. They said setting such conditions would mean indefinite continuation of the war. They also said it was unrealistic to demand that Hanoi release all U. S. prisoners prior to a cease-fire.

Administration spokesmen countered that the Mansfield amendment, or any other proposal setting a definite date without major conditions, would encourage Hanoi to refuse to negotiate seriously for a peace settlement, in the hope that congress would simply force the United States to pull out.

A series of relatively close, dramatic votes led up to the final decisions on the end-the-war language.

Sens. Cannon, Alan Cranston (D-Calif.) and Hubert H. Humphrey (D-Minn.) offered a substitute early in the day that was remarkably similar to the end-the-war language eventually put in the bill before it was defeated, but called for a pullout only from South Vietnam, not all of Indochina. It failed, 55 to 40, with several senators saying they voted against it because it was limited to Vietnam alone.

Cooper then offered his amendment requiring a total withdrawal within four months of enactment of the bill, arguing that North Vietnam was unlikely to release prisoners before the war ends and that the only way to end U.S. participation is to set a date for withdrawal and negotiate a release of U.S. prisoners later.

Brooke immediately rose and demanded to know what the United States would do if North Vietnam refused to release U.S. prisoners after the U.S. pullout. "You're asking the U.S. government to take on good faith what North Vietnam will do," he said. "What is our option? We'd have absolutely nothing left" with which to force release of prisoners. He then added his prisoner-release requirement.

Sen. James B. Allen (D-Ala.) offered an amendment which, in effect, wiped out all other proposals and instead proposed a sense-of-the-Senate resolution endorsing President Nixon's demands for prisoner release and an all-Indochina internationally supervised cease-fire as preconditions for U.S. cessation of Indochina military operations.

This failed, 50 to 45, giving the day's first hint that the administration might lack the votes to defeat a binding end-the-war amendment. Byrd and Beall voted for the Allen language, while Spong and Mathias opposed it.

This set the stage for the final showdown votes.

Roll Call

End-the-War Amendment

Associated Press

Here is the 50-to-45 roll call vote by which the Senate approved an amendment providing for the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Indochina within four months after enactment if American war prisoners are released by Hanoi. The effect of the vote was later voided.

FOR THE AMENDMENT—50

Anderson, N.M.	Magnuson, Wash.
Bayh, Ind.	Mansfield, Mont.
Bentsen, Tex.	Metcalfe, Mont.
Bible, Nev.	Mondale, Minn.
Burdick, N.D.	Montoya, N.M.
Cannon, Nev.	Moss, Utah
Chiles, Fla.	Muskie, Maine
Church, Idaho	Nelson, Wis.
Cranston, Calif.	Pastore, R.I.
Eagleton, Mo.	Pell, R.I.
Fulbright, Ark.	Proxmire, Wis.
Gravel, Alaska	Randolph, W.Va.
Harris, Okla.	Ribicoff, Conn.
Hart, Mich.	Spong, Va.
Hartke, Ind.	Stevenson, Ill.
Hollings, S.C.	Syrnnington, Mo.
Hughes, Iowa	Talmadge, Ga.
Humphrey, Minn.	Tunney, Calif.
Inouye, Hawaii	Williams, N.J.
Kennedy, Mass.	

Republicans For:

Brooke, Mass.	Pearson, Kans.
Case, N.J.	Percy, Ill.
Cook, Ky.	Schweicker, Pa.
Hatfield, Ore.	Stafford, Vt.
Javits, N.Y.	Stevens, Alaska.
Mathias, Md.	

AGAINST THE AMENDMENT—45

Allen, Ala.	Long, La.
Byrd, Va.	McClellan, Ark.
Byrd, W.Va.	McGee, Wyo.
Eastland, Miss.	McIntyre, N.Y.
Ervin, N.C.	Sparkman, Ala.
Jackson, Wash.	Stennis, Miss.

Republicans Against:

Aiken, Vt.	Griffin, Mich.
Allott, Colo.	Gurney, Fla.
Baker, Tenn.	Hansen, Wyo.
Beall, Md.	Hruska, Neb.
Bellmon, Okla.	Jordan, Idaho
Bennett, Utah	Miller, Iowa
Boggs, Del.	Packwood, Ore.
Brock, Tenn.	Roth, Del.
Buckley, N.Y.	Saxton, Ohio
Cooper, Ky.	Scott, Pa.
Cotton, N.H.	Smith, Maine
Curtis, Neb.	Taft, Ohio
Dole, Kan.	Thurmond, S.C.
Dominick, Colo.	Tower, Tex.
Fannin, Ariz.	Weicker, Conn.
Fong, Hawaii	Young, N.D.
Goldwater, Ariz.	

End-War Amendment Wording

Here is the wording of the Cooper-Brooke end-of-the-war amendment approved by the Senate, 50 to 45. The affect of the measure later voided when the military aid bill was killed.

"Funds authorized or appropriated by this or any other act for United States forces with respect to military actions in Indochina may be used only for the purpose of withdrawing all United States ground, naval, and air forces from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia and protecting such forces as they are withdrawn. The withdrawal of all United States forces from Vietnam Laos, and Cambodia shall be carried out within four months after the date of enactment of this act; provided that there has been a release of all American prisoners of war held by the government of North Vietnam or any government allied with them."

face of the evidence before us. The failure of the President to act means we have a continuation of a serious drug problem.

No action has been taken by President Nixon in spite of the evidence that Thailand serves as the major conduit for the transshipment of opium produced in Southeast Asia.

Let us look briefly at the situation in Thailand. Several congressional study missions have returned to the Congress with reports that Thailand serves as the major conduit for drug traffic in the Southeast Asia region. As a result of these investigations, we have learned that opium-bearing caravans continually bring substantial amounts of raw opium and some refined morphine derivative down to Bangkok for shipment to Hong Kong. An NBC television camera crew photographed such a caravan within the past 6 months.

After the opium reaches the port of Bangkok, it is placed aboard Thai-registered fishing trawlers. These trawlers can carry about 3.3 tons of opium per voyage. Until last year, these trawlers operated only during the summer months. Currently, they carry their deadly cargo year round. There is enough opium on each ship to supply 6 percent of the annual U.S. demand for heroin.

From Bangkok, the 11-trawler fleet sails to Hong Kong where they unload the opium onto junks in Chinese Communist waters. These junks are then able to slip into Hong Kong unmonitored. The opium is then refined and shipped to the United States. This has come to be known as the "Thai connection."

I am informed that American intelligence and narcotics personnel are aware of high-level official complicity in the Thai drug trade. Not only do our people have the names of those involved, but they also have positive identification of the Thai trawlers which carry the opium to Hong Kong.

Our military action in Southeast Asia might be more appropriately directed toward some of those Thai trawlers rather than our present targets.

We have been told repeatedly that the Thai Government is cooperating in our efforts to stem the drug traffic. It is shocking that with this so-called cooperation of the Thai Government and its security personnel resulted in the seizure of only 97 pounds of heroin and 645 pounds of opium during all of 1971.

Other serious questions have been raised concerning the degree of Thai cooperation. For example, last March the Thai Government announced it had burned 26 tons of opium. This was hailed as evidence that Thailand was "cooperating" in efforts to stop the flow of heroin. Yet, no official statement or press release mentioned the fact that about \$1 million of American funds were involved in this so-called seizure.

If the United States did buy up opium and assure its destruction, the action might be defended. But according to the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, all we did was inspect part of it before it was burned. Meanwhile, it was the Thais who collected it, tested it at

the time of collection, and ultimately destroyed it.

The matter of heroin and Thailand is not a new problem. It was not discovered yesterday, although some administration officials act as if it was. Nelson Gross of the State Department testified on June 9 that—

We have no evidence that there is any present heroin refinery working in either Laos or Thailand in the northern area or in the area of Bangkok in the south.

Three days after he made that statement, completely acting as though nothing was going on, the State Department issued a report detailing the seizure of such refineries in the very areas where Gross said none existed. The problem has been there and no one will benefit by trying to cover it up.

Mr. President, I am deeply troubled that our Government seems to be satisfied with telling the people that progress is being made, when it is not, and that not enough of an effort is being made to achieve progress in our antidrug efforts.

Such efforts to hide the truth from the American public on the critical issue of heroin traffic are highly undesirable and counterproductive.

It is time to make drug information available to the public and to put the necessary pressure on the Thai Government to take definitive action against drug smuggling. Only by the kind of direct action which the Hartke amendment proposes will we serve notice, not only to Thailand, but to other nations of the world as well, that halting the flow of heroin into this country is our No. 1 priority.

Last week, President Nixon said that he considers keeping dangerous drugs out of the United States just as important as keeping armed enemy forces from landing in the United States. I agree. That is the reason why I introduced the pending Hartke amendment, in order to force the Nixon administration to end all aid to Thailand, making it a congressional mandate.

The administration can, under the amendment, resume aid, but first it must prove to the Congress that Thailand has indeed taken all necessary measures to end this deadly traffic—no such proof now exists.

We must act now to end the widespread suffering which heroin addiction causes in our society, both for the user and the victims of drug-related crimes. We must cut off the supply at its source.

The way to do it is to adopt the amendment which is before the Senate at this time.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CHILES). The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, this amendment was, of course, offered to the

Senate before and was defeated in the Senate by a vote of 68 to 22. The law already has a provision which is a little different from this amendment in the burden of proof, in that the matter is pretty much left up to the President, whereas in this case aid is suspended unless the President makes a positive finding. There is a shift in the burden.

The difficulty is that the law as it stands applies to all countries, whereas this amendment is applicable only to Thailand. I have no objection to applying it to Thailand, but I think it should be made applicable to Laos, Vietnam, and Burma, for example.

I might also say that this amendment is in the House bill, and if we go to conference it will be in conference. If we put it in the bill here, it will not be in conference. I think if we were to have this type of provision, it should be made generally applicable to all countries. That would be my principal objection to the amendment. We are all in favor of the thrust of it, which is to do anything effective we can to stop the illegal drug traffic. How effective this amendment would be as opposed to the existing law, I am not at all sure. But I am prepared to go ahead and vote on the amendment, if no other Senator wishes to speak on it.

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. HARTKE. I quite agree; as I said before, there is no question of the provisions of the present law. Nor is there any question that this type of amendment was previously defeated in the Senate. However, neither of those facts is justification for rejecting the amendment at this time. The fact is that the President stated he is in favor of terminating economic assistance to those countries who contribute to our drug problem.

Furthermore, the former Deputy Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs says that this region of Southeast Asia, the so-called Golden Triangle, has the potential to replace Turkey as the major supplier of heroin to illicit markets in this country. I understand that the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee is saying that the amendment should apply to all countries, but the fact is that we are providing practically no aid to Laos and very limited aid to Burma.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. What does the Senator mean, no aid to Laos?

Mr. HARTKE. Would the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee advise me of the amount of aid provided for Laos in the pending bill?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Perhaps it is a little amount to the Senator, but it is more than \$400 million for this fiscal year.

Mr. HARTKE. If it would make it more palatable to the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, I would have no objection to modifying the amendment to include Laos.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Laos receives assistance from funds authorized in this bill as well as from funds available in the regular DOD budget.

For fiscal 1973 it is scheduled to receive a total of \$416.7 million. Last year

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it received \$294.9 million. It amounts to a lot of money.

Incidentally, the Laotian Prime Minister is now paying the members of his Parliament \$5,000 for their votes; did the Senator see that in the paper? Our aid is helping him to pay for those votes.

Mr. HARTKE. The chairman knows I have no sympathy for those dictatorial regimes and those regimes which are—

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not know what the Senator thinks he is going to accomplish. The President says he is against it. He has plenty of authority under existing law, if he is really against it, to cut off aid in Thailand or anywhere else.

Mr. HARTKE. I understand that. But in the face of hard evidence the President has failed to act, when the President fails to act I do not think the Senate can stand by idly.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. What makes the Senator think that if we put his amendment in, the President will act? He issues these little billets-doux to the Committee on Foreign Relations all the time, and then does whatever suits him. It is not difficult to have one of these little papers prepared and sent up. They do it all the time.

Mr. HARTKE. I am not willing to surrender quite that easily to the administration.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am not surrendering; I am stating a fact. It happens all the time.

Mr. HARTKE. The fact is that at the present time there has to be a finding by the President that there is a violation in terms of compliance, but that is not an affirmative finding. The way the bill is drafted, it is negative. The Hartke amendment shifts the burden to the President to make a definitive finding. That is not the case in the present law.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes, he has to send up a finding and say, "I find Thailand is doing everything it reasonably can," under the Senator's amendment.

Mr. HARTKE. That is right.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Does the Senator think it is difficult for him to do that?

Mr. HARTKE. I think it puts the President in a position where he may well make a definitive statement which is absolutely controverted by the facts.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Does the Senator think he has any difficulty doing that?

Mr. HARTKE. I understand the point the Senator is making, but I do not believe we should surrender our authority to the President and in essence imply that we are completely ineffective in requiring the President to be truthful with the American people—

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The way to do it is to cut off the funds.

Mr. HARTKE. I am willing to do that.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator's amendment would make more sense if he would just leave out the last sentence.

Mr. HARTKE. The fact is that I still would like to have the President make that finding. If we have the President make the finding, then we have the President in a position in which his finding may well be controverted by the evidence. I think that is a much stronger case.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Why not modify it to make it applicable to all countries, then?

Mr. HARTKE. Would the Senator agree to accept it if I did that?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It would make it a lot better amendment. I do not like to agree to it, in the face of the Senate's recent vote. I frankly have no objection to it, though I do not think it is any great step forward. But if we are going to do it at all, it ought to be applicable to all countries.

The Senate just voted on this question 2 or 3 months ago, and defeated such a proposal by a vote of 68 to 22.

Mr. HARTKE. If the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations would find it possible to agree to the amendment by making it applicable to all countries and not just Thailand, I am willing to modify the amendment. The reason I have stressed Thailand is that it is presently the principal conduit for the shipment of opium in Southeast Asia.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Well, that shifts, though. We shifted it from Turkey by paying them millions not to grow poppies. Now each of them will come along in turn; that is a great incentive for other countries to start growing it, because if they grow enough, they think we will pay them millions not to grow it. This is a good way to make money, carrying this absurdity to its logical conclusion, we may, I say facetiously, start growing it in Arkansas, and see if they will pay us to quit. It is a fairly easy way to make money, you see.

Mr. HARTKE. Let me say to the chairman that if he would find it acceptable to amend the amendment to such an extent that it would apply to all countries in addition to Thailand, the Senator from Indiana certainly finds no objection to that kind of provision.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Well, if the Senator will modify it to apply to all countries, it will be the same as existing law except, as the Senator says, the President is put under the burden of making an affirmative finding. I would have no disposition to oppose it, and also I might say that on that ground it is different from the one that was defeated and from the provision in the House bill. Therefore, it would be in conference and we could resolve it then.

So I have no objection to that.

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to modify my amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has a right to modify his amendment.

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, I send to the desk a modification of my amendment and ask that it be stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment, as modified, will be stated.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to read the amendment, as modified.

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment, as modified, be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered; and, without objection, the amendment, as modified, will be printed in the Record.

The amendment, as modified, is as follows:

On page 17, line 25, strike out the quotation marks.

On page 17, after line 25, add the following: "(2) No assistance shall be furnished under this Act (other than chapter 8 of part I, relating to international narcotics control), and no sales shall be made under the Foreign Military Sales Act or under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, to Thailand, Laos, Burma, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. This restriction may be waived when the President determines that the governments of Thailand, Laos, Burma, Cambodia, and South Vietnam have taken adequate steps to carry out the purposes of chapter 8 of part I of this Act, relating to international narcotics control."

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, what the amendment does, in substance, is to extend the jurisdiction of the restriction in this fashion: Whereas the origin amendment applied only to Thailand, this amendment, as it is now drafted, applies to Thailand, Laos, Burma, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. In other words, it deals only with those countries in Southeast Asia.

I have discussed this matter with the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations. I think this modification will accomplish our purpose of directing attention toward the "Golden Triangle," which has the potential to replace Turkey as the chief supplier of heroin and dangerous drugs to the United States. In this manner, we have really covered the entire area. If it becomes necessary at a later date to expand these aid restrictions to other countries, then we have established a precedent in the Senate to support such action.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I think this is a great improvement over the original language, because it is made applicable to all the countries in Southeast Asia that are identified with the drug traffic. As the Senator properly said, this is the principal source of the supply, both to our soldiers in South Vietnam and to this country.

I am prepared to take the amendment to conference. As I have already stated, the amendment is quite similar to existing law, but it does put an onus upon the President to make an affirmative finding if the aid is not to be discontinued. So I think it is an improvement over the existing law.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further discussion of the amendment? If not, the question is on agreeing to the amendment, as modified, of the Senator from Indiana.

The amendment, as modified, was agreed to.

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The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill is open to further amendment.

Mr. STEVENSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the privilege of the floor be granted to Mr. Basil Condos during the consideration of the amendment I am about to offer.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. STEVENSON. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The legislative clerk read the amendment, as follows:

At the end of the bill insert a new section as follows:

"SEC. 19 (a) The Congress finds and declares—

"that the purpose of United States involvement in South Vietnam—self-determination for the people of that nation—has been frustrated by actions of the Thieu regime, including the abolition of hamlet elections, newspaper censorship, and the arrest and torture of President Thieu's political opponents;

"that continued United States military and economic assistance to the Thieu regime, coupled with the United States failure to condemn the repressive acts of that regime, creates the impression that the United States supports the forcible imposition of totalitarian rule in South Vietnam; and

"that rapid and total elimination of the United States military presence in Indochina is fully consistent with our expressed interest in promoting self-determination for the people of South Vietnam.

"(b) The United States shall refrain from supporting or appearing to support actions whereby the Government of South Vietnam attempts to discourage legitimate opposition by abridging the right to vote, freedom of the press, or other individual liberties.

"(c) The President shall use all available leverage, including the withholding of assistance authorized by this Act, to implement the policies set forth in this section.

"(d) On January 1, 1973, and at semi-annual intervals thereafter, the President shall report to the Congress on any and all action he has taken to implement the policies set forth in this section; *Provided*, That no such reports shall be required after the termination of all United States military assistance to South Vietnam."

Mr. STEVENSON. Mr. President, when the United States intervened in the Indochina war, it changed the character of that conflict. What began as guerrilla warfare finally became a high-technology war of electronic battlefields and laser bombs. While professing to Vietnamize the war, we Americanized it.

In thus transforming the war, we have helped give the South Vietnamese a landscape desiccated by herbicides and pocked by bomb craters. We have helped give them abandoned hamlets and teeming slums and a deadly war the Thieu regime cannot win.

And, it appears, we are also giving the South Vietnamese people a military dictatorship.

Three months ago President Thieu rammed a bill through the national assembly giving him the power to rule by decree. A distinguished journalist—Harry Bradsher of the Washington Star—reported that the U.S. Embassy in Saigon supported Thieu's efforts to get the power to rule by decree. It seems this report has never been denied.

Thieu has wasted no time in using his power to install all the machinery of a full-blown police state.

He has transferred from civilian authorities to military authorities the power to control food distribution; to check private residences both at day and night time; to detain elements considered dangerous for the national security or public order; to prohibit strikes and demonstrations or meetings harmful to the national security and public order, and to censor printed matter.

He has transferred from civilian courts to military courts the power to try demonstrators, strikers, and ordinary civilian offenders.

He has abolished hamlet elections, decreeing that hamlet officials will be appointed instead by military province chiefs under his direct control.

He has decreed that the public prosecutor may invade the headquarters of a political party "to protect public order and the national security."

He has instituted a press censorship decree so repressive as to be condemned by an international association of newspaper publishers. The decree makes it a crime to publish any unfavorable statement about Thieu, even if the statement is true. It requires a \$46,000 deposit as a precondition of publication, a requirement which has forced at least 10 papers to shut down in less than 2 months. Only last week the editor of a paper which has continued to publish was convicted of violating the press censorship decree. The crime was printing widely known, unclassified statistics about U.S. bombing of Indochina. The penalty was a year in jail.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that an article published in the Washington Post on September 23, 1972, entitled "Saigon Newspaper Punished" be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CHILES). Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. STEVENSON. Mr. President, he has decreed that "special punitive measures will be applied against unlawful acts that seriously harm the national security and public order." Reports from Saigon indicate that the "special punitive measures" includes mass arrests, imprisonment of 8-year-old children, and torture of women.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that an article published in the New York Times on August 13, 1972, entitled "Saigon Torture in Jails Reported," be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CHILES). Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 2.)

Mr. STEVENSON. Mr. President, it is now clear that we are witnessing nothing less than a ruthless and systematic campaign to destroy or silence legitimate opposition in total disregard of the popular will and of individual liberties. It is equally clear that the Thieu regime could not conduct its campaign of repression—and indeed could not exist at all—

without massive military and economic assistance from the United States.

We assert that our purpose in South Vietnam is to promote freedom and self-determination for the people of that nation. Our client subverts that purpose in a calculated effort to consolidate power for himself and a small clique of generals, landowners, and profiteers. And our only response is an embarrassed silence or a feeble attempt by the Department of State to say that these are internal matters for which we are not responsible. In at least one case—abolition of the hamlet elections—the Department of State acted as an apologist for the Thieu regime by suggesting that its action was a temporary expedient occasioned by the North Vietnamese offensive, but the fact is that Thieu did not abolish hamlet elections until after the offensive had run its course.

Mr. President, it will not do to shrug off Thieu's reign of terror as an internal matter. We supported Thieu in the rigged election of 1967; we conducted political polls and propaganda campaigns for him in 1969 and 1970; we continued our massive support of his regime while he drove his opponents out of the presidential election in 1971—all in the name of freedom and self-determination.

If Mr. Nixon had chosen to permit the people of South Vietnam a choice, they might have elected General Minh in 1971. He, and even a popularly elected Thieu, could have governed with public support, and, in the case of Minh at least, made peace. In either event, the United States could have declared its purpose fulfilled and gone home. But the administration failed once again to perceive that morality and self-interest can coincide. It permitted its puppet then, as it does now, to pull the strings and play the tune to which the people of Vietnam die.

The Thieu regime is corrupt and tyrannical. It rules by force because it cannot rule by popularity. It is the principal obstacle in the way of a negotiated settlement. Both sides have made it clear that they cannot and will not coexist peacefully. Yet, the Nixon administration insists upon propping up this dictatorship in derogation of everything it says we have fought for, and to the detriment of the negotiated settlement which it says it seeks.

If the United States is to harmonize its actions in Indochina with its rhetoric, the initiative will have to come from the Congress. And President Thieu has given us a clear choice.

The United States can no longer be for both the Thieu regime and the people of South Vietnam. It must either actively and, if necessary, publicly oppose Thieu's repressive policies, or abandon any pretense that its support of Thieu promotes self-determination.

Mr. President, Thieu's actions point up the tragic irony of our Vietnam policy: we say we oppose the imposition of a Communist government on the people of South Vietnam, yet we aid and abet Thieu's imposition of a police state on the people of South Vietnam. The longer we fight to preserve the difference between a "free" South Vietnam, and a

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"totalitarian" North Vietnam, the less of a difference there is to preserve.

Last month Mr. Thieu expressed the belief that South Vietnam was experiencing too much democracy too soon. He has acted consistently with his beliefs. It is time that we did the same, and for that reason I hope that this amendment will be agreed to.

The amendment simply declares that the purpose of U.S. involvement in South Vietnam—self-determination—has been frustrated by the repressive actions of the Thieu regime and that continued U.S. support for that regime creates the impression that the United States supports its imposition of totalitarian rule in South Vietnam. The amendment then states that the United States shall refrain from supporting Vietnamese attempts to intimidate legitimate opposition and that the President shall use all available leverage to end the repressive acts of the Thieu regime and report on his progress semiannually to the Congress. The amendment is consistent with the sentiment of many in this Chamber, including myself, that the best way to promote self-determination in South Vietnam is to leave South Vietnam. That consistency is made explicit in the amendment.

I would hope very much that the chairman would agree to accept it.

EXHIBIT 1

SAIGON NEWSPAPER PUNISHED
(By Thomas W. Lippman)

SAIGON, Sept. 22.—The business manager of an opposition newspaper was sentenced to a year in prison by South Vietnam's military court to day because the paper printed year-old statistics on the tonnage of U.S. bombs dropped in Indochina.

It was the first case considered by the court under the stringent new press law issued Aug. 4 by President Nguyen Van Thieu's government.

The newspaper, *Dien Tin*, published by a supporter of Thieu's chief political rival, Duong Van (Big) Minh, was found guilty of printing an article "harmful to the national security" and of "sowing confusion among the people." The paper was fined one million piastres, about \$2,300.

The prison term, which could have been up to five years, was imposed on Vo Thi Suong, 32, a woman about whom almost nothing is known except that she is apolitical and had nothing to do with the paper's contents or editorial policy.

The editor and publisher, Hong Son Dong, is a close associate of Minh, who until his withdrawal from the race, was Thieu's leading opponent in last year's presidential election.

But as a member of the South Vietnamese Senate, Dong is immune from prosecution. The press law stipulates that in such a case, a paper's business manager must face the court.

Miss Suong was allowed to remain free while her conviction is being appealed to South Vietnam's Supreme Court, but was required to post a bond of 1 million piastres with the court in the meantime.

Neither she nor Sen. Dong could be reached for comment. But her lawyer, Bui Chanh Thoi, had plenty to say.

The sentence was "not logical," he said, because the terms of the laws are "very ambiguous" and contain no definition of what is "harmful to the national security."

He also said that the offending issue of the paper, that of August 16, had been confiscated before it appeared on the streets.

"Since readers could not read the article,

how could the paper be harming the national security and sowing confusion among the people?" he asked.

He said he believed the punishment was intended more as a warning for the future than as a realistic sentence for a genuine offense.

That view of the case was hardly a surprise, since the government has made clear that the press law was intended to put some newspapers out of business, which it did, and curb the contents of others, which it has also done.

The offending article was based on a statistical analysis of the U.S. bombing campaigns entitled "The Air War in Indochina," published by the Center for International Studies of Cornell University. It first appeared in print a year ago, is widely available and used as a reference work here, and is largely based on public documents and the Pentagon Papers.

Its conclusions are critical of the air campaign. But persons familiar with the *Dien Tin* article said it contained only the statistics, not the conclusions.

In general, Saigon newspapers are permitted to print only the war news distributed by the South Vietnamese army's Psychological Warfare Department.

EXHIBIT 2

SAIGON TORTURE IN JAILS REPORTED
(By Sydney H. Schanberg)

SAIGON, SOUTH VIETNAM, Aug. 12.—Documents smuggled out of South Vietnamese prisons and extensive interviews with former prisoners paint a picture of widespread torture of people jailed by the Saigon Government since the North Vietnamese offensive started four and a half months ago.

Here is a sampling of the prisoner's accounts:

"Nguyen Thi Yen was beaten unconscious with a wooden rod. Later, when she revived, she was forced to stand naked before about 10 torturers, who burned her breasts with lighted cigarettes."

"Trinh Dinh Ban was beaten so badly in the face that the swelling shut and infected his eyes. The police drove needles through his fingertips and battered him on the chest and soles of his feet until he was unable to move."

"Vo Thi Bach Tuyet was beaten and hung by her feet under a blazing light. Later, they put her in a tiny room half flooded with water and let mice and insects run over her body."

STORIES ARE TYPICAL

These particular accounts are said to describe the torture of three student leaders still being held in South Vietnamese jails on suspicion of being Communist sympathizers. The accounts in these documents and many others obtained by this correspondent were purportedly written by prisoners—and in some cases by sympathetic guards—and then smuggled out.

The three accounts are typical of the stories told in the other documents and in the interviews about the treatment of the thousands of students, workers, peasants, women and children arrested by the national police and military authorities in the "pre-emptive sweeps" made in the search for Communist sympathizers and agents since the North Vietnamese Army began its offensive.

Some of the documents reached this correspondent through friends of prisoners or critics of the Government to whom the papers had been passed. Some of the interviews were also arranged this way. Additional information was gathered on the basis of other leads.

There is no way to verify the accounts of torture first hand, for the Saigon Government refuses to allow journalists to visit its prisons, which it calls "re-education centers." A formal written request was denied.

All of those interviewed said their names could not be used because they feared police reprisals.

REPORTS ARE SIMILAR

As with the smuggled documents, it is impossible to corroborate the accounts given by former prisoners in interviews. But although one cannot establish after the fact that the welts and scars visible on their bodies were inflicted by the police, the widespread reports bear out the prisoners' version.

Government officials and pro-Government legislators defend the recent repressive measures by arguing that the survival of South Vietnam is at stake. Critics reply that only the Government of President Nguyen Van Thieu, not South Vietnam, is at stake.

"Necessity requires us to accept a flexible view of the law," said one official. "You wouldn't wait until the Vietcong agent pointed his gun at your back before you handcuffed him, would you? Legal aspects do not count when there is a question of survival involved."

The victims obviously feel differently. Here, for example, is part of an account given by a woman who was interrogated intensively but not beaten in a police detention center in Saigon and then released:

"When you were being interrogated, you could hear the screams of people being tortured. Sometimes they showed you the torture going on, to try to frighten you into saying what they wanted you to say."

"Two women in my cell were pregnant. One was beaten badly. Another woman was beaten mostly on the knees, which became infected."

"One high school student tried to kill herself by cutting both wrists on the metal water taps in the washroom, but she failed. They had tortured her by putting some kind of thick rubber band around her head to squeeze it. It made her eyes swell out and gave her unbearable headaches."

"One girl was so badly tortured that the police left her in a corridor outside the interrogation room for a day—so that other prisoners would not see her condition."

This was a typical story of those interviewed. Some said that water had been forced down their mouths until they nearly drowned. Others told of electric prods used on sensitive parts of the body, of fingernails pulled out and of fingers mashed.

Several of the informants said they had discovered, while in prison, a sardonic saying by the police—"Khong, danh cho co."—"If they are innocent, beat them until they become guilty."

The accounts of the informants indicated that the worst torturing took place while prisoners were being interrogated in police centers—before they were transferred to prisons such as Con Son and Chi Hoa. Con Son is South Vietnam's biggest civilian penitentiary, situated on Con Son, an island 140 miles southeast of Saigon. Chi Hoa, the country's second largest prison, is in Saigon.

The informants said that most of the torture and interrogation took place between 10 P.M. and 3 A.M. They said some of the prisoners, under torture or fearing torture agreed to become police agents to win their release.

NAMES ARE GIVEN

Some of the documents purportedly smuggled out of the prisons gave the names of five persons who had been tortured to death recently in jail, and said this was only a part list. The documents listed Bui Chi and Nguyen Duy Hien, students from the Hue area who were said to have died in Con Son. Also listed were Ta Xuan Thanh, Dinh Van Ut and Bui Duong of Saigon, who were said to have died in Chi Hoa.

It is impossible to tell, without Government cooperation, how many thousands have been arrested since the North Vietnamese offensive began. Most foreign diplomats think the figure is well over 10,000. One American

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source said that slightly over 15,000 people had been jailed and about 5,000 released later. But whatever the exact figures, it is clear that thousands remain in prison and that arrests continue.

The bulk of the arrests have been in the Mekong Delta south of Saigon and in the extreme north. Many students were seized in Hue, some of them reportedly while working in refugee centers.

LITTLE DISTINCTION INDICATED

It is also impossible to tell how many of those arrested really have Communist connections and how many are simply opposed to the Government of President Thieu, because the police seem to make little distinction. There is a third category of prisoners as well—people who were apparently seized at random and who committed no crime. They just happened to have been in the wrong place.

Critics of the Government say that each district administration has been given a quota of arrests and that local officials have been trying to meet the quotas quickly with little regard for legal niceties.

According to one document, purportedly written by a sympathetic jailer, an old woman has been imprisoned in Con Son because one of her sons is regarded as a Communist sympathizer and is in hiding. Her four other sons are in the South Vietnamese Army. She wants to write them about what had happened to her, the jailer said, but she has forgotten their military addresses and the prison authorities will not help her communicate with them.

FAMILY LINKS ONE CAUSE

This woman seems to be typical of many of those arrested recently. They were picked up because they have relatives who are active Vietcong or suspected of having some link with the Communists. But according to the Vietnamese officials themselves, most families in South Vietnam have a relative or relatives "with the other side" and the Government would have to arrest millions if it were to apply this criterion across the board.

Nguyen Van Thong, a pro-Government member of the lower house and chairman of the committee that deals with police and prison legislation, said in a recent interview that the Government should have carried out these arrests a lot earlier. Though Mr. Thong acknowledged that some innocent people had undoubtedly been arrested, he said "These people will sooner or later get out of jail."

Legal form, rarely observed with fidelity at any time in South Vietnam's recent history, has clearly been abandoned since the enemy offensive began. On the one hand, President Thieu continues to declare that the back of the North Vietnamese drive has been broken, yet on the other he has been using his recently granted special powers to narrow civil liberties further.

LAWS SEEM TO BE IGNORED

Although no Government edict has been issued, the normal laws governing the rights of the accused appear to have been virtually suspended. Often those arrested are reportedly not told the charge against them nor allowed to consult a lawyer. Prisoners are sometimes kept for months and years without a hearing or trial. Often the police will not acknowledge that they are holding a particular person so his family is unable to locate him.

In a sense, many of these people and their cases simply disappear—except for reports that leak out clandestinely.

The same jailer at Con Son who purportedly wrote of the old woman with four sons in the army also was said to have given the following description of an area of the prison holding 1,500 people from Hue and other northern areas:

"I was horrified to find that the place was full of women and old people and more than

50 children under 9 years old. None of them knew why they had been brought here. In general, their arrests had happened like this: Village officials would come and call them to the village headquarters. Once they were there, the officials would tell them falsely that they had to be evacuated, presumably because of near-by fighting. And then they would find they had been deported to Con Son."

This prison made headlines two years ago when the treatment of hundreds of prisoners jammed into small cells known as "tiger cages" was publicized by two American Congressmen on a fact-finding tour of Vietnam. The Congressmen managed to enter the "tiger cage" area over the objections of both the South Vietnamese warden and his American adviser.

Although the United States is the major provider of aid to the South Vietnamese police and prison system, the American mission here refuses to discuss the situation on the record, contending that it is entirely a South Vietnamese program.

AIRLINE ROLE CHARGED

According to authoritative sources, however, Air America, the airline operated in Indochina for the Central Intelligence Agency, has been used to transport arrested people to Con Son.

The two top American advisers to the South Vietnamese on police and prison matters—Michael G. McCann and Theodore D. Brown, director and deputy director, respectively, of the American mission's public-safety directorate—do not deny the widespread torture or the use of Air America; they simply refuse to comment. Requests for interviews with both men were rejected.

A high American source, who granted an interview but insisted on anonymity said that being outside the situation "I cannot affirm that tortures don't take place" and he acknowledged that "all kinds of deplorable things may well be going on." But he argued that some of those arrested were known anti-government and Communist activists who had been involved in terrorist incidents—"and who aren't exactly the nice college kids next door."

Critics of the Government describe what has been happening recently as a police-state operation. And while repressive tactics are not so obvious on the streets of Saigon and other cities as they apparently are in the jails, there have been disquieting signs of intimidation.

The police set up checkpoints from time to time in Saigon, on the pretext of searching people and vehicles for weapons or explosives destined for terrorist activities. But on the several occasions this correspondent has stood close by and watched these searches, it appeared that the checkpoints were often no more than means of shaking down Vietnamese for money or goods.

Despite these tactics, there has been little protest.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Well, Mr. President, the Senator from Illinois has made a very fine statement. There is nothing in it with which I do not agree. He is quite right about the course of the war in Vietnam, that it has been turned into an American war; that it started out, as he said, as a guerrilla and civil war and since we took over it has become a tragic story, with the gradual elimination of all aspects of democracy in South Vietnam, all of which has been reported fully in the press. I am not at all sure the amendment will be persuasive on the President because I assume that he will take the position that he is presently doing all he can to assure self-determination in South Vietnam—at least his published statements have been to that effect.

But, in any case, I personally approve of the thrust of the Senator's amendment which is that we should not continue to support totalitarian rule in South Vietnam and that we should end our occupation there. I certainly agree that the way to promote self-determination in South Vietnam is for the United States to remove all of its forces and come home.

So, I am prepared to accept the amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CHILES). The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Illinois (Mr. STEVENSON).

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. STEVENSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the name of the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. HUMPHREY) be added as a cosponsor of this amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. STEVENSON. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT) for his support.

MOTION TO RECONSIDER A PREVIOUS VOTE

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, on last Friday the Senate agreed to an amendment of mine on lines 10 and 11 of page 17 of the bill. I did not at that time move to reconsider that action of the Senate. I deferred to the members of the minority staff and told them that we would not act until this noon.

I understood that the minority leader would be back by noon. I would like at this time to move to reconsider the vote by which my amendment on lines 10 and 11 of page 13 of the bill was agreed to.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. TURNER). The question is on agreeing to the motion to table.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, is that in order when a motion to table is being considered?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quorum call is in order if there is no further debate.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, I tried to find out where the leadership is at this moment. I am unsuccessful in finding out anything. As far as I am concerned, I do not feel that I should hold up the work of this session any longer than is absolutely necessary. It has been held up too long already with these great inspiring speeches which take place every morning

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when no one is in the gallery and no one on the floor.

Under these circumstances, if there is no one interested in this legislation, as far as I am concerned, the Senate may have a voice vote.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion to table. [Putting the question.]

The motion was agreed to.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE SCOTT AMENDMENT TO H.R. 16029

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, tomorrow the Senate is scheduled to vote on the Scott amendment to the foreign aid bill. That amendment would increase the money amounts in the bill by a total of \$370 million. It would tack on an additional: \$200 million for military assistance; \$135 million for supporting assistance or budget subsidies; and, \$35 million for military credit sales.

The bill now contains \$1.35 billion for these programs. I believe this amount is overly generous and no increase is warranted.

In 1970, at the outset of the Nixon doctrine, Congress approved only \$815 million for these same programs, or \$535 million less than is in the bill as it now stands. The Scott amendment would serve to double the 1970 appropriation. I hope it will be defeated.

Mr. President, Senators should be aware that the amounts proposed in the bill, although substantial in themselves, are in fact but a fraction of the total military aid and arms sales program proposed for this fiscal year. The price tag on the entire package is \$8.4 billion. A breakdown of this multibillion program is contained in the committee's report and I ask unanimous consent that it be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Military and related assistance and arms sales programs, fiscal year 1973 (executive branch estimates)

	Amount
Military assistance grants.....	\$819,700,000
Foreign military credit sales.....	629,000,000
Excess defense articles.....	245,000,000
Ships loans.....	39,600,000
Security supporting assistance.....	879,418,000
Foreign military cash sale (DOD).....	2,200,000,000
Commercial sales.....	722,598,000
Military assistance — DOD funded.....	2,924,700,000

Total military and related assistance and sales..... 8,460,016,000

¹ Valued at one-third acquisition cost.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, my opposition to the pending amendment stems in large part from knowing that the additional \$370 million, like most of the money already in the bill, will be

used, either directly or indirectly, in a manner contrary to our own values and objectives.

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, states, for example:

The Congress declares that the freedom, security, and prosperity of the United States are best sustained in a community of free, secure and prospering nations.

The Congress declares, therefore, that it is not only expressive of our sense of freedom, justice and compassion, but also important to our national security that the United States, through private as well as public efforts, assist the people of less-developed countries in their efforts to acquire the knowledge and resources essential for development and to build the economic, political and social institutions which will meet their aspirations for a better life, with freedom, and in peace.

The Congress declares that it is the policy of the United States to support the principles of increased economic cooperation and trade among countries, freedom of the press, information, and religion. . . .

Maximum effort shall be made, in the administration of this Act, to stimulate the involvement of the people in the development process through the encouragement of democratic participation in private and local governmental activities. . . .

And so it goes, Mr. President, one pious statement after another.

But what is the reality? Where is the "community of free, secure, and prospering nations"? What ever became of our effort to help the poorer nations build "economic, political, and social institutions which will meet their aspirations for a better life, with freedom and in peace"? Where have we supported "freedom of press, information"? And what ever happened to the "maximum effort to stimulate the involvement of the people in the development process through the encouragement of democratic participation in private and local governmental activities"?

Mr. President, the reality of foreign aid is that all of these hopes, all of these dreams have gone aglimmering, and no amount of money can alter the situation or breathe new life into the corpse of foreign aid.

One has only to pick up the daily newspaper to appreciate how bankrupt this program has become. For example, Friday's Washington Post carried a front-page story entitled, "Lao Regime Said To Bribe Opposition." The article reads:

The Laotian government used Treasury funds this week to bribe legislators to end their six months opposition to Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma, highly knowledgeable diplomatic sources disclosed today.

Or, there is the story from the Evening Star of August 14 entitled, "Diplomats Charge 'Big Steal' of Laotian AID Funds." This article points out:

Diplomats here (Vietnam) are highly critical of the American AID mission and the Lao Government for failing to take meaningful steps to halt corruption and mismanagement in the foreign exchange funds established to stabilize the Lao economy.

The fund consists of more than \$25 million, of which the U.S. contributed more than \$16 million.

Diplomats here call the effort "the big steal" and claim the fund almost totally goes to the powerful Laos Mandarin, the Sawanikone family, and a handful of Chinese businessmen.

Mr. President, the United States provides direct budget subsidies to the Laotian treasury with cash grants from supporting assistance. This year Laos is scheduled to receive a total U.S. aid package costing \$417 million. This will bring the total amount of our aid to Laos since 1946 to over \$2 billion.

Similarly discouraging are the reports coming out of Cambodia. Since the resumption of aid to that nation in 1970, the United States has provided \$372 million in military grant aid alone. Another \$225 million is scheduled for this fiscal year. Despite these efforts, the performance of the Cambodian Army has been disappointing at best and, according to an article in the Washington Post of September 4, "Cambodia's Soldiers Still Quit Fighting at Dinnertime." The Sun of August 19 carried a report entitled, "In Cambodian Army Corruption Thwarts AID." In this report we learn,

There is hardly a battalion or brigade command post without a gleaming white or pearl Mercedes parked among the olive-drab military vehicles.

Adding credibility to this observation is the list of Cambodian imports financed by cash grants from the United States. Looking at some of the items on the list, one wonders if there is any relationship between Cambodia's imports and the needs of a country suffering the ravages of war; some of the items on the list include the following:

Air-conditioning equipment and repair parts.....	\$65,407.97
Brewery supplies (bottle tops).....	19,465.00
Cellophane tape.....	10,340.44
Cigarette manufacturing materials.....	702,994.66
Garden hose.....	138,221.45
Office machines:	
Accounting machines.....	46,998.88
Adding machines.....	59,780.16
Calculators.....	126,110.00
Duplicating machines and accessories.....	36,896.63
Typewriters.....	436,470.77
Pen refills (4,000,000).....	82,330.00
Plumbing fixtures (color).....	9,991.28
Soft drink manufacturing equipment and material.....	1,011,903.58
Television sets.....	17,120.00
Time magazine.....	5,850.00
Toothpaste.....	55,483.14

Finally, there is Vietnam. The stories are both endless and taxing on the imagination: "Saigon Declares End of Elections on Hamlet Level"; "United States Admits End of Viet Hamlet Vote"; and "Vietnam: Democracy Was Very Disorderly."

And, for the sake of variety, there are any number of additional selections, each as morbid as the other: "United States to Train Taiwanese in Submarines"; "United States Will Pay \$9 Million on Malta Rent"; "Greece's Jet Purchase Worries Turkish Regime"; and, "United States Drops Piasters from Heaven on North Vietnam."

Each of these articles portrays, in one way or another, various aspects of the

states disregard the sanctity of contractual obligations and the rule of law has been disapproved. Both morality and legality are today strongly adhered to, at least in the realm of East-West economic arrangements. In order to gain respectability and acceptance in the preponderantly capitalist setting of world commerce, communist enterprises have made a commendable effort to conform to the standards and practices which have been the common heritage of merchants since time immemorial. Nonetheless, the dissimilarity of Eastern and Western economic structures, the different frames of reference within which domestic and foreign business are conducted, the intrusion of extreme ideological precepts and the absence of a common body of legal principles distort the process of trade in a manner never anticipated by those who have built the ancient foundations of orderly economic life.

The communist nations of Europe and Asia have also fashioned novel institutions. These institutions cannot be judged from the vantage point of our own ideas about economics, property, profit and law. Just as England, in her own time, gave form to a body of practices which gradually acquired universal reputations as the *lex mercatoria*, so the Soviet Union, China and other like-minded nations can justifiably claim the right to forge original methods for the convenient conduct of their foreign trade.

A new source of difficulty arises in the opening field of economic cooperation. To date, only camouflage accommodations have been practicable in this field in order to respect the rigidities of Marxist-Leninist dogma. Thus, profits are euphemistically expressed in terms of royalties or service fees, rather than dividends. The substitute for foreign ownership of socialist means of production is a transfer of title to plant and equipment, coupled with a lease-back arrangement. A semblance of equity control is obtained by means of a carefully drawn management contract. Whenever a transaction is deemed advantageous, the communist partner spares no ingenuity to meet his capitalist partner half-way, and in the process pragmatism somehow triumphs over doctrine. But the development of ideologically compatible devices to sustain the growing shift from traditional commodity trade to more ambitious forms of joint ventures is still in an embryonic and precarious stage.

Obstacles to normal commerce and competition arising from fundamental differences between the two social systems, rather than from lingering political hostility as such, may be illustrated by means of a few representative examples. These examples extend to both the micro-economic and macro-economic levels of East-West relations and demonstrate the need for a wholly new regulatory approach.

The Eastern economy is essentially secretive and unresponsive to normal market forces. A foreigner has no reliable basis for gauging business prospects. Since purchase and production patterns are governmentally decreed, Western firms cannot hope to sell in proportion to real demand unless their products have appropriate priority in the state economic plan.

Further, they cannot effectively outbid competitors from other countries enjoying market access under bilateral commercial agreements or fraternal socialist preference. Even if a private company has confidently submitted the most attractive commercial offer to an Eastern state monopoly, it may be disqualified by an unexplained veto based on national policy considerations. This results from the monolithic structure of the communist systems and the fusion of all economic and political authority under the same roof.

Scarce hard currency and gold reserves push the Eastern monopolies toward strictly balanced trade, tied transactions and com-

pensatory deals, often requiring Western sellers to make unrelated counter-purchase commitments as a condition of placing their orders. Unless the goods received in barter are staple commodities the Western firm is forced either to become the reluctant distributor of unwanted merchandise or to pass up the chance of trade altogether.

Although the communist economies are attempting to decentralize their international dealings, Western traders are still generally required to transact business through intermediary export-import monopolies. As a rule they cannot negotiate directly with end-users of industrial products, plants or technology. They cannot (except in Yugoslavia and Rumania) acquire equity or participate in the profits of local companies. Nor can they, normally, establish representative offices, attend to on-the-spot maintenance of their equipment, hire local help, or utilize many other facilities which are available in an open economy.

The distortions of competition are comparable. To be sure, no cohesive case of mischievous market disruption has so far been made out against the Eastern monopolies. Neither Russia nor China, much less the smaller communist countries, have shown any desire to misallocate their resources to adventurous business forays. But the fact remains that private Western firms find themselves occasionally embroiled in an unequal competitive contest with free-wheeling state enterprises, particularly in the politically sensitive, less developed areas of the world.

Because it is characteristically a large scale exporter and importer with a cavalier attitude toward profit, a state monopoly has a natural propensity to dislocate established patterns of trade even when its motives are economically legitimate. All that is needed is an administrative decision to sell or buy taken at the apex of the governmental trade apparatus, and the flow of goods is automatically pumped into or out of the economy regardless of the interaction between national costs and international prices.

The borderline between healthy competition and harmful disruption is blurred, at best. For example, classical Western safeguards against dumping are ineffectual in their application to communist export monopolies, since costs and prices are arbitrary notions in the East. On the other hand, in a centrally planned economy the issue of anti-dumping controls does not even arise. Were the gates of the U.S.S.R., China or Cuba suddenly thrown open to unimpeded merchandising from abroad, their markets would remain impervious to underpriced or injurious disposal. If the goods are required under the government import plan, the low price is welcomed. If they are not considered essential, they cannot enter in the first place, let alone threaten local industry.

By the same token, in a market system reciprocal most-favored-nation undertakings and tariff reductions usually lead to increased imports. In the case of a planned economy the impact of such arrangements is largely meaningless, since the state alone decides what is to be bought. The protectionism is complete and invisible.

Similar difficulties arise in the negotiation of commercial treaties with communist countries, in the operation of international legal conventions of which they are members and in their participation in various multinational organizations. Global arrangements such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or the International Monetary Fund cannot accommodate Eastern state trading and Western private trading side-by-side under the normal operation of their existing rules and procedures.

It would be misleading if my bill of complaints were addressed to the Eastern countries alone, and if Western attitudes and practices were depicted as lily-white. The

long-standing legislative and administrative American market and other markets of the West are a matter of public record. So are the discriminatory limitations on exports and credits required by Eastern purchasers. Many of these restrictions and limitations are predicated on political rationales which have long ago lost their validity. Most notable among them are, of course, the United States export controls which withhold the supply of goods and data to Eastern countries because of their presumed strategic significance, notwithstanding the fact that the same goods and data are often readily available from competing Western sources.

Beyond that, entirely conventional institutions and practices are frequently as unacceptable to the communist as to the capitalist side of a transaction. Thus, in the event a commercial dispute requires litigation (and a fair number do), communist enterprises are no less reluctant to submit to the "bourgeois" courts, laws and procedures of the West, than capitalist enterprises are to face the communist courts, law and procedures of the East.

Various proposals have been advanced from time to time with a view to placing the conduct of East-West trade on a more satisfactory footing.

Some authoritative legal scholars, in West and East, believe that the requisite solutions will emerge spontaneously, because commercial law and practice everywhere tends inexorably away from the strictures of nationalism and ideology, toward conformism. Essentially, they appear to endorse the view of Lord Mansfield, the great eighteenth century judge who, in the best rationalist tradition of his period held that the theoretical foundations of all mercantile rules were nothing more than universal common sense and reason in action—a manifestation of the natural law of mankind.

As a practitioner, my observations prompt me to dissent from this verdict. Experience in the front lines of East-West trade shows that the trend toward universality is more apparent than real, more semantic than conceptual. In practice, that which looks standard and conventional becomes distorted, owing to the deep underlying divergence between the two systems of economic organization.

It has been seriously suggested that a non-communist country could counter the Eastern government monopolies with state corporations of its own, and several have done so. To create an exclusive national channel for the exchange of goods and services, however, would be tantamount to emulating totalitarian trading methods and inviting serious and probably irreversible inroads into a domain, which market economies prefer to leave in private hands. The Frankenstein features of such a monster, effective though it might be as a vehicle for trade and competition with collectivist Eastern economies would be more alarming than comforting to those whom it was designed to protect.

It has also been suggested that communist countries be invited and various global arrangements, multinational organizations, multilateral conventions and uniform laws for the coordination of procedures and practices pertaining to foreign trade. This is, unfortunately, impractical. Progress toward uniformity presupposes an underlying similarity or affinity of institutions. In the absence of a common core of social, economic and juridical concepts the search for uniformity seems futile.

Theoretically, business relations between private firms and state monopolies could be made the subject of separate national laws. A legislature can authoritatively condition all purchases and sales involving wholly planned economies upon compliance with special statutory terms. However, this mode of regulation would yield highly undesirable by-products. Entire branches of law would

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require piecemeal amendment, with resultant disturbance to the overall legal order.

In the short term, the bilateral treaty remains an unquestionably convenient instrument for the regulation or trade between a government operated and a market oriented economy. Aside from dealings with matters of direct concern to the two states themselves, such treaties can prescribe proper conditions for contractual relationships between private and public enterprises. Through a comprehensive document of this type, the requisite regime could be externally installed without disturbing the logic and unity of locally established practices and laws.

In the ultimate analysis, the peculiarities of East-West trade are unique; the solutions must, therefore, also be unique. For this fundamental reason economic intercourse between free enterprise and state enterprise societies require a separate and independent system of international regulation—a model code of ground rules specially conceived to mitigate the distortions of direct business dealings and to safeguard the general structure of world commerce as it strains to accommodate the growing phenomenon of total state trading. In my opinion, this approach is superior for conceptual as well as practical reasons. It pursues the aims sought through the other approaches without inviting any of their drawbacks—the fear of exclusive trade channels, the impracticability of unified norms, the dislocation of general laws and the fragmentation of bilateral treaties.

It would be neither realistic nor just to demand deep unilateral changes in the Eastern economies or their foreign trade organizations. Crucial to any workable code would be a negotiated exchange of concessions and assurances, with each side giving up something of value to gain something in return. The difficulty of reaching such a settlement cannot be underestimated, but once accomplished, it would be largely self-enforcing. Each country would hesitate to violate any rule, for fear of losing privileges the other rules afforded. Not judicial compulsion, but the expectation of mutual advantage would be the engine of compliance. Such are the intrinsic checks and balances that organized business life can generate for its own protection.

In the near term, it would be a delusion to expect communist and capitalist states to conclude a full-blown convention for transideological trade. But a new opportunity to move toward satisfactory guidelines is provided by the U.S.-Soviet Commercial Commission established last May. The success of future efforts in this forum, jointly undertaken by representatives of the two principal poles of Eastern and Western economic organization, could have exemplary value for all free enterprise and state enterprise countries, and lead to the ultimate goal of a universal charter of fair practices for East-West trade.¹

IN PROTEST OF SOVIET EXTORTION

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. President, within recent weeks we have once again become painfully aware of the insidious practice of discrimination against Jews by the Soviet Government. Soviet authorities have instituted a new system of heavy

exit fees ranging from \$5,000 to \$25,000 for educated Jews who wish to emigrate to Israel. The Soviet Government's convenient excuse has been that the fees are repayment for state-financed education. However, since state education is the only kind available or permissible, it is clear that this new ploy is one of extortion and exploitation.

Concerned individuals throughout the world have condemned this deplorable policy of buying and selling human beings. Sadly enough, this practice has a historical precedent, dating back to the czarist days. In the mid-19th century, Russian serfs were considered commodities, the property of their owners. The price varied, depending on the serf's abilities and education. It is, indeed, ironic that in this case education has become a definite detriment to these modern serfs of the Soviet Government.

It has become clear that more and more Jewish intellectuals and technicians have been applying for exit visas. Reportedly, invitations have been sent to some 80,000 Soviet Jews by Israeli relatives. These invitations are among the conditions for applications to the Soviet passport office for exit permits. More than one-third of the families include at least one professional. In the past, Soviet Jews wishing to emigrate have traditionally been harassed and threatened upon application for permission to emigrate.

Yet this new measure, totally unjustifiable, all but curtails the feasibility of emigration. We cannot and must not stand by and watch fellow human beings be ransomed off for their level of education.

I firmly believe that we must voice our protest loudly as well as show by our diplomatic actions that we view this new policy as revolting and totally unacceptable. I insist that we completely drop the idea of granting most-favored-nation treatment to the Soviet Union until this despicable practice is curtailed. Granting most-favored-nation treatment would indicate a total ignorance and apathy for Soviet discriminatory practices. Future American-Soviet agreements should be based on mutual respect, yet when the Soviet Union persists in disregarding basic human rights and human dignity, there is no basis for respect.

We are a nation which advocates freedom, justice, and human dignity. We cannot degrade ourselves and these ideals by granting trade concessions to the Soviet Union when the very same government flagrantly violates the ideals we cherish. Public outcry has, in the past, influenced the Soviet leaders to alter certain policies. Let us hope that our vocal protest as well as diplomatic actions in this instance will have the same effect, and that those Soviet Jews wishing to emigrate will be able to do so freely rather than for a ransom.

CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, is there further morning business?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time for morning business having expired, morning business is concluded.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives by Mr. Berry, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had passed a bill (H.R. 16705) making appropriations for foreign assistance and related programs for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973, and for other purposes, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

The message also announced that the House had agreed to the following concurrent resolutions, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate:

H. Con. Res. 672. Concurrent resolution commemorating the 200th anniversary of Dickinson College; and

H. Con. Res. 701. Concurrent resolution commending the 1972 U.S. Olympic team for their athletic performance and Mark Andrew Spitz, in particular, for his unparalleled achievement in the 1972 Olympic games in Munich, Germany.

HOUSE BILL REFERRED

The bill (H.R. 16705) making appropriations for foreign assistance and related programs for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973, and for other purposes, was read twice by its title and referred to the Committee on Appropriations.

HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTIONS REFERRED

The following concurrent resolutions were referred to the Committee on the Judiciary:

H. Con. Res. 672. Concurrent resolution commemorating the 200th anniversary of Dickinson College; and

H. Con. Res. 701. Concurrent resolution commending the 1972 U.S. Olympic team for their athletic performance and Mark Andrew Spitz, in particular, for his unparalleled achievement in the 1972 Olympic games in Munich, Germany.

UNFINISHED BUSINESS LAID ASIDE

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, S. 3970 will be laid aside, and it will remain in the laid-aside status until a time later in the day to be determined by the majority leader or his designee.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1972

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Hollings). Under the previous order, the

¹ The content and rationale of a proposed charter of fair practices for East-West trade is set forth in chapter 26 of the author's "Coexistence and Commerce" (McGraw-Hill, New York 1970).

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Chair lays before the Senate H.R. 16029, which will be stated by title.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (H.R. 16029) to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and for other purposes.

The Senate proceeded to consider the bill, which had been reported from the Committee on Foreign Relations with an amendment, to strike out all after the enacting clause and insert:

That this Act may be cited as the "Foreign Assistance Act of 1972".

OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION

SEC. 2. Section 234(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, relating to the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, is amended by striking out "(1) except as evidence of indebtedness debt securities convertible to stock, but such debt securities shall not be converted to stock while held by the Corporation" and inserting in lieu thereof "(1) in its financing programs, acquire debt securities convertible to stock or rights to acquire stock, but such debt securities or rights shall not be converted to stock while held by the Corporation".

REFUGEE RELIEF ASSISTANCE

SEC. 3. Section 491 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, relating to refugee relief assistance, is amended by striking out "1972" and "\$250,000,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "1973" and "\$100,000,000", respectively.

ASSISTANCE TO WAR AND FLOOD VICTIMS

SEC. 4. Part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new chapters:

"CHAPTER 10—ASSISTANCE FOR WAR VICTIMS IN INDOCHINA"

"SEC. 495. ASSISTANCE TO WAR VICTIMS IN INDOCHINA.—(a) The Congress affirms the willingness of the United States to share the burden for the immediate and postwar relief and rehabilitation of the people and nations of Indochina, including South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

"(b) The Congress urges the President to begin immediately the preparation of plans and proposals outlining programs and institutional channels through which the United States Government may support and participate in the postwar relief and rehabilitation of the people and nations of Indochina.

"(c) The Congress further urges the President to solicit the cooperation of other governments in submitting to the United Nations Secretary General a proposal for convening, as soon as practical, an international conference to help determine humanitarian needs among the people and nations of Indochina and to explore approaches to the task of postwar relief and rehabilitation, including the kinds of international arrangements to carry out this task.

"(d) The Congress further urges the President to solicit the cooperation of other governments in submitting to the United Nations Secretary General a proposal to establish as soon as practical an autonomous Fund of the United Nations for Indochina (FUNI) to receive contributions for humanitarian purposes in Indochina and to support the task of postwar relief and rehabilitation under international auspices.

"CHAPTER 11—PHILIPPINE DISASTER RELIEF"

"SEC. 497. PHILIPPINE DISASTER RELIEF.—Notwithstanding the provisions of this or any other Act, the President is authorized to provide, on such terms and conditions as he may determine, relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction assistance in connection with damage caused by floods in the Philippines during 1972. Of the funds provided to carry

out this part, \$50,000,000 shall be available only to carry out this chapter. Such assistance shall be distributed, to the extent practicable, under the auspices of or by international institutions and relief agencies or United States voluntary agencies."

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

SEC. 5. Chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, relating to military assistance, is amended as follows:

(1) In section 504(a), relating to authorization, strike out "fiscal year 1972" and insert in lieu thereof "fiscal year 1973".

(2) In section 506(a), relating to special authority, strike out "1972" wherever it appears and insert in lieu thereof "1973".

(3) At the end of such chapter 2, add the following new section:

"SEC. 515. LIMITATIONS ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS.—No funds authorized or appropriated under any provision of law shall be made available by any means by any officer, employee, or agency of the United States Government for the purpose of financing any military operations in Thailand by any military forces, other than the national forces of Thailand or the United States, unless Congress has specifically authorized or specifically authorizes the making of funds available for such purpose."

SECURITY SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE

SEC. 6. (a) Section 532 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, relating to authorization for security supporting assistance, is amended by striking out "fiscal year 1972 not to exceed \$618,000,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "fiscal year 1973 not to exceed \$550,000,000".

(b) Chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, relating to security supporting assistance, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sections:

"SEC. 534. REFUGEE ASSISTANCE IN CAMBODIA.—The President is authorized to provide humanitarian assistance, on such terms and conditions as he considers appropriate, to refugees and war victims in Cambodia. Of the funds appropriated pursuant to section 532 for the fiscal year 1973, not less than \$2,000,000 shall be available until expended solely to carry out this section.

SEC. 535. ASSISTANCE TO SOUTH VIETNAM CHILDREN.—(a) It is the sense of the Congress that inadequate provision has been made (1) for the establishment, expansion, and improvement of day care centers, orphanages, hostels, school feeding programs, health and welfare programs, and training related to these programs which are designed for the benefit of South Vietnamese children, disadvantaged by hostilities in Vietnam or conditions related to those hostilities, and (2) for the adoption by United States citizens of South Vietnamese children who are orphaned or abandoned, or whose parents or sole-surviving parent, as the case may be, has irrevocably relinquished all parental rights.

"(b) The President is therefore authorized to provide assistance, on terms and conditions he considers appropriate, for the purposes described in clauses (1) and (2) of subsection (a) of this section. Of the funds appropriated pursuant to section 532 for fiscal year 1973, \$5,000,000 shall be available until expended solely to carry out this section. Not more than 10 per centum of the funds made available to carry out this section may be expended for the purposes referred to in subsection (a)(2) of this section. Assistance provided under this section shall be furnished, to the maximum extent practicable, under the auspices of and by international agencies or United States voluntary agencies.

"SEC. 536. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN SOUTH VIETNAM.—The President is authorized to provide humanitarian assistance, on such terms and conditions as he considers

appropriate, to refugees, civilian war casualties, war orphans, abandoned children, and other persons disadvantaged by hostilities or conditions related to those hostilities in South Vietnam. Of the funds appropriated pursuant to section 532 for the fiscal year 1973, not less than \$70,000,000 shall be available, until expended, solely to carry out this section. Of the funds appropriated under section 532 of this Act, including any such funds made available to carry out this section, not less than \$18,000,000 shall be allocated for project assistance in South Vietnam for public health services and war victims.

"SEC. 537. CENTER FOR PLASTIC SURGERY IN SAIGON.—Of the funds appropriated pursuant to section 532 for the fiscal year 1973, not less than \$715,000 shall be available solely for furnishing assistance to the Center for Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery in Saigon."

TRANSFER BETWEEN ACCOUNTS

SEC. 7. Section 610(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, relating to transfer between accounts, is amended—

(1) by inserting immediately after "except that" the designation "(1)"; and

(2) by inserting before the period at the end thereof a comma and the following: "and (2) no funds made available for any provision of part I of this Act may be transferred to, or consolidated with, funds made available for any provision of part II of this Act (including chapter 4 of such part II)".

PROHIBITIONS AGAINST FURNISHING ASSISTANCE

SEC. 8. Section 620 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, relating to prohibitions against furnishing assistance, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsections:

"(x) No assistance, other than training, may be furnished under part II of this Act (including chapter 4 of such part), and no sale, credit sale, or guaranty with respect to defense articles or defense services may be made under the Foreign Military Sales Act, to, for, on behalf of the Governments of Pakistan, India (including Sikkim), Bangladesh, Nepal, Ceylon, the Maldives Islands, or Bhutan.

"(y) None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be used to provide any kind of assistance to any foreign country in which a military base is located if—

"(1) such base was constructed or is being maintained or operated with funds furnished by the United States; and

"(2) personnel of the United States carry out military operations from such base; unless and until the President has determined, and informed the Congress in writing, that the government of such country has, consistent with security, authorized access, on a regular basis, to bona fide news media correspondents of the United States to such military base. The President shall not exercise any special authority granted him under section 614(a) of this Act with respect to this section."

ALLOCATION AND REIMBURSEMENT AMONG AGENCIES

SEC. 9. Subsection (a) of section 632 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, relating to allocation and reimbursement among agencies, is repealed.

LIMITATIONS ON CAMBODIAN ASSISTANCE

SEC. 10. Section 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, relating to limitations upon assistance to or for Cambodia, is amended—

(1) by striking out "\$341,000,000" and "1972", wherever they appear in subsections (a) and (b) and inserting in lieu thereof "\$275,000,000" and "1973", respectively; and

(2) by inserting in subsection (g), after "section", a comma and the following: "or any amendment thereto."

FOREIGN MILITARY SALES

SEC. 11. The Foreign Military Sales Act is amended as follows:

(1) In section 23, relating to credit sales, strike out "ten" and insert in lieu thereof "twenty".

(2) In section 31(a), relating to authorization, strike out "fiscal year 1972" and insert in lieu thereof "fiscal year 1973".

(3) In section 31(b), relating to aggregate coiling on foreign military sales credits, strike out "fiscal year 1972" and insert in lieu thereof "fiscal year 1973".

(4) In section 33(a), relating to aggregate regional ceilings, is amended by striking out "\$100,000,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "\$150,000,000".

EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES

SEC. 12. (a) Section 8(b) of the Act entitled "An Act to amend the Foreign Military Sales Act, and for other purposes", approved January 12, 1971, as amended, is amended by striking out "\$185,000,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "\$150,000,000".

(b) Section 8(e) of such Act is amended by striking out "prior to July 1, 1972".

HOSTILITIES IN INDOCHINA

SEC. 13. Funds authorized or appropriated by this or any other Act for United States forces with respect to military actions in Indochina may be used only for the purpose of withdrawing all United States ground, naval, and air forces and protecting such forces as they are withdrawn. The withdrawal of all United States forces from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia shall be carried out within four months after the date of enactment of this Act: Provided, That there is a release within the four-month period of all American prisoners of war held by the Government of North Vietnam and forces allied with such Government, and an accounting of all Americans missing in action who have been held by or known to such Government or such forces.

AZORES AGREEMENT

SEC. 14. Commencing thirty days after the date of enactment of this Act, no funds may be obligated or expended to carry out the agreement signed by the United States with Portugal, relating to the use by the United States of military bases in the Azores, until the agreement, with respect to which the obligation or expenditure is to be made, is submitted to the Senate as a treaty for its advice and consent.

PROHIBITING OBLIGATION OR EXPENDITURE OF FUNDS FOR CERTAIN AGREEMENTS TO WHICH THE SENATE HAS NOT GIVEN ITS ADVICE AND CONSENT

SEC. 15. No funds may be obligated or expended to carry out any agreement entered into, on or after the date of enactment of this Act, between the United States Government and the government of any foreign country (1) providing for the establishment of a military installation in that country at which combat units of the Armed Forces of the United States are to be assigned to duty, or (2) revising or extending the provisions of any such agreement, unless such agreement is submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent and unless the Senate gives its advice and consent to such agreement. Nothing in this section shall be construed as authorizing the President to enter into any agreement relating to any matter, with or without the advice and consent of the Senate.

APPLICABILITY OF SECTIONS 14 AND 15 TO THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES

SEC. 16. The provisions of sections 14 and 15 do not affect the authority of the Export-Import Bank of the United States, in accordance with its established procedures and practices, to consider and act on any application for a guarantee, insurance, extension of credit, or participation in an extension of credit with respect to the purchase or lease

of any product by any foreign country, or an agency or national thereof.

ILLEGAL INTERNATIONAL NARCOTIC TRAFFIC STUDY

SEC. 17. (a) It is the sense of the Congress that the control of illegal international narcotic traffic is essential to the well-being of the United States; that illegal international narcotic traffic is now a major enterprise involving complex operations in numerous countries in all parts of the world; and that such traffic continues to take place in countries which receive economic and military assistance from the United States, including assistance to carry out antinarcotic drug programs.

(b) On or before the expiration of the one hundred and eighty-day period following the date of the enactment of this Act, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs shall prepare and submit to the Congress a report, in two parts, concerning the illegal international narcotic traffic.

(c) The first part of such report shall include a survey of (1) the cultivation and processing of narcotic drugs (which are illegal in the United States) in each country where these operations are known to, or believed by, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to occur; (2) the routes of transportation of such drugs to the United States; (3) the means by which such drugs are brought into the United States; (4) the financial and banking arrangements which support such illegal international narcotics traffic; and (5) changes in the international patterns of cultivation, processing, and shipping of such drugs for the United States markets which, in the opinion of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, have occurred since calendar year 1969, and an evaluation of those changes.

(d) The second part of such report shall include—

(1) a list of the countries which, in the opinion of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, are currently major centers in illegal international narcotic traffic;

(2) a summary of the programs and other actions undertaken by such countries for the suppression of such traffic; and

(3) an evaluation by the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs of the effectiveness of such programs and actions, including reasons for their effectiveness or ineffectiveness.

(e) Each Federal department or agency having the responsibility for the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States, or for programs and other actions related to the suppression of the illegal international narcotic traffic, shall, upon the request of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, make available to the Bureau such information and other assistance as may be so requested.

PUBLIC LAW 480

SEC. 18. Section 104(c) of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended, is amended by striking out the semicolon at the end of such section and inserting in lieu thereof a comma and the following: "except that no agreement may be entered into under this subsection (c) unless such agreement has been specifically authorized by legislation enacted after the date of enactment of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1972;"

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, the Senate should have a strong feeling of déjà vu in considering the bill before it. Twice within the last year the Senate has defeated a foreign aid bill only to see it resurrected. Like Banquo's ghost, it will not down.

So, here we are today with essentially the same foreign aid bill the Senate de-

feated 2 months ago by a vote of 42 to 48. The bill reported by the Foreign Relations Committee contains all of the provisions in the earlier bill, S. 3390, as it was defeated in the Senate, except that the amounts have been changed in order to hold the line at the level Congress appropriated for the last fiscal year. The Federal funds deficit for the last 3 years is \$72 billion and the official estimate for the current year is for \$38 billion more. Many say it is likely to reach \$45 billion. Thus, we will have had at least \$110 billion in deficit spending for these 4 years. There is no justification for adding hundreds of millions more to this burden by increasing military aid programs above last year's level—military aid to foreign countries, may I emphasize.

The bill does not contain any additional authorizations for economic aid other than \$100 million for relief and rehabilitation work in Bangladesh. Economic aid programs were authorized for 2 years in the 1971 Foreign Assistance Act. This is a military aid bill. It authorizes a total of \$1.45 billion for the three major programs: \$500 million for military grant aid, \$550 million for supporting assistance or budget subsidies, and \$400 million for financing military credit sales. In each case the amount is the same as Congress voted last year—that is, for fiscal 1972.

I ask unanimous consent to have a comparative chart and other pertinent explanatory tables printed in the Record following my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I wish to point out, however, that the \$1.45 billion in military assistance recommended in this bill is only about one-fourth of the \$5.6 billion military assistance package programmed by the executive branch for the current fiscal year. The bill does not include, for example, \$2.9 billion for South Vietnam, Laos, and the Korean forces in Vietnam, ship loans of \$39.6 million, \$450 million in excess equipment at acquisition cost, or most of the costs of supporting the 47 U.S. military missions abroad. When Government cash sales and commercial sales are included, the estimated total flow of arms and supplies abroad this fiscal year adds up to \$8.5 billion, almost five times the appropriations to be authorized by this bill.

I will not take the Senate's time to list the policy provisions in the bill. They are detailed in the committee report. With the exception of two provisions added by the committee and a slight revision in Senator Brooke's amendment, policy provisions are exactly as they were in S. 3390 when it was defeated. Senator Brooke's amendment, as adopted by the committee, is the revised version he proposed as an amendment to the pending bill. It reflects the Senate's action on his amendment to the military procurement bill in that it requires, as a condition for completion of the U.S. withdrawal from Indochina, an accounting for Americans missing in action in addition to the earlier requirement for the release of U.S. prisoners of war.

The two new substantive provisions

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from which U.S. personnel carry out military operations. The latter provision, although general in application, is designed to insure that American newsmen have proper access to U.S.-operated bases in Thailand.

finally rejected after 4 weeks of desultory consideration last July. However, every Member should know by now the issues involved in this bill. I hope that those who plan to offer amendments will do so promptly so that the Senate can dispose of this bill—one way or another—without unnecessary delay.

EXHIBIT 1

COMPARATIVE DATA ON FOREIGN AID ITEMS

[In millions of dollars]

Program	Committee recommendation and appropriation fiscal year 1972	Executive branch request	S. 3390 as defeated in Senate	H.R. 16029
1. Grant military assistance.....	500	780	600	\$ 735
2. Supporting assistance.....	1 550	844	685	1 769
3. Military credit sales.....	400	527	435	527
(a) Aggregate ceiling.....	2 (550)	(629)	2 (600)	2 (629)
Total security assistance.....	1, 450	2, 151	1, 720	2, 031

Program	Committee recommendation and appropriation fiscal year 1972	Executive branch request	S. 3390 as defeated in Senate	H.R. 16029
4. Bangladesh assistance.....	\$ 100	100	100	100
Total security and economic.....	1, 550	2, 251	1, 820	2, 131

⁵ \$5,000,000 for Naval training in the Western Hemisphere.

TABLE 1—COMPARATIVE DATA ON FOREIGN AID MONEY ITEMS

(In millions of dollars)

Item	Appropriation fiscal year 1972 (or existing law)	Administration request	H.R. 16029	Senate committee recommendation
1. Grant military assistance	500.0	780.0	730.0	500.0
(a) Naval training, Western Hemisphere			5.0	
2. Supporting assistance	550.0	844.0	769.0	550.0
(a) Earmarked items:				
(1) Israel	(50.0)		(50.0)	(50.0)
(2) Refugee, Cambodia			(2.0)	(2.0)
(3) Refugee and humanitarian aid in South Vietnam				(70.0)
(4) Aid to South Vietnamese children			(5.0)	(5.0)
(5) Plastic Surgery Center—Saigon			(.7)	(.7)

² Also exempts cash sales from the ceiling.

TABLE II.—MILITARY AND RELATED ASSISTANCE AND ARMS SALES PROGRAMS, FISCAL YEAR 1973 (EXECUTIVE BRANCH ESTIMATES)

Program:	Amount
1. Military assistance grants	\$819,700,000
2. Foreign military credit sales	629,000,000
3. Excess defense articles	1,245,000,000
4. Ships loans	39,600,000
5. Security supporting assistance	879,418,000
6. Foreign military cash sales (DOD)	2,200,000,000
7. Commercial sales	722,598,000
8. Military assistance—DOD funded	2,924,700,000
Total military and related assistance and sales	8,460,016,000

¹ Valued at one-third acquisition cost.

TABLE III.—MILITARY AID FUNDED THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET FOR ALLIED FORCES IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA

(In millions of dollars)

	Fiscal year—		
	1971	1972	1973
South Vietnam-----	1,848.9	1,824.1	2,431.2
Korea-----	208.2	188.9	133.5
Laos-----	155.8	240.3	260.0
Thailand-----	113.0	66.1	(1)
Total-----	2,325.9	2,339.4	2,924.7

1 Military aid for Thailand to be funded from the MAP program.

TABLE IV.—MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE DATA, FISCAL YEAR 1973 PROGRAM REGIONAL SUMMARY

(In thousands of dollars)

[illegible]

TABLE IV.—MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE DATA, FISCAL YEAR 1973 PROGRAM REGIONAL SUMMARY—Continued

	Development and humanitarian economic programs							Total military and economic, fiscal year	
	Agency for International Development			Peace Corps	Public Law 480	International financial institutions ⁴	Total economic	1973	1972
	Development/humanitarian assistance ²	Contingency fund and international narcotics control ³	AID development and humanitarian total						
Summary, all programs	1,598,976	72,800	1,671,776	72,200	1,099,789	920,000	3,763,765	9,301,183	7,439,099
LA	389,416		389,416	18,913	106,559		514,888	613,588	528,970
AFR	173,209		173,209	23,149	134,310		330,668	370,643	352,838
EUR				10	850		860	49,859	78,247
NESA	347,204	15,000	362,204	7,400	390,976		760,580	1,515,532	1,292,250
EA and PAC	188,857	2,200	191,057	12,352	445,494		648,903	5,125,331	4,036,862
Other	500,290	55,600	555,890	10,376	21,600	920,000	1,507,866	1,621,312	1,145,470
Administrative and other expenses, State								4,918	4,462

¹ In legal value—at 1/4 average class acquisition costs.² Includes AID administrative expenses.³ Includes contingency fund and international narcotics control funds.⁴ Includes International Development Association, Inter-American Development Bank, and Asian Development Bank.

MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE DATA, FISCAL YEAR 1973 PROGRAM BY COUNTRY

[In thousands of dollars]

	Security programs						Economic programs							Total military and economic fiscal year 1973	Total military and economic fiscal year 1972
	Military assistance grants	Foreign military credit sales	Military programs			AID supporting assistance	Total security	Agency for International Development			Other programs				
			Excess defense articles ¹	Military service funded	Ship loans ¹			Development/humanitarian assistance	International narcotics control	Total	Peace Corps	Public Law 480	Total economic		
Latin America	20,300	75,000	2,500		900	98,700	98,700	389,416		389,416	18,913	106,559	514,888	613,588	528,970
Argentina	550	15,000				15,550	15,550							15,550	16,047
Bolivia	4,873	4,000	500			9,373	9,373	18,214		18,214		9,700	27,914	37,287	50,051
Brazil	988	15,000				15,988	15,988	8,300		8,300	2,625	21,870	32,795	48,783	38,073
Chile	1,114	5,000	200		900	7,214	7,214	850		850	418	4,860	6,128	13,342	13,384
Colombia	778	10,000	100			10,878	10,878	78,600		78,600	1,898	21,730	102,228	113,106	122,061
Costa Rica								1,060		1,060	765	1,026	2,851	2,851	3,336
Dominican Republic	1,435		100			1,535	1,535	11,600		11,600	500	17,705	29,805	31,340	27,115
Ecuador	1,000		300			1,300	1,300	14,543		14,543	1,135	4,889	20,567	21,867	11,364
El Salvador	805		100			905	905	14,150		14,150	483	900	15,533	16,438	10,869
Guatemala	1,736	2,000	200			3,936	3,936	24,350		24,350	765	2,637	27,752	31,688	18,607
Guyana								10,100		10,100		1,780	11,880	11,880	14,072
Haiti								6,000		6,000		1,251	7,251	7,251	4,211
Honduras	734		100			834	834	18,242		18,242	964	972	20,178	21,012	7,689
Inter-American programs								16,880		16,880			16,880	16,880	14,691
Jamaica								10,849		10,849	838	450	12,137	12,137	6,202
Mexico	87	2,000				2,087	2,087							2,087	750
Nicaragua	1,045		100			1,145	1,145	7,500		7,500	516	328	8,344	9,489	14,070
Panama	527		100			627	627	22,295		22,295		1,080	23,375	24,002	17,581
Paraguay	791		200			991	991	7,094		7,094	418	2,712	10,224	11,215	11,645
Peru	820	5,000				5,820	5,820	13,747	1,766	13,747	1,766	8,460	23,973	29,793	38,315
ROCAP								27,700		27,700	203	153	28,056	28,056	13,417
Trinidad and Tobago												90	90	90	90
Uruguay	1,450	2,000	500			3,950	3,950	24,500		24,500	92	3,540	28,132	32,092	5,387
Venezuela	870	15,000				15,870	15,870	500	1,580	500			2,080	17,950	18,198
Caribbean regional programs								20,350		20,350	1,012	426	21,788	21,788	11,342
Economic regional programs								31,992		31,992	2,935		34,927	34,927	35,002
Regional military costs	687					687	687							687	5,231
Near East and South Asia	142,952	443,000	68,000		11,000	664,952	754,952	347,204	15,000	362,204	7,400	390,976	760,580	1,515,532	1,292,250
Afghanistan	215					215	215								
Ceylon	15					15	15	6,720		6,720	1,499	24,100	32,319	32,534	58,293
Cyprus												24,100	32,319	32,534	58,293
Greece	9,554	55,000	25,500		5,900	95,954	95,954					3,960	3,960	3,960	3,960
India	234					234	234	99,590		99,590	3,211	172,330	275,131	275,365	81,350
Iran	492					492	492				1,300	1,044	2,344	2,836	7,325
Israel	(¹)	(¹)	(¹)									45,342	45,342	95,342	105,342
Jordan	(¹)	(¹)	(¹)									3,042	4,242	44,242	48,592
Lebanon	(¹)	(¹)	(¹)					1,200		1,200					
Nepal	29					29	29	1,883		1,883	1,191	5,305	5,305	5,305	14,505
Pakistan	243					243	243	79,800		79,800		630	3,704	3,733	4,208
Saudi Arabia	(¹)	(¹)										105,358	185,158	185,401	160,615
Southern Yemen															
Syria												90	90	90	90
Turkey	88,611	15,000	40,000		5,100	148,711	148,711					216	216	216	216
Yemen								43,000	15,000	58,000			13,014	219,725	199,440
Economic regional programs/CENCO													1,026	1,026	1,026
Regional military costs ¹	43,559	373,000	2,500			419,059	419,059	5,011		5,011	199	1,362	6,572	6,572	6,689
Unallocated								110,000		110,000			110,000	419,059	383,249

	Security programs							Economic programs										Total military and economic fiscal year 1973	Total military and economic fiscal year 1972
								Agency for International Development					Other programs						
	Military assistance grants	Foreign military credit sales	Military programs		Ship loans ¹	Total military	AID support- ing assistance	Total security	Develop- ment/hu- manitar- ian assis- tance	Internat- ional narcotics control	Total	Peace Corps	Public Law 480	Total economic					
			Excess defense articles ¹	Military service funded															
East Asia and Pacific	542,928	92,500	163,000	2,924,700	9,500	3,732,628	743,800	4,476,428	188,857	2,200	191,057	12,352	445,494	648,903	5,125,331	4,036,862			
Burma						225,041	75,000	300,041					621	621	621	621			
Cambodia	209,541		15,500			109,142		109,142					30,018	30,018	330,059	246,437			
China (Taiwan)	7,642	55,000	46,500										126	126	109,142	100,762			
Hong Kong						33,245		33,245	123,200		123,200		87,920	211,120	244,365	239,967			
Indonesia	28,745		4,500			413,510		413,510	28,600		28,600	2,194	142,500	173,294	586,804	585,369			
Korea	215,710	25,000	33,600	133,500	5,700	362,000	49,800	411,800	870	700	1,570		3,429	4,999	416,799	294,996			
Laos			2,000	360,000		181		181				2,908	958	3,866	4,047	4,214			
Malaysia	181					27,580		27,580	20,565		20,565	1,971	33,800	56,336	83,916	83,629			
Philippines	20,780		3,000		3,800								45	45	45	670			
Singapore						64,454	25,600	90,054	2,145	1,000	3,145	1,568	15,657	20,370	110,424	105,599			
Thailand	59,954		4,500			2,484,600	585,000	3,069,600	345	500	846		130,420	131,266	3,200,866	2,352,412			
Vietnam			53,400	2,431,200								525		525	525	449			
Western Samoa							8,400	8,400	13,131		13,131	3,186		16,317	24,717	13,532			
Economic regional programs															12,875	8,079			
Regional military costs	375	12,500				12,875		12,875							370,543	352,838			
Africa	17,975	18,500	3,500			39,975		39,975	173,209		173,209	23,149	134,310	330,668	370,543	352,838			
Botswana									()		()	692	9,450	10,142	10,142	10,042			
Burundi									()		()		920	920	920	920			
Cameroon									()		()	700	380	1,080	1,080	979			
Central African Republic									()		()								
Chad									()		()		210	210	210	210			
Congo (Brazzaville)									()		()	481	110	591	591	522			
Dahomey									()		()		1,800	1,800	1,800	1,800			
Ethiopia	12,139		1,000			13,139		13,139	16,550		16,550	1,304	390	839	839	775			
Gabon									()		()		1,134	18,988	32,127	32,099			
Gambia									()		()								
Ghana	55							55	32,370		32,370	2,345	13,260	47,975	48,030	30,896			
Guinea									()		()		4,970	4,970	4,970	4,984			
Ivory Coast									()		()	826	1,350	2,176	2,176	2,057			
Kenya									2,835		2,835	2,351	810	5,996	5,996	5,343			
Lesotho									()		()		1,773	2,072	2,072	1,606			
Liberia	499					999		999	3,709		3,709	2,444	2,390	3,543	9,542	10,408			
Madagascar			500						()		()		510	510	510	510			
Malawi									()		()		180	655	655	656			
Mali									()		()	475	1,580	1,820	1,870	2,418			
Mauritania	50					50		50	()		()	240	1,170	1,170	1,170	1,170			
Mauritius									()		()		1,305	1,460	1,460	1,602			
Morocco	()	()							17,055		17,055	1,056	42,000	60,111	60,111	49,299			
Niger									()		()		1,575	2,204	2,204	2,119			
Nigeria									23,870		23,870		630	24,500	24,500	25,797			
Rwanda									()		()		360	360	360	360			
Senegal	25					25		25	()		()	721	1,683	2,404	2,429	2,910			
Seychelles									()		()		60	60	60	60			
Sierra Leone									()		()		1,740	3,423	3,423	3,281			
Somali Republic									()		()		450	450	450	450			
Sudan									()		()	479	180	180	180	45			
Swaziland									()		()		479	479	479	410			
Tanzania									6,400		6,400		1,370	7,700	7,700	3,270			
Togo									()		()	704	550	1,254	1,254	1,153			
Tunisia	()	()							()		()		3,150	36,013	36,013	46,969			
Uganda									3,150		3,150	723	180	3,151	3,151	5,913			
Upper Volta									2,530		2,530	441	180	3,151	3,151	5,913			
Zaire	455	3,500				3,955		3,955	()		()		508	3,200	3,708	3,635			
Zambia									6,950		6,950	1,012	3,200	11,162	15,117	7,903			
Economic regional programs									()		()		320	320	320	320			
Central West Africa									24,085		24,085			24,085	24,085	29,900			
East Africa									1,600		1,600			1,600	1,600	5,805			
Southern Africa									8,200		8,200			8,200	8,200	14,435			
Africa Regional									21,855		21,855	2,049		23,904	23,904	16,998			
Regional military costs	4,752	15,000	2,000			21,752		21,752	2,050		2,050			2,050	21,752	19,802			
Self-Help projects															2,050	1,700			
Europe	10,299		8,000		18,200	36,499	12,500	48,999					10	850	860	49,859			
Austria	24					24		24								24			
Iceland													650	650	2,600	800			
Italy					2,600	2,600		2,600							9,710	9,709			
Malta							9,500	9,500				10	200	210	2,905	35,177			
Portugal	905		2,000			2,905		2,905							33,861	32,374			
Spain	9,261		6,000		15,600	30,861	3,000	33,861								3			
United Kingdom																			
Regional military costs	109					109		109							109	171			

¹ In legal value—at 1/2 average class acquisition costs.
² Includes AID administrative expenses.
³ Includes contingency fund and international narcotics control funds.
⁴ Includes International Development Association, Inter-American Development Bank and Asian Development Bank.

* Classified.
 * Self-Help funds only.
 † Includes classified countries.

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OTHER PURPOSES OF THE BILL

In addition to authorizing appropriations and other limitations as detailed in Table I, the bill also does the following:

1. provides that all funds authorized or appropriated for United States forces with respect to military actions in Indochina may be used only for the purpose of withdrawing U.S. ground, naval and air forces from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia and protecting such forces as they are withdrawn. Withdrawal of all U.S. forces in those countries shall be completed within four months after the date of enactment of the bill provided there is a release within the four-month period of all American prisoners held by the Government of North Vietnam and all forces allied with that government;
2. requires that future agreements with foreign countries relating to U.S. overseas military installations be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent;
3. prohibits obligation or expenditure of funds to carry out the military base agreement with Portugal until the agreement has been submitted to the Senate in treaty form;
4. impose a \$275 million ceiling for fiscal year 1973 on U.S. obligations in, for, or on behalf 1973 on U.S. obligations in, for, or on U.S. air operations and South Vietnamese operations in Cambodia;
5. with the exception of training assistance, it prohibits U.S. Government military assistance or sales to the nations of South Asia;
6. requires specific authorization for the financing of any foreign forces operating in Thailand;
7. prohibits transfer of Agency for International Development development assistance or disaster relief funds for use for military or supporting assistance purposes;
8. prohibits transfer of foreign assistance funds to other agencies except as reimbursement for services rendered;
9. urges the President to initiate planning for postwar relief and rehabilitation in Indochina with emphasis on the United Nations as a channel for assistance;
10. extends the maximum repayment period for military credit sales from ten to twenty years;
11. requires a report to Congress within six months on illegal international traffic in narcotics;
12. requires specific authorization of agreements with foreign countries for use of proceeds from Food for Peace sales as grants for military purposes;
13. earmarks \$50 million of funds made available for development assistance to be used for flood relief and related purposes in the Philippines; and
14. prohibits aid to countries which do not provide access to U.S. newsmen to military bases which were constructed or are maintained with U.S. funds and from which U.S. personnel carry out military operations.

GREECE

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, there is another item which I think is relevant at this time. It is the question of aid to Greece. There is a substantial amount of money in the bill for Greece.

It has been almost 2 years since the State Department asserted that "the trend toward a constitutional order is established in Greece." Since then a succession of high administration officials have visited Athens and voiced their approval of the military junta. The most recent of these was the Secretary of State who chose the occasion of a visit to Athens to praise the Greek contribution to NATO.

It is not surprising, given the affinity of political philosophy between our pres-

ent administration and the junta, that military ties between the two governments have been steadily strengthened over the past 3 years. The most recent example of this is the conclusion of an agreement providing for the permanent basing of U.S. naval units in Greek ports.

In light of these developments, it is interesting to note the comments of private American observers about the increasing repression of political freedom in Greece. There recently came to my attention an article on this subject published in the July issue of the Reader's Digest a magazine not noted for being opposed to governments like that in Greece. Usually the articles in that magazine are quite sympathetic to Greece.

The author, David Reed, observes that Greece—

The country which in classical times gave the world the concept of democracy has become a dictatorship, ruled by a former colonel who, with a handful of other colonels, deposed a parliamentary government in a coup d'etat. Though rightist in outlook the new government shares many of the repressive factors of the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe.

I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Reed's article be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks. I urge my colleagues to read it in order to gain a clearer idea of present conditions in Greece.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GAMBRELL). Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, in that connection, I also ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks a recent article published in the New York Times of September 21, 1972, written by Kathleen Teltsch, entitled "U.N. Unit Said To Report Greeks Violate Human Rights." This article is the most current one I have seen as to the way human beings are being treated by the Government of Greece.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 2.)

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I think it is worthy of note that in the foreign aid bill, out of 64 countries which receive assistance, 25 are governed by military dictatorships or governments with no open political opposition. I repeat, 25 out of 64 countries. I may say that among the 25 are some of the major recipients of our largess.

It is a rather interesting commentary that here we are, professing to be a democratic country and interested in the preservation of free enterprise and free political institutions. We say that. Our leaders say that. In fact, we profess that we are fighting the war in Vietnam—or rather, I should say, we are slaughtering the defenseless inhabitants of that unfortunate land from 5 miles up with our B-52's—in the name of democracy and free political choice.

Yet in this bill, 25 countries—and that is almost 50 percent—who are recipients of our aid, are nondemocratic countries; that is, they are authoritarian in nature.

I may say, too, that about 80 percent of the aid in this bill is destined for 10

countries, most of which are nondemocratic in nature.

It is an interesting point, if we judge the military aid program against what we are trying to accomplish by spreading military assistance all around the world.

Thus, Mr. President, I think that we should take a new look at the justification for this overall program.

It is my understanding that the distinguished Senator from California wishes to ask me a question or two, and then I intend to offer an amendment.

EXHIBIT 1

[From the Reader's Digest, July 1972]

GREECE: OUTCAST OF EUROPE

(By David Reed)

On Christmas Eve of 1970, Chistos Sartzetakis, the Greek magistrate whose courageous investigation of a political murder was depicted in the multiaward-winning film "Z," was arrested in Athens by Greece's dreaded military police. They had no warrant; the regime that now rules Greece merely suspected that he was involved with an opposition group and wanted him interrogated. Only months later did his family learn what had happened to him. For six days and nights he had been forced to stand at attention, without food. Whenever he started to topple, guards beat him upright. There followed 47 days in solitary confinement before he was transferred to a regular prison. Finally, 11 months after his arrest, he was released.

The Sartzetakis case is typical of Greek justice today. The country which in classical times gave the world the concept of democracy has become a dictatorship, ruled by a former colonel who, with a handful of other colonels, deposed a parliamentary government in a coup d'etat. Though rightist in outlook, the new government shares many of the repressive features of the communist regimes of Eastern Europe. For Greece's 8.5 million people, all political activity has been banned. Martial law remains in force in the main cities, with suspects often held indefinitely without arraignment or charge. Some political prisoners have, like Sartzetakis, been subjected to torture. Other persons have been forced to live in remote villages under police surveillance. The press has been silenced. A network of informers spies on the nation.

Shadow of Fear. Yet, to the more than two million tourists who flock to view the glories of ancient Greece each year, these ugly aspects are not apparent. There are no tanks in the streets, no soldiers in evidence. The atmosphere is friendly—indeed, almost everyone in Greece, apart from a small minority of communists and other leftists, is strongly pro-West, pro-American.

Prosperity's face is on the land. Last year, the gross national product rose by an impressive 7.6 percent—with inflation held to only three percent. Athens stores bulge with goods and shoppers. In the late evening, the city's tavernas are filled as people dine to racy bouzouki music.

Under the surface, however, there is a profound malaise. Ordinarily the most voluble of people when it comes to political discussions, Greeks now fall silent when strangers are within earshot. Telephones are assumed to be tapped. Prominent figures of the former parliamentary government say that they are followed by plainclothesmen. When someone disappears, even if only for a few hours, relatives automatically assume that he has been arrested. For good reason: Greeks have drawn prison sentences of up to ten years merely for holding meetings or distributing leaflets.

In one case that no Greek newsmen will ever forget, John Kapsis, editor of the now-defunct newspaper *Ethnos*, was given a five-year sentence (he was released after 14 months) for having published a brief interview with John Zigdis, a former cabinet min-

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ister, in which Zigdis urged the restoration of parliamentary government. (Zigdis himself got 4½ years.) The men were convicted under a subtle press law that forbids publishing anything which may create public "anxiety."

Prometheus Unbound. When the colonels struck in April 1967, they claimed that they did so "to save the country from communism." But few people in Greece believe that such a threat existed. In actual fact, the colonels had been plotting a takeover for years. Democracy was clearly in trouble, but instead of saving it, the colonels merely finished it off.

For eight years, until 1963, Greece had had a strong and stable parliamentary government under Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis. After his defeat, however, the country slid into growing chaos. Political strikes and riotous demonstrations erupted almost daily. An election was scheduled for May 1967, which was virtually certain to put the late George Papandreou, a former prime minister, in power. Although Papandreou was a moderate, many people feared that his son and political heir apparent, Andreas Papandreou, would eventually turn Greece into a left-leaning state.

The ensuing colonels' revolt will long be regarded as a masterpiece of its kind. A contingency plan, code-named "Prometheus," had been drawn up by the army general staff to meet a possible national emergency by rounding up communists and other radicals and by taking over key installations such as radio stations and airports. The purpose, of course, was to prevent, not to promote, a coup. But just as Prometheus stole fire from the gods, so the colonels swiped the plan from their superiors. On the night of April 21, the colonels had the signal for Prometheus flashed to police and military units throughout the country. More than 6,000 persons were automatically rounded up, and radio stations and airports were seized. Troops under the colonels' direct command picked up cabinet ministers, politicians and loyalist army officers, and tanks surrounded the palace of King Constantine.

Greece was then introduced to the man who had masterminded the coup—a colonel named George Papadopoulos. Like his fellow conspirators, Papadopoulos came from rural Greece, having been born in 1919 in a hard-scrabble village on the Peloponnesian peninsula, the son of a schoolteacher. The only avenue of advancement for a bright country lad lay through the army, and at 18 he was sent to the national military academy. In the mid-1950s, he was one of the organizers of a secret society of junior officers, and his conspiratorial ambitions earned him the nickname "Nasser." Much of his career was spent in the murky world of intelligence. For a time, he served in the Greek equivalent of the Central Intelligence Agency where, among other duties, he maintained vigilance against those who would conspire against the government. It was, some say, like sending a goat to guard the cabbage.

At a press conference after the takeover, Papadopoulos likened Greece to a patient who had to be put under restraint for his own good. "We have a patient lying on an operating table," Papadopoulos declared. "If you do not tie him down, you may lead him to his death rather than to an operation that will make him recover." When several reporters rose at once to ask questions, Papadopoulos clapped his hands sharply and barked, "Don't force me to restore order!" The reporters sat down. All of Greece, in fact, sat down.

Power and Papadopoulos. At first, a 15-member "revolutionary council," composed almost entirely of colonels who had staged the takeover, ruled the country. Papadopoulos operated behind the scenes as "first among equals." In December 1967, King Constantine, who had opposed the colonels

all along, attempted to rally the army for a counter-coup. The effort failed, and the king went into exile in Italy.

Since then, the colonels who looted Papadopoulos to power have all been eased from positions of direct authority and placed in second- and third-ranking posts. Papadopoulos now is prime minister, minister of national defense, minister of foreign affairs and minister of government policy. In every government office there are photographs of King Constantine and Queen Anne-Marie; in between, there is a slightly smaller photograph of Papadopoulos. (The only exception is Papadopoulos' own office—with a picture of Jesus between the king and queen.)

Shortly after assuming power, Papadopoulos had a new constitution written, which then was submitted to the public in a referendum. Under martial law, no meaningful debate was possible. Amid guffaws from both Greeks and foreigners, the regime announced that 92 percent of the voters had approved the constitution. In any event, it is not taken seriously by the Greeks. The key articles, dealing with civil liberties and parliamentary elections, have never been implemented.

Indeed, Papadopoulos has done a thorough job of tying the "patient" to his operating table. He rules by decree. Most professional associations, such as those of doctors or lawyers, are not allowed to choose their leaders freely. In place of normal political life, Papadopoulos has set up a "consultative committee." In elections held last December, some 10,000 handpicked "electors," all of them beholden to the regime for their jobs, were allowed to select 60 members of the committee. Papadopoulos then personally chose 15 more members. The committee has no right to initiate or reject legislation; it can only chat about government promulgated measures.

Greek labor leaders have been ousted, and government appointees have been installed in their place. While workers theoretically enjoy the right to strike, there has not been a single strike in the five years that Papadopoulos has been in power. "No one would dare," a former union leader says. Universities and lower schools have been brought under the thumb of the government, too, with dissident professors and students having been purged.

Such tactics have led the rest of the world to shun Greece as a political leper. Since the colonels' coup five years ago, only two foreign heads of state—both from African countries—have paid official visits to Athens. At a meeting in 1970 of the Council of Europe—an unofficial but influential forum of opinion—15 governments, most of them members of NATO, accused the Greek regime of "torture and other ill treatment" of political prisoners. (Certain that it would be expelled, Greece had previously withdrawn from the Council.) In another expression of disapproval, members of the Common Market have "frozen" Greece's application to join.

Consulting the Oracles. Still, Greece remains in NATO, and, at a time of growing Soviet naval penetration in the Mediterranean, her shore facilities are much needed for the American Sixth Fleet. This has caused problems for U.S. policy makers. After the coup, the United States stopped providing heavy weapons to Papadopoulos in an effort to pressure him into restoring civilian rule. But he refused to budge and, to keep the Greek sector of NATO's defenses from falling into disarray, full military aid was resumed in September 1970. When Congress later passed the foreign-aid bill for fiscal 1972, it prohibited military aid to Greece unless the Administration decided that the "overriding requirements of the national security

* The frequency of such practices seem to be diminishing because of international scrutiny and the resultant publicity.

of the United States" justified its continuance. On February 17, President Nixon signed such a statement, thus continuing the program.

It appears that Papadopoulos will be running Greece for a long time to come. His spokesmen maintain that 80 percent of the people support the government. How they arrive at that figure is a mystery, for the regime has never held a free election. It is clear, however, that some Greeks, fed up with former parliamentary squabbling, accept the current government—if only as a lesser evil.

Many of the country's peasant farmers, who account for about half the population, also seem to approve, or at least remain supremely indifferent. Opposition comes mostly from Greece's intellectuals, professional people and middle and upper classes in general; most people arrested these days are democrats or royalists. The regime has little to fear from the left, which is fragmented and weak. And, as the old pro in the game of overthrowing the government, Papadopoulos keeps close watch over the army for any young officer aspiring to spring his own Prometheus on the boss.

Papadopoulos maintains that it is his mission to remake Greek society. Constitutional rule will be restored, he has declared, "when I, the bearer of the people's mandate and of the historic responsibility toward the nation and the armed forces, decide that this can be done safely and usefully for the nation." This does not sound like a man who contemplates an early transfer of power.

EXHIBIT 2

[From the New York Times, Sept. 21, 1972]
U.N. UNIT SAID TO REPORT GREEKS VIOLATE HUMAN RIGHTS

(By Kathleen Teltsh)

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., September 20.—A United Nations panel, after examining hundreds of letters, has reportedly concluded that a "consistent pattern" of gross violations of human rights appears to exist in Greece.

The letters—many of them said to have been smuggled out of prisons where the writers were confined—describe in detail torture and threats they say were used by security policemen and jailers to elicit "confessions" of treasonous actions against the military-backed Athens Government.

The United Nations panel of five experts, which met for 10 days, was not able to screen all of the 27,000 communications concerning human rights received from a number of countries in the last year.

PANEL CREATED LAST YEAR

The panel—the first United Nations body empowered to examine complaints from individuals or private groups for any pattern of "gross and reliably attested violations of human rights"—was created last year under a United Nations resolution that called for secrecy in the screening of documents.

The conclusions reached so far on Greece, Iran and Portugal—the panel did not complete work on others—were conveyed at closed meetings to the United Nations subcommission on the prevention of discrimination and protection of minorities.

The parent body has instructed the panel to keep its findings "under study" until it meets again next August, which would give the three accused governments a chance to reply—if they wish—to the charges.

The members of the panel were selected on a broad regional basis from the 26 who serve on the subcommission. They are not supposed to be government spokesmen but rather experts serving as private persons. The five are José D. Ingles of the Philippines; Ahmed Kettani, Morocco; Antonio Martinez Baez, Mexico; Mrs. Nicole Questiaux, France and Sergei N. Smirnov of the Soviet Union.

Although they met in private and adopted precautions to keep their findings confidential,

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tial, they were reliably reported to have found a "consistent pattern" of violations committed by Portugal and by Iran, which were accused of arbitrarily arresting hundreds of political dissidents, holding secret trials for them and, in scores of instances, executing them.

However, the most substantial evidence supplied to the panel was on Greece. According to informants, this material included affidavits on recent trials of prisoners as well as the letters.

LAWYER AT ATHENS TRIAL

Included was one communication from a Washington lawyer, George C. Vournas, who witnessed the trial last March in Athens of 17 persons on conspiracy charges. Mr. Vournas wrote: "It was distressing to note that charges of beatings and torture, which all the defendants went through, were taken for granted or considered 'normal procedure' by the court."

The bulk of the material on Greece was submitted by Prof. Frank C. Newman of the University of California Law School at Berkeley who acted as legal counsel without pay for a group of Americans and Europeans and for four widely respected private organizations active in protecting human rights.

The four are Amnesty International; the International Commission of Jurists; the International Federation for the Rights of Man, and the International League for the Rights of Man. The league had designated Mr. Vournas to observe the Athens trial.

Professor Newman said during a telephone interview that he was "disappointed but not dismayed" by the delay, and maintained that the United Nations was testing a "revolutionary concept" in enabling citizens anywhere to write and level charges against their own governments, calling the governments to account before world opinion.

TORTURE IS REPORTED

The letters and affidavits he submitted included a number written in recent months and in 1971 that he said, showed that abuses were continuing in Greece and that torture continued to be allowed by the military Government, which seized power in a coup in 1967.

A spokesman for the Greek delegation said tonight that the delegation had not tried to break the rule of secrecy surrounding the panel and was unaware of its conclusions. The spokesman, Stephane G. Stathatos, said: "If we receive a communication we will act accordingly."

The Council of Europe, on the basis of its own inquiry in 1969, had also concluded that widespread violations were committed in Greece, including the torture of political prisoners. Greece withdrew from the council before proceedings for expulsion could take place.

Through Professor Newman, the organization known as Amnesty International is known to have submitted communications signed by more than 300 prisoners.

Amnesty International, in one communication to the United Nations, gave the names of 117 prisoners it charged were being held as of last April in seven different facilities under conditions that violated their human rights. The facilities were identified as Aegina, Eptapyrgion, Trikkala, Kergyra, Chalkis and Alikarnassos prisons and Boyati Military Camp.

Other documents also complained of abuses at Averoff Prison in Athens where women prisoners were held, and cited mistreatment of political inmates at Korydallos Prison and elsewhere.

The letters describe prison conditions as "medieval" and note that the International Committee of the Red Cross, before it was ordered out of Greece, had urged the Athens Government to close some facilities as unfit for use. One communication describes Eptapyrgion Prison as a "sunless tomb" where

political prisoners are without medical treatment. Another from Kerkira Prison on the island of Corfu, written in 1972, reports that political prisoners are kept in unheated and windowless cells.

SOLES BEATEN WITH ROD

A communication from Korydallos prison, dated January this year, names the security officers who the writer said had tortured him and administered "falanga"—beatings with a wooden rod on the soles of the feet. It said: "The interrogation was accompanied by horrible tortures—blows, kicks—hands handcuffed behind the back for 48 hours, starvation for 36 hours, and solitary confinement for 35 days."

Another communication was attributed to a medical student and said he was arrested last October by the Athens security police. It describes his interrogation in these terms: "They first blindfolded me, took me down the cellar with kicks and cuffs. There they made me undress and tied me to a bench. Someone started to hit me on the soles of the feet with a metal tube, while someone else had tied my genital organ with a nylon thread which he kept pulling."

A communication from Andreas I. Frangias, described as a 53-year-old engineer, says he was beaten repeatedly until he lost consciousness. It says that he repudiated a statement he signed last January because the mistreatment "took away my powers of resistance and the normal use of reason."

The subcommission's decision to put off action means that the five experts will have a heavy backlog to consider in the next 12 months. Communications on human rights matters total 10,000 to 30,000 annually but have been known to run as high as 57,000 in some years. Many reflect organized campaigns to report a relatively small number of abuses.

Informants say that communications have been sent recently charging violations of human rights in Czechoslovakia, in Indonesia, in Bangladesh, Brazil and, most recently, concerning the treatment of Asians in Uganda.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I should like very much to ask a question of the Senator from Arkansas, but first want to extend my congratulations to him for his fine work as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. In the past there have been many improper and even dangerous international situations which the Senator has brought the attention of this body. I would like to ask him a question about a provision of his committee's bill that relates to one of these situations.

The able Senator from Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD) and I have been particularly concerned because American newsmen have been denied access to American bases in Thailand. They have encountered restrictions there which apparently did not prevail in South Vietnam even at the peak of our war activity there.

Mr. President, in that connection, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record an article published in the Los Angeles Times on August 6, 1972, and written by Jack Folsie, entitled "United States-Thailand: A Collusion for Secrecy."

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

UNITED STATES-THAILAND: A COLLUSION FOR SECRECY

(By Jack Folsie)

BANGKOK.—Despite the august pronouncements cited above, there is today almost

total denial of any first-hand reporting of the American air war in Indochina by American correspondents.

The news blackout has become almost total because, for the first time in the Vietnam war, almost all U.S. Air Force warplanes are now concentrated at seven massive bases in Thailand. These bases and U.S. Army logistical back-up installations in Thailand, housing some 49,000 American servicemen, continue to be closed to newsmen—for practical reporting purposes—through a collusive arrangement between the Thai and American governments.

The bar to regularized access to U.S. military installations in Thailand was in effect when I first visited Bangkok seven years ago and asked to see U.S. servicemen. The response from American embassy officials then was and still is:

"They are on Thai bases, and you'll have to obtain permission from the Royal Thai government."

In those early years, if one were polite and patient, it was possible to make brief visits in groups or individually to some of the bases. The Thai Foreign Ministry, which processed requests, seemed sympathetic and slightly embarrassed at the incongruity of acting as the gatekeeper for Americans to meet Americans.

The U.S. Embassy was then headed by Ambassador Graham Martin, who had acceded to the Thai control of base press coverage in the first place. The embassy worked it out so that a phone call from its civilian press attaché to his counterpart at the Thai Foreign Ministry, saying that the newsmen was "okay," hurried the approval. In this way, visiting columnists with pro-administration views gained immediate admission.

However, since veteran Asian diplomat Leonard Unger became ambassador four years ago, there has been a noticeable decay in those arrangements. The Thai government, always sensitive to criticism from the American Congress and press, has stiffened its attitude toward coverage of U.S. bombing from Thai bases. Since the nation came under full military rule last November, Thai foreign ministry officials say all newsmen's requests must be approved at the highest level, the National Executive Council.

Ambassador Unger's own determination to keep the American presence in Thailand as little publicized as possible has not made it any easier for a resident correspondent to do his job.

As the ranking American in Thailand, Unger has used his authority to keep the military "low profile." There are six American generals presently serving here, and it is extremely difficult to talk to them or their ranking subordinates.

The last Thai-based American general to hold a press "background" on his own was Joseph Stilwell, when he had the two-star job as head of the American Military Advisory Group. He was popular with the Thai generals, but Ambassador Unger blocked his reappointment despite their request he stay on. Stilwell, not related to Vinegar Joe Stilwell but a good deal like him, went on to Vietnam and earned a third star.

Whatever the difficulty of newsmen in penetrating the American-built, manned and maintained military bases on Thai soil, it was only an irritant so long as the air war was conducted by the 7th Air Force headquartered in Saigon, and with much of its air armada located at South Vietnamese bases which were accessible to newsmen.

However, since President Nixon's pullout of troops from Vietnam, all the high-performance jet squadrons have returned to the United States or moved to Thailand. The B-52 superbomber fleet jams every bit of space at the American-built airport-seaport complex at Utapao-Sattitip in Thailand. Other B-52s must make long flights from Guam to bomb North Vietnam because there is no more space for such planes at Utapao.

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Thus, virtually all of the Air Force application of power against enemy targets in North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia now originates in Thailand.

Despite this now-vital dependence on Thai bases—or perhaps because of it—no strenuous diplomatic effort appears to have been made to arrange with the Thai government for a more realistic method of allowing Thai and foreign correspondents to report the air war originating at American bases here.

American diplomats continue to report they are seeking to persuade the Thais to allow entry to the bases by newsmen on a regularized basis, such as usually applies in every other nation which allows the presence of large American military forces.

Ambassador Unger is said to have taken up the problem directly with Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn in recent weeks.

"But every time we think they're close to an agreement, one of the Thai embassies abroad sends back a story from some newsmen which upsets them," an American official bemoaned.

This acute regard for Thai sensitivity has not kept Unger from "going to the mat" on other Thai-American issues he apparently considered more important.

Economic pressures, for instance, were brought to bear quickly, firmly and successfully in behalf of the Bangkok landing rights of Pan American Airways and Trans-World Airlines. This was done by diverting free-spending GIs on leave from Vietnam to other dollar-hungry Asian cities.

When it is suggested that the embassy—presumably upon the urging of the State Department and even the White House—might exert similar efforts to "crack the teakwood curtain" around the bases, the usual reply is:

"But that would be assailing Thai sovereignty. And you know how sensitive they are about that. They might even decide to force us out of Thailand."

It is true that on occasion, mostly for internal consumption, high-ranking Thais threaten to send the Americans packing. Air Chief Marshal Dawee Chullasappa, one of the "big five" in the junta government, did so only last month. But he said, with confusing logic, that it was only something to consider if George McGovern were elected President and moved to withdraw American forces from Thailand.

Just as often as the Thais express discontentment with the American presence, their generals express appreciation of the current resumption of American full-scale bombing. The end of any semblance of parliamentary government in Thailand last November resulted, among other reasons, from rising popular desire for an "understanding" with the People's Republic of China, even though it was fostering a low-level but persistent Communist insurgency in parts of Thailand. The generals wanted none of that.

To veteran observers here, it appears that the U.S. government finds the present Thai-American understanding on press coverage at American bases a convenient one, just as for years it chose to limit reporter-access to bases in Laos.

As an Air Force public relations officer said about Nakorn Phanom, a base never opened to newsmen, "when a base is classified secret, it's so easy to keep it secret."

"What if the Thais okayed our entry?" a reporter asked.

"We'd find some other reason for keeping you out," he said.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I am therefore gratified to see that the committee bill includes a section prohibiting any foreign country—not just Thailand—from denying access to bona fide American news media correspondents seeking to enter bases maintained or constructed by American funds, and to

which Americans are assigned for military operations.

But I would like clarification of the phrase "consistent with security" contained in the language of the bill. Could the distinguished chairman tell me more precisely what the committee had in mind when it approved those particular words?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. If the Senator will allow me, for the purposes of the record, I ask unanimous consent that an excerpt from page 16 be printed in the Record. It is the background to this provision as explained in the committee's report.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Access to U.S.-financed bases

This provision adds a new subsection 620(y) to the Foreign Assistance Act, in order to insure that American newsmen have access to overseas base facilities constructed or maintained by United States funds and used by U.S. personnel to carry out military operations. The American public, consistent with security requirements, has a legitimate right to be kept informed about activities conducted from such facilities and they rely on the news media to perform this service.

This provision, though general in scope, results from U.S. newsmen being denied access to bases in Thailand, constructed with the tax dollars of U.S. citizens, which are manned by U.S. military personnel. These bases constitute an increasingly important aspect of our involvement in the Indochina war. As U.S. Air Force contingents have been removed officially from South Vietnam, many of them have been shifted to American-built bases in Thailand, and it is from these bases that the United States now conducts a large part of the air war throughout Indochina.

Because the Thai Government has restricted access to these bases by American newsmen, the American public is in turn denied access to information about our air operations in the war. The Committee finds this situation intolerable and believes that it must be remedied.

This provision is designed to do that. It prohibits furnishing assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act to any country which denies American reporters access to military base facilities constructed or supported by United States funds and used by our personnel for military operations. The prohibition is not subject to waiver under Section 614(a) of the Act.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I should say that initially this provision was restricted to Thailand. Then it was decided, as a result of discussion in the committee, that that was, perhaps, a little too pointed and would not be well received in some circles, so the committee made it general in application. Then it occurred to some Members that there would be countries receiving aid in which nuclear weapons were stored. This "consistent with security" was inserted with the idea that where nuclear weapons were stored, the authorities could decline to allow newsmen to enter that area of the base where the nuclear weapons were stored.

Personally, I think they make a fetish of the matter of nuclear weapons. I think the information ought to be made public. I do not approve of adding the phrase. However, that is the reason it was put in.

I think it gives an "out" which this administration has shown it will take

advantage of, in order to refuse access to our overseas base facilities.

This is a wide open escape hatch. And I regret that it is in the bill. However, if the administration would abide by the intent of the committee, it would be all right. I have found them very reluctant to do that when it did not suit their purpose.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, it seems to me that on too many occasions "the flag of national security" has been used to hide the basic truth about the war in Vietnam, even when our security was not in question at all.

Does the Senator agree that the phrase "consistent with security" was not intended to prevent bona fide American correspondents from portraying an accurate picture of the air war to the American people?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It certainly was not. Of course, the whole purpose of the amendment was to allow them to report accurately upon the air war going on there. As the Senator knows, and he has already indicated, the occasion for this amendment was the exclusion of our reporters from the Thai bases.

Mr. CRANSTON. It is my understanding that American newsmen had been given free access to the U.S. Air Force bases in South Vietnam even when our large Air Force effort originated from those bases. Clearly, the free access to those bases that was accorded the newsmen constituted no security threat to the war in Vietnam. And similarly there is no reason to expect that any newsmen should be barred from the airbases in Thailand for security reasons.

I trust that we can expect that if this provision becomes law, that would not be done. Would that be the understanding of the Senator from Arkansas?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. If they abide by the law, that would be my understanding. However, we have found it very difficult in the past to enforce these restrictions. That language "consistent with security" would cause them to say, "Well, this endangers our security." And, long after the fact, someone will complain and the issue will again be raised. However, in the meantime they will have excluded the newsmen.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, the Senator has been very helpful in making plain what was and was not meant by the amendment.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I thank the Senator.

Mr. CRANSTON. I thank the Senator from Arkansas.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, I would like to ask the chairman of the committee a question about what interpretation he puts upon the amendment by Representative VANIK, which amendment was accepted by the House. That amendment would apparently call for the abrogation of our economic agreements with Russia.

The amendment reads:

On page 17, after line 12, add the following new section:

"Sec. 506. None of the funds appropriated or made available pursuant to this Act for carrying out the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, may be used to provide loans, credits, financial and investment assistance, or insurance guarantees on sales to

or investments in any Nation which requires payment in excess of \$50 or its equivalent for exit visas, exit permits, or for the right to emigrate."

I ask the chairman of the committee what interpretation he puts upon that amendment which was approved by the House.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is obviously intended to apply to Russia. I do not see how it could have much application other than, as the press said, to have some effect upon the use of credit facilities of the Export-Import Bank, which is not in the pending bill but was in the appropriations bill that the House passed. It is not in this bill.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, does the Senator believe that this would require Russia to pay cash for what it receives from this country?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I have had only a very limited opportunity to examine the amendment. I thoroughly disapprove of using the foreign aid bill to try to force and cajole a foreign country to change its internal policies. If I can have any influence on it, I shall not accept any such amendment.

Mr. AIKEN. I would say that if this amendment means what some people interpret it to mean, it would also mean that we would likely have no foreign aid appropriation bill this year, other than an extension of the present amount.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I would think so. I would certainly not myself agree to accepting any such provision. I think it is wrong.

Mr. AIKEN. We have just renewed, after a great deal of trouble and a great deal of delay, economic trade with certain other countries in the world. However, I do not understand that carrying out that trade is contingent upon our taking over their governments and running their business affairs and their political affairs for them.

So if this provision means what some interpret it to mean, we should discontinue much of our economic trade with Russia. Then I would certainly feel that a continuing resolution would be the only route we could pursue. As a matter of fact, I do not approve of all of the provisions in the bill as reported by the Senate committee, as the chairman of the committee well knows. However, I would feel that the Senate should have an opportunity to act upon this type of legislation which would authorize appropriations for foreign aid. Foreign aid is still an important function of our Government.

But if it is to be loaded up with low-down politics such matters as cancellation of the wheat deal with Russia then it is better to have no bill at all. This action of the House I consider to be primarily political action and harmful to the United States.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I feel it is inappropriate to the bill. I might say to the Senator from Vermont that there have been other instances in the past, many instances in which various members have sought to use the foreign aid bill to accomplish their own ulterior purposes, which had nothing to do with foreign aid. It is one of the reasons I have become

disillusioned with this whole program. I do not believe it is any longer in the interest of the United States to carry on the bilateral foreign aid program, especially military aid, but even in the economic field, except in some very restricted areas.

If we can afford to do anything substantially in assisting other countries it should be done through multilateral organizations, not because I think they are perfect in their operations, but because they insulate the program from this type of effort. They offer better prospects for fending off this type of amendment.

I would also say in view of our financial situation and the deplorable condition of our domestic economy, with inflation, and so forth, it is high time we cut back on all of these efforts and give priority to our own country, which is our strength, and rebuild it and then reconsider foreign aid.

Mr. AIKEN. I appreciate the statement of the Senator about carrying on foreign aid programs through multilateral organizations. I would not give up entirely on bilateral organizations because in some cases they might be wholly advisable. Further than that, I agree with the chairman that there should be a better understanding of the degree of our participation in these programs. I think we should work toward a limit of 25 percent on all these programs for the United States.

We have it now on—I think we have it or hope to—as it applies to the United Nations establishment itself. That purpose should properly be extended to virtually all the multilateral subsidiary programs, but I would not give up entirely the bilateral programs for foreign aid because there are instances, and we do not know when that might arise, when they would be very important.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am particularly opposed to military aid. I feel it is wrong for a big and powerful country to inject itself into the military affairs of these smaller and weaker countries. This is a very sensitive subject—the source of their nationalism and independence. If we are going to do anything at all, we ought to help them. This should be done with restraint; help them in their own economic affairs to where they can take care of their own military affairs.

I do not think that is what we are doing. I think we have started here a tremendous military aid and sales operation with vast amounts of money involved, with vast interests, not only of the Pentagon, but manufacturers of arms; it is part of the industrial complex, and they are selling these things like hotcakes or automobiles, without regard to the effect on the recipient country. If we give them these things, and at cheap rates, we create a market we would not otherwise have. I think it is harmful to world peace and to the economy of the countries involved.

In Latin America many countries receive military assistance. It is not a lot individually, but it is substantial in the aggregate. I do not think we have any business giving them any military aid. For a country trying to do its best, I agree with the Senator from Vermont

that we could look with favor on economic aid and that that might enable them to maintain some army does not disturb me too much. But we are not directly involved in that. That is where I draw the line. I do not want to give military aid directly.

Mr. AIKEN. We are selling arms to other countries. They do apply to us for military assistance and military equipment. Those who plan to buy it come back to us and say, "If you do not sell it to us at a reasonable price we will get it from some of these peace-loving countries that make quite a lot of business out of making and selling arms."

Another thing we have contended with is that some countries that we sell arms to, and I suppose at reasonable prices, after a while call them secondhand or obsolete and they offer them to other countries. So the sale of arms is quite a big business in the world and it does have political effects as well as economic effects. But as for the countries we have helped to feed themselves, and I think of the food for peace program or Public Law 480 as the rest of the world knows it where we have helped them overcome famine, as a rule have become better customers of ours; their living standard rises and they become better customers of the whole world.

The economy of the world, as a whole, is improving. That is why I am so concerned about the amendment the House approved yesterday. I do not want to see the price of wheat going down 60 cents a bushel, which has been the reasonable increase in the price, but it could if we were forced to cancel the business with Russia and China.

Boeing Aircraft Co. is getting not only substantial orders from Mainland China but from our airlines as well. That is good. Whether more business means that they simply have more money to lose, I do not know. But I do go with most of the ideas of the chairman, not all of them, but particularly on doing more business multilaterally, and at the same time I would reserve the right for bilateral assistance to countries where we alone would be the principal partner.

I thank the Senator.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I appreciate the comments of the Senator from Vermont, the ranking Republican member of our committee. He gives very serious consideration to these matters. He is greatly experienced in them.

I wish to remind him that a year or so ago we held hearings on arms sales. It is not always other countries that approach us. We have some of the most aggressive arms salesmen in the world, some of them representing private interests, where they acquire these arms from the Government at cheap prices and then peddle them abroad.

In addition, the Defense Department drums up its own trade. They go to these countries and solicit their business; they offer them concessional terms. If they cannot pay for them, they give arms to them. They give these countries easy terms and low interest rates.

I believe this bill extends from 10 to 20 years the repayment period on military credit sales. In other words, it is not just

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a question of sitting and waiting for other countries to ask for arms; we aggressively seek to sell them arms, and we have done it in the most aggressive way of any nation in the world. We have military missions in 47 countries. These are composed of colonels, majors, generals. They are well financed. There is a lot of money appropriated for those missions. One of their main purposes is to induce the respective countries where they are accredited to buy arms from us, and they succeed in a big way.

I want to call attention to the September 8 issue of the Defense Monitor, from the Center for Defense Information. This organization was recently established under the direction of Rear Adm. Gene R. LaRoque, of the U.S. Navy, a very distinguished admiral who has commanded everything, I think, from destroyers and submarines to aircraft carriers, and a very able man indeed. I have met with him, as many of my colleagues have on various occasions. He is, I think, an extremely intelligent and dedicated man.

This issue of the Defense Monitor is entitled "Military Assistance: Arsenal for Democracy?" I want to read a few parts of it.

I ask unanimous consent that the entire issue be included as a part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Defense Monitor, Sept. 8, 1972]

MILITARY ASSISTANCE: ARSENAL FOR DEMOCRACY?

DEFENSE MONITOR IN BRIEF

This year the U.S. will provide over \$9.5 billion in military assistance to foreign countries.

Prior to 1946, the U.S. gave no military assistance to any foreign nation in peacetime.

Military assistance is supplied in a variety of forms, some of which the public is unaware and the Congress does not debate.

Certain major military assistance programs bypass Congress and do not appear in Administration budgets.

Part of the Food for Peace Program is used to provide funds for weapons.

Military assistance is designed to promote world peace and strengthen the security of the U.S.

Frequently it does neither, U.S. aid sometimes facilitates military conflict and weakens America's security by over-involvement.

The U.S. supplies well over half of all armaments to the nations of the world that are not allied with the USSR.

The U.S. military assistance will go to 64 nations in 1973.

Twenty-five of these nations are governed by the military or permit no open opposition to the government.

Many of these nations contain forces striving for change that may be suppressed with American arms.

The United States will provide about \$9.5 billion in various forms of foreign military aid during fiscal year 1973.

This \$9.5 billion figure appears nowhere in the Federal Budget, but is the total of 17 separate programs administered by several agencies and financed by various appropriations acts. Two billion of this military assistance appears in the Foreign Assistance bill, and another \$3 billion is in the Defense Budget. Over \$4 billion of it does not require Congressional authorization and therefore is relatively unknown to the public.

The 17 Military Assistance programs and

amounts projected for 1973 appear in Table I. They can be divided into four categories:

Category I includes all the assistance funded by a direct appropriation by the Congress. Category II are funds buried in the Defense Department budget earmarked for the support of countries in Southeast Asia. Funding for Southeast Asia was taken out of the foreign assistance appropriation in 1965 on grounds that it was an integral part of the Vietnam war. Category III involves no budget appropriation and includes cash sales and transfers of military equipment by the Pentagon. The Pentagon runs these programs with little oversight by Congress or by any other Executive Agency, including the State Department. Category IV involves use of money from the Food for Peace program (PL 480). Under the Food for Peace Law, some agricultural commodities are given to foreign countries with no payment. Money that would have been paid the U.S. can be used by recipient countries for purchase of military weapons.

MILITARY AID IS GOING UP

The billions projected for 1973 are nearly three times those listed for military assistance programs in 1965. Major trends are:

Category I—Direct Military Assistance Appropriated:

Grant military aid under the Foreign Assistance program doubled from \$400 million in 1969 to \$803 million for 1973.

The grant military aid program planned for 1973 includes a five-fold increase in delivery of air defense missiles to foreign countries over 1972—from \$5 million to \$26 million.

Aircraft deliveries under the grant aid programs are scheduled to double between 1972 and 1973—from \$65 million to \$121 million. Most aircraft are helicopters and fighters and are for Southeast Asia.

Category II—Military Assistance in Defense Appropriation:

Military assistance to Southeast Asia funded by the military service has increased from \$34 million in 1965 to \$2.9 billion projected for 1973. This will continue to increase as U.S. troops leave Vietnam.

Category III—No Budget Appropriation Required:

Defense Department cash and credit sales deliveries have increased from \$892 million in 1966 to an estimated \$2.8 billion in 1972. Sales are often at bargain prices.

Commercial military sales have increased from \$274 million in 1965 to a projected \$723 million for 1973. Transfer of excess defense articles has gone from \$85 million in 1965 to a projected \$245 million for 1973.

On a regional basis, the most rapid increases in overall military assistance since 1965 have been in East Asia, due to the Vietnam war.

Defense Secretary Laird, in testifying recently in Congress for assistance said:

"If we are going to reduce the burdens on the United States for free world defense while maintaining our treaty commitments in a period of increasing threats, it can only come from a willingness to support a strong security assistance program."

Mr. Laird does not describe what "increasing threats" exist and/or where they must be met.

TABLE 1—Various categories of military assistance, fiscal year 1973

I. Direct military assistance appropriated (Foreign Assistance Act):	
Military assistance program (grant aid)	\$803, 000, 000
Foreign military credit sales	629, 000, 000
Security supporting assistance	875, 000, 000
Public safety	7, 000, 000
Subtotal	2, 314, 000, 000

II. Military assistance in Defense appropriation:¹

Military assistance service funded	2, 500, 000, 000
Military assistance advisory groups, military groups, pay and allowances	272, 000, 000
International military headquarters	74, 000, 000
NATO infrastructure (military construction)	48, 000, 000
Purchase of local currency, above market rates	92, 000, 000
Subtotal	2, 986, 000, 000

III. No budget appropriation required:

Excess defense articles ²	245, 000, 000
Ship loans ³	40, 000, 000
Transfer of defense stocks	106, 000, 000
Real property transfers	486, 000, 000
Export-Import Bank military loans	360, 000, 000
Foreign military cash sales (DOD)	2, 200, 000, 000
Commercial military sales	723, 000, 000
Subtotal	4, 160, 000, 000

IV. Agriculture appropriation:

Public Law 480, part of the Food for Peace program	124, 000, 000
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Total military assistance in 1973

¹ Does not include an additional \$2,800,000 to Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA): \$1,800,000 for Project Agile, a counterinsurgency program directed abroad, and \$1,000,000 for border surveillance in Korea.

² Now \$2,900,000,000.

³ One-third acquisition value.

Sources: Recent congressional publications on foreign and military assistance and defense appropriations; the fiscal year 1973 budget.

MILITARY AID IN PERSPECTIVE

U.S. military assistance presently goes to sixty-four countries.

Some 50,074 US military personnel are employed administering these programs, 27,000 of them abroad.

In contrast to the \$9.5 billion US military assistance for 1973, US economic and humanitarian aid will be \$3.7 billion.

According to Defense Department figures, which do not include all forms of military assistance, the US during 1950-1970 provided approximately 70 percent of all armaments supplied to neutral nations and those allied to the US.

NO COORDINATED POLICY

In Congress, those military aid programs which come under the Foreign Assistance Act are reviewed by the Foreign Relations Foreign Affairs Committee. Those coming under Defense Department appropriations are handled by the Armed Services Committees. Within the executive branch, the Defense Department administers most military aid programs, but the Agency for International Development handles supporting assistance and the State Department handles export licenses for commercial sale of weapons abroad.

In an attempt to coordinate military assistance programs, a new position of Under-Secretary of State for Coordinating Security Assistance Programs, has been created. However, comprehensive military assistance budgets have not been developed or made available to Congress or the public. The Defense Department did provide Congress this year with listings that accounted for \$5.9 billion of the planned military assistance. The listings omitted certain programs—namely sales—that would bring the total to over \$9.5 billion.

PURPOSES OF MILITARY AID

After World War II the United States gave military aid to Europe and sent military forces there to contain "Soviet Expansion." This containment policy was extended worldwide, and by the mid-60's the United States had military commitments and/or aid programs with 86 foreign countries.

Today "containment" is no longer the guiding doctrine of American foreign policy, yet much military effort continues to follow the old guidelines. The US retains 192 major and 1,221 minor military facilities overseas. We still station more than 566,000 military personnel in foreign countries, over half of them in Europe. There is a need to bring military policy into line with the new goals of foreign policy expressed by the President. There is a need to reassess our overall military assistance program and the stationing of large numbers of US troops in foreign lands. Certainly, there is a need to restructure our military aid programs.

US aid is to "strengthen the security of the United States" but involvement in many places runs directly counter to longrun American interests, such as reduction of world tensions and balance of payments deficits. US security is not improved by arming both India and Pakistan, Jordan and Israel, Honduras and El Salvador. Such involvement earn the enmity of both parties.

Details of the nature of much assistance are classified secret: \$508,640,000 goes to the Middle East—Israel, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

TABLE II.—TOP 10 RECIPIENTS¹

10 countries	1973 military assistance	1973 non-military aid
South Vietnam.....	\$2,959,900,000	\$131,266,000
Laos.....	438,300,000	4,999,000
Korea.....	428,600,000	173,294,000
Cambodia.....	326,525,000	30,018,000
Iran.....	207,232,000	2,344,000
Turkey.....	153,303,000	71,014,000
Taiwan.....	113,374,000	
Thailand.....	99,686,000	20,370,000
Greece.....	97,974,000	
Australia.....	90,000,000	
Secret.....	530,895,000	
Total, this listing.....	5,445,789,000	433,305,000

¹ Military assistance for all categories in 1973, but exclusive of cash sales, property transfers, NATO infrastructure and international headquarters, comes to \$5,887,495,000. 80 percent goes to 10 countries.

The US provides military assistance to 25 countries governed by the military or with no open political opposition. They are:

China (Taiwan), South Vietnam, Indonesia, Cambodia, Thailand, Greece, Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Portugal, Ghana, Libya, Nigeria, Zaire, Ethiopia, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru.

CONCLUSIONS

The secrecy surrounding much of our military assistance programs limits informed reasoning by the public and the Congress. The \$9.5 billion for Military Assistance in 1973 is egregiously high.

The seventeen different programs are not coordinated to provide a comprehensive picture that can be related to foreign policy objectives.

US military aid programs are in need of revision because the use that many countries make of this assistance is sometimes inimical to world order and US interests.

US Military Assistance to 25 countries with military and dictatorial governments perpetuates these governments and may encourage the formation of other like governments.

The outflow of US arms and military equipment to 64 foreign countries in 1973 sets a poor example to the rest of the world.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I may say there are some graphs which I assume will not be possible to reproduce, but I think most of it can be. It is important because the bill before us looks quite small in amount. It has only \$1.4 billion for military assistance, and it gives the impression to those who read quickly, without bothering to be familiar with the whole gamut of aid, that this is all the military assistance there is. It is no such thing. This is only a very small part of it. I quote from the Defense Monitor:

The United States will provide about \$9.5 billion in various forms of foreign military aid during fiscal year 1973.

This \$9.5 billion figure appears nowhere in the Federal Budget, but is the total of 17 separate programs administered by several agencies and financed by various appropriations acts. Two billion of this military assistance appears in the Foreign Assistance bill, and another \$3 billion is in the Defense Budget. Over \$4 billion of it does not require Congressional authorization and therefore is relatively unknown to the public.

The 17 Military Assistance programs and amounts projected for 1973 appear in Table I. (See page 2) They can be divided into four categories:

Category I includes all the assistance funded by a direct appropriation by the Congress. Category II are funds buried in the Defense Department budget earmarked for the support of countries in Southeast Asia. Funding for Southeast Asia was taken out of the foreign assistance appropriation in 1965 on grounds that it was an integral part of the Vietnam war. Category III involves no budget appropriation and includes cash sales and transfers of military equipment by the Pentagon. The Pentagon runs these programs with little oversight by Congress or by any other Executive Agency, including the State Department. Category IV involves use of money from the Food for Peace program (PL 480). Under the Food for Peace Law, some agricultural commodities are given to foreign countries with no payment. Money that would have been paid the U.S. can be used by recipient countries for purchase of military weapons.

MILITARY AID IS GOING UP

The billions projected for 1973 are nearly three times those listed for military assistance programs in 1965. Major trends are,

CATEGORY I—DIRECT MILITARY ASSISTANCE APPROPRIATED

Grant military aid under the Foreign Assistance program doubled from \$400 million in 1969 to \$803 million in 1973.

The grant military aid program planned for 1973 includes a five-fold increase in delivery of air defense missiles to foreign countries over 1972—from \$5 million to \$26 million.

Aircraft deliveries under the grant aid program are scheduled to double between 1972 and 1973—from \$65 million to \$121 million. Most aircraft are helicopters and fighters and are for Southeast Asia.

CATEGORY II—MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN DEFENSE APPROPRIATION

Military assistance to Southeast Asia funded by the military services has increased from \$34 million in 1965 to \$2.5 billion projected for 1973. This will continue to increase as U.S. troops leave Vietnam.

I may say this goes up so fast that even the Center for Defense Information cannot keep up with it. That figure of \$2.5 billion has already been raised within the last few days to \$2.9 billion. In fact, all these figures, I may say, are the closest estimates at the time they were prepared.

There will be variations as they go through the various committees of the Congress.

I call attention to category 1, which is headed "Direct Military Assistance Appropriated." That word should be "requested," because these are appropriation requests. They have not yet been finally acted upon. These are appropriation requests. These appropriation requests, according to the Defense Monitor, total \$2.314 billion. I hope that nothing near such an amount will be appropriated.

Under category 3, I merely wish to comment that no budget appropriation is required. I would explain that in that category are Export-Import Bank military loans, foreign military cash sales—DOD—and commercial military sales, which are carried here by the center for the purpose of giving some perspective on the volume and the magnitude of our involvement in the supplying of military equipment around the world.

The cash sales and the commercial military sales are not aid in the sense of using taxpayers' money. I think there is an element of aid in the sense that they do have the advantage of the know-how and the influence of the Defense Department in the case of cash military sales, which are estimated at \$2.2 billion for this fiscal year. The DOD, of course, is the intermediary, it is the middleman, between the manufacturer and the foreign country. They facilitate the sales. They do give assistance, and they are a considerable element of assistance in the time, effort, and so forth, but this type of arrangement does not include the actual granting of money as in the case of category 1, for example, where they are given grant aid, credit sales, and supporting assistance.

I want to read one other paragraph, and then I shall conclude on this matter:

MILITARY AID IN PERSPECTIVE

U.S. military assistance presently goes to 64 countries.

Some 50,074 U.S. military personnel are employed administering these programs, 27,000 of them abroad.

Think of it: Over 50,000 military personnel, according to the Monitor, are devoted to these various military assistance programs. Think what that costs in time and money.

This issue of the Monitor also contains this interesting comparison:

In contrast to the \$9.5 billion U.S. military assistance for 1973, U.S. economic and humanitarian aid will be \$3.7 billion.

According to Defense Department figures, which do not include all forms of military assistance, the U.S. during 1950-1970 provided approximately 70 percent of all armaments supplied to neutral nations and those allied to the U.S.

There is a very striking comment here on the purposes of military aid. I shall read just one part of it:

U.S. aid is to "strengthen the security of the United States" but involvement in many places runs directly counter to longrun American interests, such as reduction of world tensions and balance of payments deficits. U.S. security is not improved by arming both India and Pakistan, Jordan and Israel, Honduras and El Salvador. Such involvements earn the enmity of both parties.

Clip 0054T

Details of the nature of much assistance are classified secret; \$508,640,000 goes to the Middle East—Israel, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan.

The U.S. provides military assistance to 25 countries governed by the military or with no open political opposition.

Mr. President, I think that is an extremely interesting comment by a group of experts.

As Senators know, it has been agreed by unanimous consent that the votes on the Scott amendment and the Stennis amendment will take place at 1:30 on next Tuesday. It is my understanding that in the meantime any other amendments are in order. I send to the desk an amendment and ask for its immediate consideration.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

On page 13, strike out lines 10 and 11, and insert in lieu thereof the following: out "\$500,000,000 for the fiscal year 1972" and insert in lieu thereof "\$400,000,000 for the fiscal year 1973".

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I offer this amendment to reduce the authorization for military grant aid to \$400 million, \$100 million less than the amount in the bill as reported by the committee.

In my earlier statement I cited the figures on the budget deficit. They bear repeating because—make no mistake about it—this bill authorizes more deficit spending and an increase in the debt burden borne by every American taxpayer.

In the last 3 fiscal years the Federal Government's deficit, excluding the trust funds, has totaled \$72 billion. The deficit for the current fiscal year is officially estimated at \$38 billion. Many experts say that it is more likely to be \$45 billion. The Federal debt now exceeds \$437 billion—more than \$2,000 for every man, woman, and child in the United States.

Last year the balance-of-payments deficit set a new record of \$30 billion, a record likely to be broken this year, depending to some extent upon the final outcome of the sale of unusually large amounts of wheat, at a very low price relative to the world price, but nevertheless it could have a major effect on the deficit. And in 1971, for the first time since 1888, the Nation had a trade deficit. There will be an even larger trade imbalance this year.

In sum, our Nation's fiscal situation is perilous. This is no time to be giving foreign countries hundreds of millions of arms—arms which in no way enhance security of the American people.

The military aid bill reported by the Foreign Relations Committee would add \$1.45 billion to the Federal debt to buy arms and military supplies for 47 countries around the world. But this is not by any means the true picture of what the United States is doing to arm other countries. In this fiscal year, the executive branch proposes to give or sell a total of \$8.5 billion in arms, or budget support for arms, to foreign countries, five times the total authorizations proposed by this bill—\$5.6 billion of that is in the form of grants or on easy credit terms. This bill, for example, does not

contain the authorizations for military aid to South Vietnam, Laos, or the Korean forces stationed in South Vietnam. Nor does it involve the Government's cash sales or commercial sales of weapons.

In fiscal year 1970 Congress authorized and appropriated \$350 million for grant military assistance. This bill proposes to authorize \$500 million, an increase of \$150 million. The Federal deficit in 1970 was \$13 billion, one-third the \$38 billion estimate for 1973. We have a vast backlog of unmet needs here at home—every Senator knows the great needs of his own State.

I propose that we cut \$100 million from the amount this bill proposes to add to the \$430 billion deficit in order to devote this money to solving some of our own problems. The security of the American people will not suffer one iota if we cut \$100 million from these free gifts of tanks, planes, and guns. But the welfare of our constituents may be advanced by freeing Federal funds for programs that can improve the quality of life here at home.

I might add that my amendment will, in no way, affect Israel, since Israel does not receive military grant aid. And, Senators should realize that adoption of my amendment will still allow \$50 million more than Congress appropriated 3 years ago.

Mr. President, I urge that the Senate approve this modest cut in the military grant aid provided in the bill.

CALL OF THE ROLL

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. I think that more than five Senators should be present before action is taken on this amendment.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator suggest the absence of a quorum?

Mr. AIKEN. I suggest a quorum call.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

[No. 466 Leg.]

Aiken	Cranston	Montoya
Allen	Fulbright	Moss
Anderson	Gambrell	Pearson
Bayh	Gurney	Ribicoff
Beall	Hart	Roth
Byrd	Hruska	Scott
Harry F. Jr.	Jackson	Smith
Byrd, Robert C.	Jordan, Idaho	Stevenson
Chiles	Mansfield	Young
Cooper	Mathias	

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HART). A quorum is not present.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I move that the Sergeant at Arms be directed to request the attendance of absent Senators.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from West Virginia.

The motion was agreed to.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sergeant at Arms will execute the order of the Senate.

After some delay, the following Senators entered the Chamber and answered to their names:

Bennett	Tong
Bible	Gravel
Brock	Harris
Brooke	Hollings
Burdick	Humphrey
Cannon	Inouye
Case	Javits
Church	Kennedy
Cotton	Long
Curtis	Magnuson
Dole	McClellan
Eagleton	McGee
Ervin	Miller
Fannin	Nelson

Packwood
Pastore
Percy
Proxmire
Randolph
Schweiker
Spong
Stennis
Stevens
Symington
Talmadge
Tunney
Weicker
Williams

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from Texas (Mr. BENTSEN), the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. EASTLAND), the Senator from Louisiana (Mrs. EDWARDS), the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES), the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. McGOVERN), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. McINTYRE), the Senator from Montana (Mr. METCALF), the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. MONDALE), the Senator from Maine (Mr. MUSKIE), the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PELL), and the Senator from Alabama (Mr. SPARKMAN) are necessarily absent.

I further announce that the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. JORDAN) and the Senator from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE) are absent on official business.

Mr. SCOTT. I announce that the Senators from Colorado (Mr. ALLOTT and Mr. DOMINICK), the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER), the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. BELLMON), the Senator from Delaware (Mr. BOGGS), the Senator from New York (Mr. BUCKLEY), the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOK), the Senator from Michigan (Mr. GRIFFIN), the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. HANSEN), the Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD), the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. THURMOND), and the Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER) are necessarily absent.

The Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER) is absent on official committee business on the west coast and also celebrating a wedding anniversary.

The Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MUNDT) is absent because of illness.

The Senators from Ohio (Mr. SAXBE and Mr. TAFT) and the Senator from Vermont (Mr. STAFFORD) are absent on official business to attend the Interparliamentary Union meetings.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. A quorum is present.

TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT ACT OF 1972—CONFERENCE REPORT

Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, I submit a report of the committee of conference on H.R. 10243, and ask for its immediate consideration.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The report will be stated by title.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 10243) to establish an Office of Technology Assessment for the Congress as an aid in the identification and consideration of existing and probable impacts of technological application; to amend the National Science Foundation Act of 1950; and for other purposes, hav-

ing met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses this report, signed by a majority of the conferees.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the consideration of the conference report?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the report, which reads as follows:

CONFERENCE REPORT

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 10243) to establish an Office of Technology Assessment for the Congress as an aid in the identification and consideration of existing and probable impacts of technological application; to amend the National Science Foundation Act of 1950; and for other purposes, having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses as follows:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the Senate amendment insert the following:

That this Act may be cited as the "Technology Assessment Act of 1972".

FINDINGS AND DECLARATION OF PURPOSE

SEC. 2. The Congress hereby finds and declares that:

(a) As technology continues to change and expand rapidly, its applications are—

(1) large and growing in scale; and

(2) increasingly extensive, pervasive, and critical in their impact, beneficial and adverse, on the natural and social environment.

(b) Therefore, it is essential that, to the fullest extent possible, the consequences of technological applications be anticipated, understood, and considered in determination of public policy on existing and emerging national problems.

(c) The Congress further finds that:

(1) the Federal agencies presently responsible directly to the Congress are not designed to provide the legislative branch with adequate and timely information, independently developed, relating to the potential impact of technological applications, and

(2) the present mechanisms of the Congress do not and are not designed to provide the legislative branch with such information.

(d) Accordingly, it is necessary for the Congress to—

(1) equip itself with new and effective means for securing competent, unbiased information concerning the physical, biological, economic, social, and political effects of such applications; and

(2) utilize this information, whenever appropriate, as one factor in the legislative assessment of matters pending before the Congress, particularly in those instances where the Federal Government may be called upon to consider support for, or management or regulation of, technological applications.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

SEC. 3. (a) In accordance with the findings and declaration of purpose in section 2, there is hereby created the Office of Technology Assessment (hereinafter referred to as the "Office") which shall be within and responsible to the legislative branch of the Government.

(b) The Office shall consist of a Technology Assessment Board (hereinafter referred to as the "Board") which shall formulate and promulgate the policies of the Office, and a

Director who shall carry out such policies and administer the operations of the Office.

(c) The basic function of the Office shall be to provide early indications of the probable beneficial and adverse impacts of the applications of technology and to develop other coordinate information which may assist the Congress. In carrying out such function, the Office shall:

(1) identify existing or probable impacts of technology or technological programs;

(2) where possible, ascertain cause-and-effect relationships;

(3) identify alternative technological methods of implementing specific programs;

(4) identify alternative programs for achieving requisite goals;

(5) make estimates and comparisons of the impacts of alternative methods and programs;

(6) present findings of completed analyses to the appropriate legislative authorities;

(7) identify areas where additional research or data collection is required to provide adequate support for the assessments and estimates described in paragraph (1) through (5) of this subsection; and

(8) undertake such additional associated activities as the appropriate authorities specified under subsection (d) may direct.

(d) Assessment activities undertaken by the Office may be initiated upon the request of:

(1) the chairman of any standing, special, or select committee of either House of the Congress, or of any joint committee of the Congress, acting for himself or at the request of the ranking minority member or a majority of the committee members;

(2) the Board; or

(3) the Director, in consultation with the Board.

(e) Assessments made by the Office, including information, surveys, studies, reports, and findings related thereto, shall be made available to the initiating committee or other appropriate committees of the Congress. In addition, any such information, surveys, studies, reports, and findings produced by the Office may be made available to the public except where—

(1) to do so would violate security statutes; or

(2) the Board considers it necessary or advisable to withhold such information in accordance with one or more of the numbered paragraphs in section 552(b) of title 5, United States Code.

TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT BOARD

SEC. 4. (a) The Board shall consist of thirteen members as follows:

(1) six Members of the Senate, appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate, three from the majority party and three from the minority party;

(2) six Members of the House of Representatives appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, three from the majority party and three from the minority party; and

(3) the Director, who shall not be a voting member.

(b) Vacancies in the membership of the Board shall not affect the power of the remaining members to execute the functions of the Board and shall be filled in the same manner as in the case of the original appointment.

(c) The Board shall select a chairman and a vice chairman from among its members at the beginning of each Congress. The vice chairman shall act in the place and stead of the chairman in the absence of the chairman. The chairmanship and the vice chairmanship shall alternate between the Senate and the House of Representatives with each Congress. The chairman during each even-numbered Congress shall be selected by the Members of the House of Representatives on the Board from among their number. The vice chairman during each Congress shall be

chosen in the same manner from that House of Congress other than the House of Congress of which the chairman is a Member.

(d) The Board is authorized to sit and act at such places and times during the sessions, recesses, and adjourned periods of Congress, and upon a vote of a majority of its members, to require by subpoena or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers and documents, to administer such oaths and affirmations, to take such testimony, to procure such printing and binding, and to make such expenditures, as it deems advisable. The Board may make such rules respecting its organization and procedures as it deems necessary, except that no recommendation shall be reported from the Board unless a majority of the Board assent. Subpoenas may be issued over the signature of the chairman of the Board or of any voting member designated by him or by the Board, and may be served by such person or persons as may be designated by such chairman or member. The chairman of the Board or any voting member thereof may administer oaths or affirmations to witnesses.

DIRECTOR AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR

SEC. 5. (a) The Director of the Office of Technology Assessment shall be appointed by the Board and shall serve for a term of six years unless sooner removed by the Board. He shall receive basic pay at the rate provided for level III of the Executive Schedule under section 5314 of title 5, United States Code.

(b) In addition to the powers and duties vested in him by this Act, the Director shall exercise such powers and duties as may be delegated to him by the Board.

(c) The Director may appoint with the approval of the Board, a Deputy Director who shall perform such functions as the Director may prescribe and who shall be Acting Director during the absence or incapacity of the Director or in the event of a vacancy in the office of Director. The Deputy Director shall receive basic pay at the rate provided for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code.

(d) Neither the Director nor the Deputy Director shall engage in any other business, vocation, or employment than that of serving as such Director or Deputy Director, as the case may be; nor shall the Director or Deputy Director, except with the approval of the Board, hold any office in, or act in any capacity for, any organization, agency, or institution with which the Office makes any contract or other arrangement under this Act.

AUTHORITY OF THE OFFICE

SEC. 6. (a) The Office shall have the authority, within the limits of available appropriations, to do all things necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act, including, but without being limited to, the authority to—

(1) make full use of competent personnel and organizations outside the Office, public or private, and form special ad hoc task forces or make other arrangements when appropriate;

(2) enter into contracts or other arrangements as may be necessary for the conduct of the work of the Office with any agency or instrumentality of the United States, with any State, territory, or possession or any political subdivision thereof, or with any person, firm, association, corporation, or educational institution, with or without reimbursement, without performance or other bonds, and without regard to section 3709 of the Revised Statutes (41 U.S.C. 5);

(3) make advance, progress, and other payments which relate to technology assessment without regard to the provisions of section 3648 of the Revised Statutes (31 U.S.C. 529);

(4) accept and utilize the services of voluntary and uncompensated personnel necessary for the conduct of the work of the Office

and provide transportation and subsistence as authorized by section 5703 of title 5, United States Code, for persons serving without compensation;

(5) acquire by purchase, lease, loan, or gift, and hold and dispose of by sale, lease, or loan, real and personal property of all kinds necessary for or resulting from the exercise of authority granted by this Act; and

(6) prescribe such rules and regulations as it deems necessary governing the operation and organization of the Office.

(b) Contractors and other parties entering into contracts and other arrangements under this section which involve costs to the Government shall maintain such books and related records as will facilitate an effective audit in such detail and in such manner as shall be prescribed by the Office, and such books and records (and related documents and papers) shall be available to the Office and the Comptroller General of the United States, or any of their duly authorized representatives, for the purpose of audit and examination.

(c) The Office, in carrying out the provisions of this Act, shall not, itself, operate any laboratories, pilot plants, or test facilities.

(d) The Office is authorized to secure directly from any executive department or agency information, suggestions, estimates, statistics, and technical assistance for the purpose of carrying out its functions under this Act. Each such executive department or agency shall furnish the information, suggestions, estimates, statistics, and technical assistance directly to the Office upon its request.

(e) On request of the Office, the head of any executive department or agency may detail, with or without reimbursement, any of its personnel to assist the Office in carrying out its functions under this Act.

(f) The Director shall, in accordance with such policies as the Board shall prescribe, appoint and fix the compensation of such personnel as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT ADVISORY COUNCIL

Sec. 7. (a) The Office shall establish a Technology Assessment Advisory Council (hereinafter referred to as the "Council"). The Council shall be composed of the following twelve members:

(1) ten members from the public, to be appointed by the Board, who shall be persons eminent in one or more fields of the physical, biological, or social sciences or engineering or experienced in the administration of technological activities, or who may be judged qualified on the basis of contributions made to educational or public activities;

(2) the Comptroller General; and

(3) the Director of the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress.

(b) The Council, upon request by the Board, shall—

(1) review and make recommendations to the Board on activities undertaken by the Office or on the initiation thereof in accordance with section 3(d);

(2) review and make recommendations to the Board on the findings of any assessment made by or for the Office; and

(3) undertake such additional related tasks as the Board may direct.

(c) The Council, by majority vote, shall elect from its members appointed under subsection (a) (1) of this section a Chairman and a Vice Chairman, who shall serve for such time and under such conditions as the Council may prescribe. In the absence of the Chairman, or in the event of his incapacity, the Vice Chairman shall act as Chairman.

(d) The term of office of each member of the Council appointed under subsection (a) (1) shall be four years except that any such member appointed to fill a vacancy occurring

prior to the expiration of the term for which his predecessor was appointed shall be appointed for the remainder of such term. No person shall be appointed a member of the Council under subsection (a) (1) more than twice. Terms of the members appointed under subsection (a) (1) shall be staggered so as to establish a rotating membership according to such method as the Board may devise.

(e) (1) The members of the Council other than those appointed under subsection (a) (1) shall receive no pay for their services as members of the Council, but shall be allowed necessary travel expenses (or, in the alternative, mileage for use of privately owned vehicles and a per diem in lieu of subsistence at not to exceed the rate prescribed in sections 5702 and 5704 of title 5, United States Code), and other necessary expenses incurred by them in the performance of duties vested in the Council, without regard to the provisions of subchapter 1 of chapter 57 and section 5731 of title 5, United States Code, and regulations promulgated thereunder.

(2) The members of the Council appointed under subsection (a) (1) shall receive compensation for each day engaged in the actual performance of duties vested in the Council at rates of pay not in excess of the daily equivalent of the highest rate of basic pay set forth in the General Schedule of section 5332(a) of title 5, United States Code, and in addition shall be reimbursed for travel, subsistence, and other necessary expenses in the manner provided for other members of the Council under paragraph (1) of this subsection.

UTILIZATION OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

Sec. 8. (a) To carry out the objectives of this Act, the Librarian of Congress is authorized to make available to the Office such services and assistance of the Congressional Research Service as may be appropriate and feasible.

(b) Such services and assistance made available to the Office shall include, but not be limited to, all of the services and assistance which the Congressional Research Service is otherwise authorized to provide to the Congress.

(c) Nothing in this section shall alter or modify any services or responsibilities, other than those performed for the Office, which the Congressional Research Service under law performs for or on behalf of the Congress. The Librarian is, however, authorized to establish within the Congressional Research Service such additional divisions, groups, or other organizational entities as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.

(d) Services and assistance made available to the Office by the Congressional Research Service in accordance with this section may be provided with or without reimbursement from funds of the Office, as agreed upon by the Board and the Librarian of Congress.

UTILIZATION OF THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

Sec. 9. (a) Financial and administrative services (including those related to budgeting, accounting, financial reporting, personnel, and procurement) and such other services as may be appropriate shall be provided to the Office by the General Accounting Office.

(b) Such services and assistance to the Office shall include, but not be limited to, all of the services and assistance which the General Accounting Office is otherwise authorized to provide to the Congress.

(c) Nothing in this section shall alter or modify any services or responsibilities, other than those performed for the Office, which the General Accounting Office under law performs for or on behalf of the Congress.

(d) Services and assistance made available to the Office by the General Accounting Office in accordance with this section may be provided with or without reimbursement

from funds of the Office, as agreed upon by the Board and the Comptroller General.

COORDINATION WITH THE NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION

Sec. 10. (a) The Office shall maintain a continuing liaison with the National Science Foundation with respect to—

(1) grants and contracts formulated or activated by the Foundation which are for purposes of technology assessment; and

(2) the promotion of coordination in areas of technology assessment, and the avoidance of unnecessary duplication or overlapping of research activities in the development of technology assessment techniques and programs.

(b) Section 3(b) of the National Science Foundation Act of 1950, as amended (42 U.S.C. 1862(b)), is amended to read as follows:

"(b) The Foundation is authorized to initiate and support specific scientific activities in connection with matters relating to international cooperation, national security, and the effects of scientific applications upon society by making contracts or other arrangements (including grants, loans, and other forms of assistance) for the conduct of such activities. When initiated or supported pursuant to requests made by any other Federal department or agency, including the Office of Technology Assessment, such activities shall be financed whenever feasible from funds transferred to the Foundation by the requesting official as provided in section 14(g), and any such activities shall be unclassified and shall be identified by the Foundation as being undertaken at the request of the appropriate official."

ANNUAL REPORT

Sec. 11. The Office shall submit to the Congress an annual report which shall include, but not be limited to, an evaluation of technology assessment techniques and identification, insofar as may be feasible, of technological areas and programs requiring future analysis. Such report shall be submitted not later than March 15 of each year.

APPROPRIATIONS

Sec. 12. (a) To enable the Office to carry out its powers and duties, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Office, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, not to exceed \$5,000,000 in the aggregate for the two fiscal years ending June 30, 1973, and June 30, 1974, and thereafter such sums as may be necessary.

(b) Appropriations made pursuant to the authority provided in subsection (a) shall remain available for obligation, for expenditure, or for obligation and expenditure for such period or periods as may be specified in the Act making such appropriations.

And the Senate agree to the same.

HOWARD W. CANNON,

ROBERT C. BYRD,

Managers on the Part of the Senate.

GEORGE P. MILLER,

JOHN W. DAVIS,

EARLE CABELL,

CHARLES A. MOSHER,

MARVIN L. ESCH,

Managers on the Part of the House.

Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, let me state in summary that, with respect to the conference report there were a few minor and technical changes. The conferees voted unanimously to report H.R. 10243 essentially in the form as passed by the Senate.

The minor and technical changes include:

First, clarification of the language in section 4, "Technology Assessment Board," the purpose of which is to limit the delegation of subpoena power to Members of the House of Representa-

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tives and the Senate, and thus to exclude delegation to the Director of the Office who is a nonvoting member of the board;

Second, adding a subsection to section 7, "Establishment of the Technology Assessment Advisory Council," providing for more flexible use of the advisory council by the board; and

Third, striking section 13, "Effective Date," in its entirety. Since it is anticipated that the passage of H.R. 10243 will occur near the end of the 92d Congress, this change provides for flexibility of timing in the appointment of members to the board by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate as provided for in section 4 of the act.

I ask unanimous consent that the report not be printed as a Senate report.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The question is on agreeing to the conference report.

The report was agreed to.

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1972

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 16029) to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending question is the amendment of the Senator from Arkansas.

The question is on agreeing to the amendment (putting the question).

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may make a statement at this point for 1 minute.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I voted "nay" on this amendment, and I would like to make the point that the voice vote does not necessarily express the will of the full Senate. We will have an opportunity to vote on the same issue and others associated with it under the unanimous-consent agreement on next Tuesday. Because of the fact that the quorum call reveals a limited number of Senators present, I would rather have this matter disposed of finally by the full Senate in accordance with the unanimous-consent agreement. Therefore, I did agree to allow the amendment to come up on a voice vote rather than on a record vote at this time; but I do want to stress the fact that I am opposed to it on the merits.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. What is the will of the Senate?

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator withhold that request?

Mr. SCOTT. I withdraw it.

ANNOUNCEMENTS OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY QUESTIONS RELATED TO SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, under the provisions of Senate Resolution 299, August 15, 1972, the joint Senate leader-

ship announces the following appointments to the select committee to study questions related to secret and confidential Government documents: Senator MANSFIELD, chairman, Senators PASTORE, HUGHES, CRANSTON, GRAVEL; Senator SCOTT, cochairman, Senators JAVITS, HATFIELD, GURNEY, and COOK.

CONSUMER PROTECTION ORGANIZATION ACT OF 1972

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending business be temporarily laid aside, and that the Senate return to the consideration of Calendar No. 1049, S. 3970, a bill to establish a council of consumer advisers.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be stated by title.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (S. 3970) to establish a Council of Consumer Advisers in the Executive Office of the President, to establish an independent Consumer Protection Agency, and to authorize a program of grants, in order to protect and serve the interests of consumers and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senate will proceed to its consideration.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I am very pleased to rise in support of S. 3970, the Consumer Protection Organization Act of 1972. This is a good bill, a sound bill, one which would establish a council of consumer advisers in the Executive Office of the President, establish an independent consumer protection agency, and authorize a program of consumer protection grants in order to protect and preserve the interests of consumers. Similar legislation was considered and passed by the 91st Congress, and I was particularly sad to see it passed over by the House when we adjourned at that time.

There are three main thrusts to the legislation, and I support each of these objectives. The council of consumer advisers would assist in developing the President's consumer policies and would coordinate Federal consumer protection programs. The consumer protection agency would serve as an advocate of the consumer's interest before Federal agencies and the courts. And third, the legislation provides for a revenue program to strengthen the efforts of State and local governments so that better consumer protection services are provided to the American people.

Some may argue that other committees should have jurisdiction over the Consumer Protection Act of 1972. Let us face it: Other than the Committee on Government Operations, only the Senate Committee on Commerce has any reasonable claim to possible jurisdiction over this legislation, and as chairman of the committee I have requested that the legislation not be referred to Commerce. It was referred to us in the 91st Congress. We made our contributions. Those contributions are reflected in the bill now before us.

S. 3970 is a fine bill. It does need some amending language, and the distin-

guished chairman of the Consumer Subcommittee, Senator Moss, will join with me in offering a number of amendments to improve S. 3970. But that is where it stops. We do not need to have this bill referred to any committee for an unholy burial.

I would offer my congratulations for the fine work that has been done on this bill, particularly the work of Senators RUBINOFF, PERCY, and JAVITS. This is truly a bipartisan effort, one which has been endorsed by both the Democratic and Republican Party platforms, and one which has been a long time in coming. It is a fair piece of legislation; it is a balanced piece of legislation; let us get on with passing the legislation and establishing an organized consumer protection structure in the Federal Government.

QUORUM CALL

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1972

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill (H.R. 16029) to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and for other purposes.

WE SHOULD HOLD THE LINE ON MILITARY AID

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, the Nixon administration plans to disburse about \$9.5 billion worth of military weapons to foreign governments during this fiscal year. The \$9.5 billion is hidden in the Federal budget in 17 different places, administered by several different Federal agencies and financed by various appropriation acts.

It must be emphasized that the bill we are considering today, on which important votes will be taken on Tuesday, represents only a part of the total program, and the smaller part at that. When one totals up the whole military package which the Nixon administration proposes to deliver to foreign governments this year, it amounts to nearly \$50 for each man, woman, and child in the United States. Two-thirds of it will be paid for, directly or indirectly, by the American taxpayer, either through outright grants or through subsidized sales to foreign governments.

In view of the immensity of this military assistance program, I hope that the Senate will support the recommendation of the Committee on Foreign Relations to hold the line against further increases this year. In reporting the bill, the committee has taken such a position, and has refused to add the additional \$700 million requested by the administration.

Mr. President, Senators should look at the rapid expansion of this program over the past few years before casting

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their votes for or against the amendments that are going to be offered to increase the amounts in the committee bill. I, myself, have watched the program very carefully through the years, and yet I am startled at how rapidly it has expanded.

For example, Defense Department cash and credit sales, often at a scaled-down price, have increased from \$892 million in 1966 to an estimated \$2.8 billion in 1972. The transfer of excess defense articles has gone from \$85 million in 1956 to a projected \$245 million for 1973. U.S. military assistance presently extends to 64 foreign governments. Some 50,074 U.S. military personnel are employed administering these programs, 27,000 of them overseas.

This program, Mr. President, is another example of Federal spending run amuck. With a Federal deficit of \$25 billion or more projected for this year, how can we afford to enlarge this giveaway program still further by adopting the increases President Nixon asks?

As matters now stand, every dollar we spend on this program must be borrowed and added to our spiraling national debt.

In this connection, Mr. President, a highly readable synopsis of the military assistance program, in all its different guises, has been presented to us by the Center for Defense Information. It comes in the form of a pamphlet entitled "The Defense Monitor," dated September 8, 1972. I perused it with great interest, and I certainly recommend it to other Members of the Senate. In fact, I think that it is such a valuable summary of the size and scope of the military assistance program for 1973, that I ask unanimous consent that the publishable portions of the pamphlet be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the pamphlet was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Defense Monitor, Sept. 8, 1972]

MILITARY ASSISTANCE: ARSENAL FOR DEMOCRACY?

DEFENSE MONITOR IN BRIEF

This year the U.S. will provide over \$9.5 billion in military assistance to foreign countries.

Prior to 1946 the U.S. gave no military assistance to any foreign nation in peacetime.

Military assistance is supplied in a variety of forms, some of which the public is unaware and the Congress does not debate.

Certain major military assistance programs bypass Congress and do not appear in Administration budgets.

Part of the Food for Peace Program is used to provide funds for weapons.

Military assistance is designed to promote world peace and strengthen the security of the U.S.

Frequently it does neither. U.S. aid sometimes facilitates military conflict and weakens America's security by over-involvement.

The U.S. supplies well over half of all armaments to the nations of the world that are not allied with the USSR.

U.S. military assistance will go to 64 nations in 1973.

Twenty-five of these nations are governed by the military or permit no open opposition to the government.

Many of these nations contain forces striving for change that may be suppressed with American arms.

The United States will provide about \$9.5 billion in various forms of foreign military aid during fiscal year 1973.

This \$9.5 billion figure appears nowhere in the Federal Budget, but is the total of 17 separate programs administered by several agencies and financed by various appropriations acts. Two billion of this military assistance appears in the Foreign Assistance bill, and another \$3 billion is in the Defense Budget. Over \$4 billion of it does not require Congressional authorization and therefore is relatively unknown to the public.

The 17 Military Assistance programs and amounts projected for 1973 appear in Table I. (See page 2) They can be divided into four categories:

Category I includes all the assistance funded by a direct appropriation by the Congress. Category II are funds earned in the Defense Department budget earmarked for the support of countries in Southeast Asia. Funding for Southeast Asia was taken out of the foreign assistance appropriation in 1965 on grounds that it was an integral part of the Vietnam war. Category III involves no budget appropriation and includes cash sales and transfers of military equipment by the Pentagon. The Pentagon runs these programs with little oversight by Congress or by any other Executive Agency, including the State Department. Category IV involves use of money from the Food for Peace program (PL 480). Under the Food for Peace Law, some agricultural commodities are given to foreign countries with no payment. Money that would have been paid the U.S. can be used by recipient countries for purchase of military weapons.

MILITARY AID IS GOING UP

The billions projected for 1973 are nearly three times those listed for military assistance programs in 1965. Major trends are:

Category I—Direct Military Assistance Appropriated:

Grant military aid under the Foreign Assistance program doubled from \$400 million in 1969 to \$803 million for 1973.

The grant military aid program planned for 1973 includes a five-fold increase in delivery of air defense missiles to foreign countries over 1972—from \$5 million to \$26 million.

Aircraft deliveries under the grant aid program are scheduled to double between 1972 and 1973—from \$65 million to \$121 million. Most aircraft are helicopters and fighters and are for Southeast Asia.

Category II—Military Assistance in Defense Appropriation:

Military assistance to Southeast Asia funded by the military services has increased from \$34 million in 1965 to \$2.5 billion projected for 1973. This will continue to increase as U.S. troops leave Vietnam.

Category III—No Budget Appropriation Required:

Defense Department cash and credit sales deliveries have increased from \$892 million in 1966 to an estimated \$2.8 billion in 1972. Sales are often at bargain prices.

Commercial military sales have increased from \$274 million in 1965 to a projected \$723 million for 1973. Transfer of excess defense articles has gone from \$85 million in 1965 to a projected \$245 million for 1973.

On a regional basis, the most rapid increases in overall military assistance since 1965 have been in East Asia, due to the Vietnam war.

Defense Secretary Laird, in testifying recently in Congress for assistance said:

"If we are going to reduce the burdens on the United States for free world defense while maintaining our treaty commitments in a period of increasing threats, it can only come from a willingness to support a strong security assistance program."

Mr. Laird does not describe what "increasing threats" exist and/or where they must be met.

TABLE I.—Various categories of military assistance, fiscal year 1973

I. Direct Military Assistance (Foreign Assistance Act):		Appropriated
Military assistance program (grant aid)-----	\$803,000,000	
Foreign military credit sales-----	629,000,000	
Security supporting assistance-----	875,000,000	
Public safety-----	7,000,000	
Subtotal-----	2,314,000,000	
II. Military Assistance in Defense Appropriation: ¹		
Military assistance service funded-----	2,500,000,000	
Military assistance advisory groups, military groups, pay and allowances-----	272,000,000	
International military headquarters-----	74,000,000	
NATO infrastructure (military construction)-----	48,000,000	
Purchase of local currency, above market rates-----	92,000,000	
Subtotal-----	2,986,000,000	
III. No Budget Appropriation Required:		
Excess Defense Articles ² ---	254,000,000	
Ship Loans ² -----	40,000,000	
Transfer of Defense Stocks---	106,000,000	
Real Property Transfers---	486,000,000	
Export-Import Bank Military Loans-----	360,000,000	
Foreign Military Cash Sales (DOD)-----	2,200,000,000	
Commercial Military Sales---	723,000,000	
Subtotal-----	4,160,000,000	
IV. Agriculture Appropriation: Public Law 480, Part of the Food for Peace Program-----		124,000,000
Total military assistance in 1973-----	9,584,000,000	

¹ Does not include an additional \$2.8 million to Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA): \$1.8 million for Project Agile, a counterinsurgency program directed abroad, and \$1 million for border surveillance in Korea.

² One third acquisition value.

Sources: Recent Congressional Publications on Foreign and Military Assistance and Defense Appropriations; the FY 1973 Budget.

MILITARY AID IN PERSPECTIVE

U.S. military assistance presently goes to 64 countries.

Some 50,074 U.S. military personnel are employed administering these programs, 27,000 of them abroad.

In contrast to the \$9.5 billion U.S. military assistance for 1973, U.S. economic and humanitarian aid will be \$3.7 billion.

According to Defense Department figures, which do not include all forms of military assistance, the U.S. during 1950-1970 provided approximately 70 percent of all armaments supplied to neutral nations and those allied to the U.S.

NO COORDINATED POLICY

In Congress, those military aid programs which come under the Foreign Assistance Act are reviewed by the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees. Those coming under Defense Department appropriations are handled by the Armed Services Committees. Within the executive branch, the Defense Department administers most military aid programs, but the Agency for International Development handles supporting assistance and the State Department

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handles export licenses for commercial sale of weapons abroad.

In an attempt to coordinate military assistance programs, a new position of Under-Secretary of State for Coordinating Security Assistance Programs, has been created. However, comprehensive military assistance budgets have not been developed or made available to Congress or the public. The Defense Department did provide Congress this year with listings that accounted for \$5.9 billion of the planned military assistance. The listings omitted certain programs—notably sales—that would bring the total to over \$9.5 billion.

PURPOSES OF MILITARY AID

After World War II the United States gave military aid to Europe and sent military forces there to contain "Soviet Expansion." This containment policy was extended world-wide, and by the mid-1960's the United States had military commitments and/or aid programs with 86 foreign countries.

Today "containment" is no longer the guiding doctrine of American foreign policy, yet much military effort continues to follow the old guidelines. The U.S. retains 192 major and 1,221 minor military facilities overseas. We still station more than 566,000 military personnel in foreign countries, over half of them in Europe. There is a need to bring military policy into line with the new goals of foreign policy expressed by the President. There is a need to reassess our overall military assistance program and the stationing of large numbers of U.S. troops in foreign lands. Certainly, there is a need to reconstruct our military aid programs.

U.S. aid is to "strengthen the security of the United States" but involvement in many places runs directly counter to longrun American interests, such as reduction of world tensions and balance of payments deficits. U.S. security is not improved by arming both India and Pakistan, Jordan and Israel, Honduras and El Salvador. Such involvements earn the enmity of both parties.

Details of the nature of much assistance are classified secret; \$508,640,000 goes to the Middle East—Israel, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

TABLE II.—TOP 10 RECIPIENTS¹

10 countries	1973 military assistance	1973 non-military aid
South Vietnam.....	\$2,959,900,000	\$131,266,000
Laos.....	438,300,000	4,999,000
Korea.....	428,600,000	173,294,000
Cambodia.....	326,525,000	30,018,000
Iran.....	207,225,000	2,344,000
Turkey.....	153,303,000	71,014,000
Taiwan.....	113,374,000	
Thailand.....	99,686,000	20,370,000
Greece.....	97,974,000	
Australia.....	90,000,000	
Secret.....	530,895,000	
Total, this listing.....	5,445,789,000	433,305,000

¹ Military assistance for all categories in 1973, but exclusive of cash sales, property transfers, NATO infrastructure and international headquarters, comes to \$5,887,496,000. 80 percent goes to 10 countries.

The U.S. provides military assistance to 25 countries governed by the military or with no open political opposition. They are:

China (Taiwan), South Vietnam, Indonesia, Cambodia, Thailand, Greece, Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Portugal, Ghana, Libya, Nigeria, Zaire, Ethiopia, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru.

CONCLUSIONS

The secrecy surrounding much of our military assistance programs limits informed reasoning by the public and the Congress. The \$9.5 billion for Military Assistance in 1973 is egregiously high.

The seventeen different programs are not coordinated to provide a comprehensive picture that can be related to foreign policy objectives.

U.S. military aid programs are in need of revision because the use that many countries make of this assistance is sometimes inimical to world order and U.S. interests.

U.S. Military Assistance to 25 countries with military and dictatorial governments perpetuates these governments and may encourage the formation of other like governments.

The outflow of U.S. arms and military equipment to 64 foreign countries in 1973 sets a poor example to the rest of the world.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. CHURCH. Yes. I am happy to yield.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Will the Senator indicate again the total amount of foreign assistance being sought by the administration?

Mr. CHURCH. Yes.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. I believe he compared that with the total amount that was sought a year ago.

Mr. CHURCH. Yes. There are two figures I would call to the Senator's attention. The grand total of weapons to be disbursed, including all categories—that is, outright grants, subsidized sales, cash and commercial sales—comes to \$9,584,000,000 for fiscal 1973.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. That is a budget request?

Mr. CHURCH. The figures are drawn from the budget requests.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Yes.

Mr. CHURCH. As the Senator knows, part of this is funded through the Defense Department appropriation, part through the food-for-peace program, and part through other facets of the budget. Only \$2.314 billion is covered by the direct military assistance program authorized by the pending bill. But the bill, as reported by the Committee on Foreign Relations, is \$700 million below the administration's request.

The committee is trying to hold the line by keeping the level of spending at least year's figure, and thus avoid the additional \$700 million requested by the administration this year.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. I certainly support the committee's position. To get back to the \$9.5 billion budget request for fiscal 1973, does the Senator have the figures to indicate how that compares with the total appropriations for military assistance for fiscal 1972?

Mr. CHURCH. It would be larger than 1972, according to my information. The exact figure I do not have presently available. However, I would like to stress that out of the grand total of \$9.584 billion projected for fiscal year 1973, approximately two-thirds entails a cost to the Federal Government, either in the form of military grants or subsidized sales, which, as the Senator knows, actually represent a definite burden on the Federal Treasury, inasmuch as the interest charged the recipient country is less than the cost of the money to the United States.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Does the \$9.5 billion include economic assistance, or is that separate from the \$9.5 billion?

Mr. CHURCH. Economic assistance is separate from the \$9.5 billion total military figure. The comparison is as follows: The total amount of U.S. economic and humanitarian aid, as requested by the administration for fiscal year 1973, comes to \$3.7 billion; so that our military package is approximately three times as large as our economic package.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. To put it another way, in order to ascertain just how much the foreign assistance program is in both its military aspect and its economic aid aspect—the total then is roughly \$13 billion, which is being proposed for fiscal year 1973—to the \$9.58 billion would be added the \$3.7 billion, which would be roughly \$13.2 billion for the total bill for economic aid being financed by the taxpayers.

Mr. CHURCH. The grand total, by adding the economic and the military together, would come to approximately \$13 billion; but I would point out that part of the military package, contained in the overall figures, includes military cash sales and commercial sales, which are not borne by the taxpayers. So the more accurate figure would be in the neighborhood of \$10 to \$11 billion, that part involving taxpayer outlays.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. I thank the Senator.

Mr. CHURCH. It is a very large figure, indeed.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. FANNIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. WILLIAMS). Without objection, it is so ordered.

VILLAGE SITE FOR PAYSON BAND OF YAVAPAI-APACHE INDIANS CONFERENCE REPORT

Mr. FANNIN. Mr. President, I submit a report of the committee of conference on H.R. 3337, and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. WILLIAMS). The report will be stated by title.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 3337) to authorize the acquisition of a village site for the Payson Band of Yavapai-Apache Indians, and for other purposes, having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses this report, signed by a majority of the conferees.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the consideration of the conference report?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the report, which reads as follows:

CONFERENCE REPORT

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 3337) to authorize the acquisition of a vil-